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Abstract
The interpretation o f noun-noun compounds is complex, yet compounds such as 'web surfer' 
and 'beef baron' are generated and interpreted easily by native English speakers. Concept 
combination is the core process in the generation and interpretation o f  noun-noun compounds. 
Such compounds may be read literally or metaphorically suggesting that the combination 
process is capable o f both literal and metaphoric interpretations.
The motivation for this thesis is to tackle three problems which occur in concept combination. 
These problems are: (1) compounds are often polysemous, (2) compounds often appear to be 
understood by evoking a context (or world knowledge) and (3) compounds can be interpreted 
figuratively. We suggest that adopting structural alignment allows us to deal with each o f  
these problems.
Structural alignment is a process whereby conceptual structures are placed into 
correspondence and similarities are found. The structural alignment model proposed in this 
thesis suggests that there are six core combination types and that an interpretation o f a noun- 
noun compound will fall into one o f these combination types. Some o f these combination 
types are figurative and some rely on finding a context.
We provide an implementation o f the model, the fNCA system. The INCA system is a 
program where a user can find interpretations for noun-noun compounds. INCA has a 
knowledge base and attempts to find fixed patterns in a network representation o f concepts. 
Depending on the type o f pattern found, several types o f interpretation can be generated.
The performance o f  INCA is compared with that o f a number o f  human subjects in a brief 
evaluation study. The study shows that combination types proposed by our structural 
alignment model to offer a good coverage o f the interpretations that people generate. Finally 
we set out proposals for developing INCA further and outline directions for future research.
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Chapter 1 - Understanding Noun-Noun Compounds
1.1 Introduction
New words enter our language everyday. Sometimes these words exist within a certain 
context for the briefest amount o f time, sometimes these words enter the common parlance 
and last for centuries. So what, if people generate new words? To ask this question is to 
ignore the subtle beauty of human thought. Somehow people can create new words and 
somehow other people can readily understand them. The juxtaposition of existing words in 
new combinations can create a novel unit termed a compound. These compounds are different 
from other grammatical combinations of words in that, to a first approximation, they can be 
manipulated and reused as a single unit. This is how combinations such as 'arms race' and 
'web surfer' have entered our language. The search for how people combine words to make 
novel combinations and how these are interpreted is the motivation for the work that follows
This chapter will introduce the object o f study in this thesis: the nominal compound and its 
interpretation in terms o f concept combination and structural alignment. The interpretation of 
compounds can be complex, and a number of theories have been proposed. From these, two 
major problems can be drawn: ( 1) polysemy -  the notion that compounds can have more than 
one interpretation; and (2) world knowledge -  the background of facts and expectations that 
serve as a foundation for situated thinking in the real world. In this thesis we consider a 
further problem, that o f figurative or metaphoric interpretations, which stretch the boundaries 
of conventional word meaning. The problem of literal combination is already so challenging 
that current theories of concept combination generally do not account for figurative 
interpretations. However, we argue that figurality underlies the whole enterprise of concept 
combination, and consequently the model developed in this thesis will primarily deal with this 
problem. A research methodology that borrows from Cognitive Psychology and Artificial 
Intelligence is proposed. This borrowing is used as it accounts for metaphor and analogy, 
exemplars of figurative language. Using the same mechanism that accounts for metaphor we 
will offer an account of concept combination that deals with both literal and figurative 
combinations.
1.2 Research Methodology
Combinations such as 'arms race' and 'web surfer' are made up of two different words but 
appear to form a linguistic construct that, to a first approximation, functions like a single 
word. They often refer to a single concept or entity. Linguistically such constructs are known 
as compounds (O'Grady, Dobrovolsky & Aronoff, 1993). There are various ways in which 
such combinations can be studied.
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1.2.1 Analysing Combinations
The way in which combinations like 'arms race' and 'web surfer' are formed and interpreted 
falls under the broader study of language. The study o f language is of interest to various 
academic disciplines, including, but not limited to, Psychology, Philosophy, Computer 
Science and Linguistics (Aitchison, 1997). However, in each of these academic disciplines 
only certain aspects of language are investigated, and the very same linguistic phenomena can 
be viewed in different ways in different disciplines.
One sub-area of Psychology, called Psycholinguistics, looks specifically at language. It has 
been defined as "... the study o f  language behaviour: how rea l (rather than ideal) peop le  
learn an d  use language to com m unicate ideas"  (Taylor & Taylor, 1990, p3). One of its 
primary topics is language acquisition, the study o f how children acquire language. 
Constructions such as the combination 'web surfer' can be analysed in terms of when and how 
children begin to learn combinations.
Another area of Psychology that researches language is Cognitive Psychology. Cognitive 
Psychology is interested in the higher thought processes, e.g. memory, attention and language 
(Eysenck & Keane, 1995). In looking at combinations, a cognitive psychologist may be 
interested in how mental representations of the component word meanings interact to give 
meaning to the combination as a whole.
One of the major areas of philosophical investigation is philosophy of language (e.g. see 
Lycan, 1999). This area is largely concerned with theories of word meaning as reference, and 
attempts to account for the relationship between words and the world. For example, the 
combination 'arms race' can be analysed in terms of its referents, and whether these referents 
have an actual counterpart in the real world.
The analysis of combinations in Computer Science often concerns their use in information 
retrieval research. Hoenkamp and de Groot (2000) argue that combinations are of more use in 
content description than single words, since they can carry more information than single 
words on their own. They also argue that a combination such as 'horse race' is a better 
description (or key phrase) to retrieve a text about horse racing than either o f the component 
words on their own.
Unsurprisingly, the broadest approach to the study of language is that taken by Linguistics. 
Linguistic research on language is done with respect to different levels of analysis, including
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phonology, morphology, syntax, semantics and pragmatics (Saeed, 1995; Aitchison, 1992). 
Each of these levels comprises an area of sophisticated research in its own right and some are 
briefly outlined below.
Phonetics and phonology is the branch o f linguistics concerned with sounds and sound 
systems in language (Aitchison, 1992). A combination like 'web surfer' can be analysed in 
terms of the number of sounds or phones from which it is constituted. A further area of 
interest may be in analysing the stress pattern that occurs when a combination like 'web 
surfer' is uttered.
In contrast, morphology is the study of word formation and the analysis of words into 
morphemes (Brown, 1980). Morphemes are the smallest, distinct, meaningful units that a 
word can be broken into (O'Grady et al., 1993). A combination like 'arms race' would be 
analysed as consisting of three morphemes: (1) arm, (2) -s, (3) race. The second morpheme in 
this case indicates a plural.
Syntax is the study o f how words are structurally combined to create well-formed patterns 
such as phrases and sentences (Givon, 1979). From a syntactic perspective several questions 
can be asked of a combination like 'arms race'. What does a combination consist of? How 
does it fit into a sentence? Does it act like a noun? Note that a sentence can be well-formed in 
syntactic terms because it conforms to the various word-order constraints imposed by the 
language, yet be almost nonsensical, e.g. "colorless green ideas sleep furiously".
Semantics is concerned with analysing meaning in language (Saeed, 1995). A theory of 
semantics should describe how the meaning of a composite structure, like a phrase or 
sentence or a compound, is derivable from its the constituent parts. Clearly then, it is this 
aspect of word use in relation to compounds that forms the primary concern of this thesis.
Semantics, however, does not provide a complete picture of word meaning and how it 
contributes to the meaning of compounds. This is because we can distinguish between word 
meaning and world meaning. The former concerns the properties of word meanings as they 
relate to a linguistic theory of sentence meaning, while the latter concerns the meanings of 
words as they relate to the plausibility of actions and beliefs in the real world. A combination 
can be semantically well-formed if  it leads to an interpretation that is congruent with the 
properties of the words involved. However, the interpretation may be highly implausible in 
the context of the real world. For example, a 'stone lion' is generally interpreted as »  a statue 
o f a lion «  and not as »  a lion made of stone « .
3
In short, in studying language, the choice o f a research methodology is of critical importance. 
Each academic discipline involved in the study of language employs differing research 
methodologies. As a result, a single aspect of language can be examined in quite different 
ways, and the research methodology adopted will affect the manner in which the aspect of 
language under discussion is treated. The interpretation of nominal compounds falls within 
the general remit of semantics since word meaning is involved, so a general research 
methodology that allows the researcher to consider aspects o f semantics is required. However, 
to allow our model to appeal to the idea of plausibility in the real world, we shall need to look 
beyond semantics and invoke other areas that study meaning, e.g. Psychology, Cognitive 
Psychology. Ideally, we need a research methodology that draws insights from several of the 
academic research disciplines outlined above.
1.2.2 A Cognitive Science Based Research Methodology
The research methodology adopted in the present dissertation falls within the area of 
Cognitive Science. Cognitive Science is an interdisciplinary approach to the study o f mind 
and intelligence that embraces Philosophy, Psychology, Artificial Intelligence (AI), 
Neuroscience, Linguistics, and Anthropology (Gardner 1985). The inclusion of AI as a main 
branch marks Cognitive Science as a relatively new area of research as its date of origin has 
been set as 1954 (Gardner, 1985).
Table 1.1- Main branches of Cognitive Science
Main Branches of Cognitive Science
Psychology 
Artificial Intelligence 
Linguistics 
Philosophy 
Neuroscience 
Anthropology
Table 1.1 shows the main branches o f Cognitive Science. Typically a researcher will work 
predominantly in one particular branch but draw information from other branches. For 
example, a researcher interested in problem solving in AI might take interest in how subjects
4
solve problems and attempt to model this. The researcher would use a research methodology 
largely based on AI but would also draw on insights from Cognitive Psychology.
The methodology adopted in this dissertation is largely based on work from: (1) Cognitive 
Psychology, a sub area of Psychology, and (2) AI, a subarea of Computer Science. In terms of 
Cognitive Psychology, the area of concept combination (which is outlined in detail in Chapter 
3) is applied to the problem of interpreting nominal compounds. Research in this area makes 
assumptions about knowledge and how it is represented in the mind. Cognitive Psychology 
proposes that there are basic constituents to thought; these constituents include such things as 
images, concepts, categories, schema and scripts (e.g. see Eysenck & Keane, 1995).
The AI elements of our research methodology involve the application of structural alignment 
to the problem of interpreting combinations. Structural alignment is a computational theory 
that has been implemented in various forms (e.g. Falkenhainer, Forbus & Gentner, 1989; 
Veale, 1995). This theory assumes that the representation of meaning is inherently structural, 
so that structure itself imparts meaning on the elements it connects together. If  structure is the 
essence o f meaning, it follows that structural operations are the essence of meaning 
manipulation and the means through which new meanings are constructed. The theory of 
structural alignment (or structure mapping) claims that the most useful operation one can 
perform on structured meanings is alignment, in which correspondences are derived between 
the elements of two meaning structures. Structural alignment is examined in more detail in 
Chapter 4.
The goal of this thesis is to demonstrate the centrality of structural alignment to the process of 
concept combination, and to construct a model of concept combination for the interpretation 
of nominal compounds around this theory (Chapter 5). The computational foundations of 
structural alignment lead to a computational implementation of this model (Chapter 6).
Cognitive Science allows us to view a problem from various academic disciplines, but this 
multiplicity has advantages and disadvantages. The drawback is that different researchers 
may use the same technical terms but hold them to mean different things. As a foundation for
the work to follow, it is necessary to be explicit about the terminology used in this thesis, 
especially terminology related to meaning.
1.3 Accounting For Meaning
The object of study o f this dissertation is the interpretation of nominal compounds. It is not 
easy to define meaning, and this dissertation does not attempt to offer a definitive answer to
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what "meaning" is. A number of assumptions about word meaning are made throughout this 
dissertation, however. We first distinguish between different types o f meaning.
1.3.1 Sense Versus Reference
Word meaning involves both sense and reference; this distinction was first made by Frege 
(1984/1892). Sense concerns the logical description of the meaning and the inferences, 
assumptions, expectations it leads a subject to make. For instance, the sense of the word 
unicorn is the logical description of a horse with a horn on its head, and what that entails 
(mythical, magical, rare, etc.) The reference aspect of meaning concerns how a word is used 
to refer to the real world. For instance, the referent of man can be the set o f men in the world. 
Not all word meanings have both sense and reference: a unicorn has a sense but no reference 
in this world. Indeed different words can have the same referent and different senses (Frege 
1984/1892), e.g. the morning star and evening star, where the former refers to the last star to 
disappear in the morning and the latter is the first star to appear in the sky. Both refer to the 
same object in the sky, the planet Venus.
1.3.2 Extension Versus Intension
Extension and intension are more mathematical (set-theoretic) notions, but have been applied 
to meaning. Above we suggested that man refers to the set of men in the world, this is the 
extension of the word, man. In general the extension of a simple property is the class or set of 
individuals it refers to. In contrast, intension concerns the logical properties of meaning 
independent o f the entities that actually instantiate that meaning. For example, "the intension 
o f  m am m a l..is  a definition, such as 'w arm -blooded animal, vertebrate, having hair...' " 
(Sowa, 1984, p 11) without reference to particular individual mammals. The extension of 
mammal, however, is the set o f all mammals.
1.3.3 Concept Versus Category
The dichotomy between intension and extension exists for concepts and categories. Concepts 
are the meaning units from which complex meanings are constructed. Categories are used for 
categorisation, where instances o f a concept (members of the category) are recognised and 
classified (hence the term categorisation). So to deal with concepts is to take an intensional 
perspective on meaning. In contrast, to deal with categories is take an extensional perspective 
on meaning.
Concepts and categories are structured differently. A concept is structured from attributes, 
features and properties, and it guides how' we think and reason, e.g. how we expect instances 
of the concept to behave. For example, the concept BACHELOR contains all the expectations
I
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we have of being a bachelor -  being unmarried and never having been married, being male. 
Instances of the category BACHELOR will match these expectations to varying degrees, hence 
the members of the BACHELOR category will have differing levels of membership. This 
imposes a radial structure on categories, where the best examples of the category occupy the 
focal point or hub o f the category. The less typical examples inhabit the peripheral ground. 
For instance, a man who is unmarried but can get married is more a BACHELOR than a man 
who is, say, a priest. The structure of a category is thus defined by the structure of the 
corresponding concept.
Different theories of combination employ categories and concepts, depending on whether the 
intensional or extensional qualities of the theory are emphasised. To provide a common 
ground for evaluating these theories, we will sometimes use the terms concept and category 
interchangeably in this thesis. However, it should be clear from the context whether an 
intensional or extensional perspective is intended.
1.4 Compounds And Combinations
The main problem in defining compound, is that there are competing views as to what a 
compound may be. For example, in concept combination (Smith, Osherson, Rips & Keane, 
1988) the linguistic form adjective-noun, e.g. 'red apple' is considered a compound. In 
Linguistics this is seen as distinct from a compound and is known as a collocation or simply 
as an adjective noun sequence.
The theories of concept combination discussed in Chapter 3 take a very broad definition of 
what a compound is. Throughout this thesis the following definition for compounding is 
adopted:
Compounding "is the com bination o f  two or m ore fre e  m orphem es to fo rm  a new 
word", (O'Grady et al., 1993, p573).
This definition suggests that compounds can consist of all word types, e.g. adjectives, verbs 
and nouns. Compounding usually involves adjectives, nouns and verbs and no other word 
types (O'Grady et al., 1993). The definition above mirrors the one adopted in concept 
combination.
1.4.1 Noun-Noun Compounds
A nominal compound is a compound that is solely made up of nouns. It is made up of two or 
more elements. Only one type o f compound, of all the compounds the definition above 
allows, is generally researched in concept combination: the noun-noun compound. In concept
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combination research (e.g. Costello & Keane, 1997) the term noun-noun compound refers to a 
compound that is made up of exactly two nouns. Throughout this thesis we assume that the 
term noun-noun compound refers a compound consisting of exactly two nouns.
1.4.2 Nominal Compounds And Combinations
A distinction must be made between the term combination and the term nominal compound. 
Language can be viewed as consisting of a syntactic level and a semantic level. The syntactic 
element can be seen as the form of the language and the semantic element as the meaning 
associated with syntactic forms. In the present dissertation the term combination refers to the 
interpretation of a nominal compound. This interpretation operates at the semantic and 
conceptual levels. The nominal compound is the syntactic form of the combination, and care 
must be taken not to confuse both levels and create a fundamental category error.
Meaning
C o n c i
i
" p t  °  C c  
i i
"Combination"
r n c e p t
'i
N o i
Linguistic form
r y
u n  + N ( ) u n
"Nominal Compound"
Figure 1.1- Difference between nominal compound and combination
Figure 1.1 shows the distinction between the term combination and compound more clearly. 
The interaction at the semantic level is represented by the symbol, O while + indicates the 
process of syntactic composition (e.g. concatenation, insertion of a blank space or a hyphen in 
English). The goal of this thesis is to develop an account of semantic and conceptual 
composition, O, in terms of concept combination and structural alignment. Figure 1.1 is a 
simplistic representation as the same noun structure may give rise to distinct concepts, e.g. the 
noun bank. When presenting examples of combinations throughout this thesis we will largely 
assume that a noun points to a single concept. This concept would be akin to the most 
prevalent sense of a word.
1.5 Interpreting Nominal Compounds
The object of study in this dissertation is the interpretation of nominal compounds. Nominal 
compounds are linguistic structures made up of two or more nouns. The following are 
nominal compounds:
1. 'Prize fighter', 2. 'abortion clinic', 3. 'folk rock', 4. 'police academy', 5. 'air rage', 6. 
'laser therapy', 7. 'army hospital1...
Throughout this thesis, when interpretations of nominal compounds are given, these are 
intended to capture the meaning that most native speakers would give. These interpretations 
are approximations. This is in common with other areas in Cognitive Science, e.g. metaphor 
research, where when meanings (or readings) are given, these are presumed to be the most 
reasonable (e.g. Turner, 1997).
The first three nominal compounds listed above can be interpreted in order as follows:
1. »  A person who fights for money «
2. »  A clinic that performs abortions «
3. »  rock music which uses elements from folk music «
The three interpretations all involve integrating the meanings o f the constituent parts of the 
nominal compound in some way. In the first, an interpreter has to relate the concept PRIZE and 
the concept FIGHTER in some way. A 'prize fighter' is a type o f FIGHTER. In 'abortion clinic' 
the interpreter has to relate the concepts CLINIC and ABORTION. An 'abortion clinic' is a type of 
clinic where abortions are performed.
1.6 Problems In Interpreting Nominal Compounds
The interpretation o f nominal compounds has been examined in various ways. The area of 
concept combination, in particular, has pointed to a number o f problems in the interpretation 
of noun-noun compounds. The two main problems are:
1. Polysemy
2. World Knowledge
These problems are drawn from the work of Costello and Keane (1997) and Murphy (1988) 
respectively.
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1.6.1 Polysemy
Combinations can have more than one interpretation. The combination 'bed pencil' has been 
reported as having several meanings (Costello & Keane, 1997). The following interpretations 
are drawn from an experiment carried out by Costello and Keane (1997):
( 1) »  a pencil that you put beside your bed for writing some messages «
(2) »  a pencil used to draw patterns on bed-clothes «
(3) »  a bed made out of pencils «
(4) »  a pencil shaped like a bed «
(5) »  a thin bed «
(6) »  a big, flat pencil that is a bed for a doll «
(7) »  a pencil case «
The interpretations above are in no particular order, i.e. they are not ranked according to 
frequency or from best to worst. The range of interpretations becomes a major problem if  we 
wish to analyse the interpretation of combinations. Although some research has been carried 
out into this area (e.g. Costello & Keane, 1997; Keane & Costello, 1997) the focus of much 
concept combination research has been on single interpretations.
1.6.2 World Knowledge
The term world knowledge is used in this thesis to refer to information that appears to fall 
outside of a typical representation o f a concept. The importance o f world knowledge in 
concept combination was first pointed to by Murphy (1988). For example, consider the 
combination 'arms race'. A simple representation of the term race might point out that it is a 
competition based on speed. A competition will involve a number o f competitors, thus in 
'horse race' the competitors are the horses (and their jockeys).
'Arms race' seems more complex than 'horse race'. It is a race between countries to develop 
both the most arms and the most dangerous arms. This is a RACE where the competitors are 
countries. Yet a reasonable representation of RACE would not include this. The information on 
countries does not clearly belong to either ARMS or RACE. In some way, world knowledge is 
used in interpreting this combination. It may be that ARMS acts as a pointer to a broader 
context which is used to interpret the overall combination. It could be that COUNTRIES come in 
through ARMS, e.g. COUNTRIES own arm s. This problem is discussed further in Chapter 3.
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1.6.3 A New Problem: Figurative Interpretations
Lakoff and Johnson (1980) suggest that much o f everyday language involves figurative 
language. Nominal compounds occur frequently in everyday language. This suggests that in 
some cases compounds may have figurative interpretation. If this is the case, it poses a new 
problem for the interpretation of nominal compounds. Most of the current models of concept 
combination treat combinations as literal (Constraint Theory: Costello, 1996, Costello & 
Keane, 1998; Dual Process Theory: Wisniewski, 1997a, 1997b; Concept Specialisation: 
Murphy, 1988; Selective Modification: Smith e ta l., 1988)
Veale (1995) and Hayes & Veale (1999) point out that figurative combinations do exist. 
Consider the combination 'math clinic', which is typically used to describe a remedial course 
or centre for failing math students. Because a 'math clinic' is not literally a CLINIC in the 
established, medical sense, and the STUDENTS are not literally PATIENTS and the TEACHERS are 
not literally DOCTORS, this suggests that concept combination can give rise to figurative 
interpretations that stretch the conventional meanings of words and their implications. To date 
only one model attempts to give an account o f figurative interpretations, that of (Gagné, 
2001) which will be discussed further in Chapter 3.
Most theories of concept combination do not account for literal an d  figurative interpretations. 
This can be remedied by adding additional mechanisms to current theories. However, this 
causes further problems as it is not clear how one can draw a clear distinction between the 
literal and figurative. Consider the combination 'browser war' which refers to the conflict in 
the mid-1990s between Microsoft and Netscape. This combination seems to be figurative as a 
'browser war' is not literally a type of WAR. The combination 'guerrilla war' seems to be literal 
as a 'guerrilla war' does seem to be a type o f WAR. Now consider the combination 'gang war', a 
fight between street gangs. This seems to fall between the figurative and literal. On the one 
hand the 'gang war' is an armed conflict but it differs from WAR in terms of the actual conflict. 
There are likely to be sporadic shootings and killings but not large scale battles and it does not 
involve armies.
Needing to distinguish between the literal and the figurative places a large burden on any 
theory that does so. Presumably, as most of the main theories of concept combination treat the 
interpretations of compounds as being literal, these will need a mechanism that recognises 
deviation from literal language. The borderline between the literal and figurative is not clear- 
cut as the examples involving WAR should demonstrate.
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1.7 A New Approach
Previous research with regard to some forms of cognition, e.g. metaphor (Veale, 1995) and 
analogy (Gentner & Markman, 1997), has suggested that structural alignment may be the 
underlying process in the generation o f interpretations. Structural alignment or structure 
mapping is the process through which two conceptual structures are aligned and the 
constituent parts of both structures are compared. If  it is the case that structural alignment is 
the underlying process in some forms of cognition (such as metaphor and analogy), it may be 
useful to apply it to concept combinations, especially in relation to figurative interpretations.
The application of structural alignment to concept combination is not new. Dual Process 
theory (Wisniewski, 1997a, Wisniewski, 1997b) suggests that alignment is involved. This 
theory is outlined in detail in Chapter 3. It should be noted that Wisniewski applies staictural 
alignment to literal combinations and only to those where some property transfer is involved. 
What is new in our present research is the claim that literal and figurative interpretations of 
nominal compounds in terms of concept combination can be accounted for solely in terms of 
structural alignment. Such an account is given in Chapter 5.
1.7.1 Why Apply Structural Alignment To This Problem?
The most basic reason for attempting to apply structural alignment to concept combination is 
that it may be possible to account for both the literal and figurative interpretation of 
compounds in terms of a single process, i.e. there is no need for additional mechanisms. If 
concept combination involves a comparison between the component parts, then structural 
alignment would be a good model to apply given its pedigree in other areas. In Chapter 5, it 
will be shown that structural alignment can be used to account for figurative and literal 
combinations. Our view of structural alignment is set out in Chapter 4 and is based on the 
work of Veale (1995).
Furthermore, using this single mechanism we propose that world knowledge, polysemy as 
well as figurative combinations can be accounted for. An approach such as the one proposed 
is in contrast to other theories of concept combination which suggest that more than one 
process is involved, e.g. Concept Specialisation (Murphy, 1988). An advantage of our 
approach is that it conforms to Ockham's razor.1 The model proposed in Chapter 5 will have 
one underlying process, structural alignment. Compared to previous theories it has a greater 
explanatory power as it accounts for polysemy, world knowledge and figurative 
interpretations (see Chapter 3 for a more in-depth discussion of previous theories).
' "Pluralitas non est ponenda sine neccesitate": which loosely translates as "entities should not be multiplied unnecessarily".
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1.8 Chapter Summary
This chapter has introduced the topic that is the basis for study in this thesis: the nominal 
compound and its interpretation in terms o f concept combination and structural alignment. A 
research methodology that borrows from Cognitive Psychology and AI is adopted. Broadly 
speaking this is a Cognitive Science approach. Taking a Cognitive Science research 
methodology can involve conflicting definitions. The terms compound and combination were 
defined and the term concept was elaborated.
The interpretation of compounds in terms of concept combination is complex. A number of 
theories have been proposed. From these theories two major problems can be drawn: (1) 
polysemy and (2) world knowledge. In this present dissertation a further problem is 
considered, that of figurative interpretations. Current theories o f concept combination, except 
for Gagné (2001), do not account for figurative interpretations.
1.9 The Road Ahead
This chapter has touched on many of the chapters that follow in this thesis. In Chapter 2 we 
examine the basic properties o f nominal compounds. In Chapter 3 the major theories of 
concept combination are outlined. This is done in detail in relation to one example. The 
problems that arise in each theory are also discussed. Structural alignment is presented in 
detail in Chapter 4. Our view of structural alignment is based on the Sapper model of Veale 
(1995). Chapter 5 develops a new theory that deals with the three problems, polysemy, world 
knowledge and figurative interpretations, that this chapter has discussed. The theory 
introduces the new idea o f combination types. In Chapter 6 the design and implementation of 
a program, INCA (interpreting nominal compounds using alignment) is outlined. This 
program is the implementation of the theory presented in Chapter 5. In Chapter 7, INCA is 
evaluated in a study that compares the output of INCA against a group of human subjects 
interpreting the same combinations. In Chapter 8 a discussion is undertaken on all the topics 
presented in the thesis. A broader debate is also entered into how our model can integrate a 
number o f the current models.
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Chapter 2 - Basic Properties of Nominal Compounds
2.1 Introduction
This chapter examines nominal compounds. The basic properties of nominal compounds in 
English, duality and asymmetry, are set out. Then a corpus based study of nominal 
compounds in the Penn Treebank (Linguistic Data Consortium, CD-Rom, 1995 Release 2) is 
presented. This provides information on the frequency of compounds, the number of noun­
noun compounds consisting of exactly two nominals and those that consist of more than two. 
This study is used as motivation for examining noun-noun compounds, the entities most 
widely examined by researchers in concept combination. This chapter also serves as a basis
for the discussion o f the theories of concept combination in Chapter 3.
2 .2  Compounds in English
The properties o f compounds in English can be examined in a number of distinct ways. This 
section first examines the orthography of compounds in English. Compounds in English tend 
to take one o f three orthographic forms. The syntactic and semantic properties of compounds 
are then examined.
2.2.1 Orthography of Compounds
As was stated in Section 1.2 a compound can be made up of adjectives, nouns and verbs. The 
way compounds are written in English is not straightforward. There is no single way of 
writing them. Rather, there are three main ways in which they are written. They are either 
written as one word, written as two separated words or finally written together but separated 
by a hyphen. Table 2.1 shows some examples of this. The more accepted a compound 
becomes, the more likely it is to occur as two words written together, which gives the
impression that it is one word (O'Grady et al., 1993).
Table 2.1 - Typographical forms of compounds
One Word: girlguide 
Two words & a hyphen: girl-guide 
Two words: girl guide
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2.2.2 Basic Syntactic & Semantic Properties of Compounds
A compound can be broken into two parts: the head and the modifier. The modifier is usually 
the first element; the head is the second element. In a compound the first element is generally 
assumed to act by modifying the second in some way, hence the name modifier. In the 
compound 'house boat', house is the modifier and boat is the head. Semantically speaking, to a 
first approximation, the head often denotes the type of object referred to. 'house boat' is a type 
of boat but with some of the properties of a house, e.g. it provides shelter and is a place to 
live. The modifier appears to place constraints on the type of boat that 'house boat' can be. 
There are a plethora of interesting and challenging exceptions to this: to give but one, a 
'plastic dog' e.g. is not "a dog" but "plastic shaped like a dog".
There are also syntactic and morphological features that mark the second element in a noun­
noun compound as the head. The head is the point of inflection. In English a nominal head 
can be inflected to capture number (singular or plural) or the possessive case. The compound 
'assistant lecturer' has two elements, the head, lecturer and the modifier, assistant. Consider 
the case where utterances involve the possessive case. The first is acceptable in English, the 
second is not:
1. "It's the assistant lecturer's turn"
2. ? "It's the assistant's lecturer turn"1
In utterance (2) it appears that the noun-noun compound 'assistant lecturer' has been broken 
up such that "lecturer turn" is possessed in some way by "assistant" which makes the 
utterance difficult to interpret.
According to O'Grady et al. (1993) the two main properties of compounds are: (1) duality and 
(2) asymmetry.
(1) Duality
Compounds are always structured as pairs. These pairs themselves can be part of other 
compounds. The result of this duality is that a combination such as 'conservative party leader' 
is one compound but has two possible compounds as elements. Figure 2.1. demonstrates that 
there are two possible ways of representing the structure of 'conservative party leader'. One 
way is to view the head of 'conservative party leader' as leader with the modifier being the 
compound 'conservative party', 'conservative party' itself seems to consist of a head party and 
a modifier, conservative. The second way of analysing 'conservative party leader' is to view 
the compound 'party leader' as the head and conservative as the modifier. In this case the head
1 The symbol ? is placed before an utterance to mark it as an unacceptable construction.
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itself is a compound which consists of a modifier, party, and head, leader. All compounds 
consisting of more than two nominals exhibit this kind o f structural ambiguity.
conservative party leader
modifier head
conservative party leader
modifier head
conservative party
conservative party leader
modifier head
party leader
Figure 2 .1 - Duality in action
'conservative party leader' can be interpreted in at least two ways. One is that a 'conservative 
party leader' is » a  party leader who is conservative« . Another interpretation is that a 
'conservative party leader' is » a  leader o f the conservative p a r ty « . Figure 2.1 demonstrates 
that the two interpretations are reflected in the different parses for the compound.
Ultimately, to interpret compounds we need to model how a modifier affects a head. Of 
course, in larger compounds, such as 'conservative party leader' the process must be applied 
recursively to the modifier or to the head before being applied to the rest o f the compound.
(2) Asymmetry
A compound will in general either be nonsensical or gain a different meaning when reversed. 
For example, 'boathouse' and 'houseboat' have two very different meanings. Previously, it was 
stated that in a compound the head often marks out the type of object denoted by the 
compound as a whole. In these cases reversing a compound changes the head and thus the 
type o f object denoted. This results in two compounds that are orthographical reverses o f each 
other having different meanings. This is known as asymmetry. Certain combinations do not 
display the asymmetry property, e.g. 'servant girl', but these exceptions appear to be rare.
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2.3 A Corpus based Examination of Nominal Compounds
To gather empirical information on the frequency of nominal compounds, an English 
language corpus was examined. The Wall Street Journal section o f the Penn Treebank 
(Linguistic Data Consortium, CD-Rom, 1995 Release 2) was chosen as the focus of the 
study. The Penn Treebank (PT) is a corpus of annoted text marking out linguistic structures. It 
includes tagged and parsed data from the Department of Energy abstracts, IBM computer 
manuals and the Wall Street Journal.
One part of the PT provides tagged texts. The tagged section contains the entire contents of 
the Wall Street Journal from 1988. The PT has been automatically tagged and then checked 
and corrected manually by trained "taggers" under the supervision of professional linguists. 
The Wall Street Journal section (WSJ) consists of one directory named "wsj" which contains 
25 sub-directories. Each of these numbered subdirectories contains 100 text files. The length 
of these files is not uniform; in one directory the smallest file contains 17 words while the 
largest contains 1,857 words. The text files are tagged as in Figure 2.2.
[ Tora/NNP Panelli/NNP ] 
had/VBD 
[ a/DT ] 
perfectly/RB 
[ good/JJ reason/NN ] 
for/IN not/RB using/VBG
[ the/DT $/$ 300/CD rowing/NN machine/NN ]
Figure 2.2 Example of tagged corpus
The tag /NNP is used to refer to "Proper noun, singular" e.g. Tom, had is tagged /VBD to 
indicate that is a "Verb, past tense". Adverbs are marked with /RB. Other tags include: /IN for 
"Preposition/subordinate", /CD for "Cardinal number" and so on (the full set of tags is listed 
in Appendix A, Section 1). Note that simple phrases are generally placed on a separate line in
the text file.
Nouns are classified into four types: (1) /NN, (2) /NNPS, (3) /NNS and (4)/NNP. These types 
are outlined in Table 2.2. Nouns are classified as either (a) proper or (b) common or mass. 
This division of common and proper is then further subdivided into singular and plural.
17
Table 2.2 - Noun types
Tag Type of Noun Example
r m noun, common, singular or mass shed, thermostat, investment
/NNPS noun, proper, plural Americas, Amusements
/NNS noun, common, plural bodyguards, facets, coasts
/NNP noun, proper, singular Shannon, Meltex, Liverpool
As mentioned in Section 2.1.1, established noun-noun compounds are often represented 
orthographically with the constituent parts separated by a hyphen. This is also the case in the 
PT, where these established hyphenated compounds were tagged as single nouns. Table 2.3 
gives examples of these compounds. As Table 2.3 shows, the constituent elements in the 
compounds were not tagged, e.g. 'Pianist-comedian' is not tagged as "Pianist/NN- 
comedian/NN". Presumably, this marks a distinction between compounds that the original 
authors already considered to be a part o f the common parlance and those that were not. 
Compounds that are tagged as single nouns were analysed separately in Section 2.3. A rough 
count of these forms was undertaken.
Table 2 3  - Establish hyphenated compounds
Term Tag
Pianist-comedian Pianist-comedian/NN
Chinese-American Chinese-American/NNP
public-relations public-relations/NNS
T ele-Communications Tele-Communications/NNPS
2.3.1 Performing the Analysis
Initially a Java program and a shell script were written (see Appendix A, Section 2) to find 
nominal compounds in the tagged Wall Street Journal section of the Penn Treebank. The 
program works on a line-by-line basis. The structure of the text files in the WSJ ensures that 
compounds do not wrap-around onto the next line (as can be seen in Figure 2.2). The program 
identifies a noun as a string of characters that ends with one o f the following nominal tags: 
"\NN", "\NP", "YNNS", and "\NNP". When the program has identified a noun, it checks the 
noun's neighbour. If  the neighbour is also identified as a noun then both the initial noun and 
its neighbour are saved as a new string, which represents the compound. This procedure
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continues iteratively to see if further immediate neighbours are also nouns. If  more nouns are 
identified, they are appended to the saved compound string. So the string "lung cancer deaths" 
would be extracted as a compound with three elements. The (possible) sub-compounds of this 
particular compound, "lung cancer", and "cancer deaths", are not extracted separately. When 
the next neighbour is not a noun or the end of a line is reached the compound string is saved 
and the program continues searching for a new compound.
The program gathers all nominal compound tokens with information on the file from which 
they originate in the WSJ and stores these in a file. This file is also used to perform error 
checking. From this initial file an unsorted list of compound tokens is computed (by removing 
the information on the source files in the WSJ of the compounds). These compound tokens 
were then further broken up into three other lists. In total the software computes the four 
following lists:
1 . a list of all nominal compound tokens
2. a list of all nominal compound types
3. a list of all noun-noun compound tokens (consisting of exactly two nouns)
4. a list of noun-noun compound types
2.3.2 Error Checking
The analysis undertaken in this study is based on two assumptions:
1. that PT contains no errors.
2. that the program and script work correctly.
The first of these is difficult to check but it should be noted that the PT has been 
automatically tagged followed by a manual correction phase and so should be relatively error- 
free (Marcus, Santorini & Marcinkiewicz, 1993). The second assumption was checked in the 
following way. One hundred random numbers were generated. The range of these random 
numbers was between 1 and 75695. This range covered the total number of nominal 
compound tokens collected by the program. Each random number generated was used to refer 
to an element in the list o f all nominal compound tokens. For example, if the number 5000 
was generated, this would taken to refer to the 5000th nominal compound token. Taking one 
hundred compounds and looking at the original source, no errors were found. All the 
compounds were extracted correctly.
The program could still have missed compounds. The error checking above only examines the 
output of the program; it does not check to see that the output generated finds all compounds 
in the input file. To check this, a number of files from the WSJ were selected and the output
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of the program was manually checked against these fdes. It appears that the program does 
find all noun-noun compounds in files that are tagged in the format of Figure 2.2
2.4 Results
The program collected 75,695 nominal compound tokens o f varying length from the WSJ. If 
the program came across a compound consisting of three or more nouns the whole entity was 
counted as a single compound. Counting of the subparts of these large compounds was not 
undertaken. Out of approximately 1,009,471 w'ords and hence adjacent word pairs, at least 
7.5% are nominal compounds of the type searched for. There are two things to note about this 
percentage:
1 . the number o f words in the actual corpus is open to debate.
2. there are actually more than 75,695 nominal compounds in the corpus.
The first of these reflects the fact any tagged item in the WSJ was counted as a word. Some of 
these are better described as morphemes than words (e.g. 's/POS or punctuation markers). So 
the number of actual words should be smaller. This suggests that the percentage of nominal 
compounds out of the total number of word pairs would actually be higher. Point (2) relates to 
the fact that many "established compounds" are tagged as single words in the corpus and 
compounds consisting o f more than two nouns contain sub-compounds which were not 
counted separately.
Of the 75,695 compound tokens, there are 41,403 nominal compound types. O f the 75,695 
nominal compound tokens 58,745 are composed of just twTo nouns. Out of these 58,745 noun- 
noun compound tokens, there are 29,660 noun-noun compound types. These results are 
summarised in Table 2.4. In relation to the size of the nominal compound type/token sets, the 
noun-noun compound is the most frequent.
Table 2.4 - Summary of Results
Compounds Total Number
compound tokens 75,695
compounds types 41,403
noun-noun compound tokens 58,745
noun-noun compounds types 29,660
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A rough count was undertaken of the number of established hyphenated compounds in the 
corpus, i.e. those that were tagged as single nouns. There are approximately 3,369 established 
hyphenated compound tokens in the corpus. This number is an over-estimate as this figure 
really refers to the number o f nouns that contain hyphens. This results in a number of false 
positives, e.g. re-election. Despite this, the number of established hyphenated compounds is 
small compared to the number of non-hyphenated compounds found in the corpus.
2.4.1 How Big Can a Nominal Compound Get?
Nominal compounds can consist o f more than two elements. Table 2.5 lists the number of 
compound types according to length.
Table 2.5 - How big nominal compound types can get
Compound types Number Examples
two elements 29,660 "abortion counselling"
three elements 10,621 "lung cancer deaths"
four elements 809 "California Health Facilities 
Authority"
five elements 226 "Defense Advanced Research 
Agency contract"
six elements 72 "state bar association policy 
making body"
seven elements 11 "General Electric Co. National 
Broadcasting Co. Unit"
eight elements 3 "New York Stock Chairman 
John J. Phelan Jr."
nine elements 0
ten elements 0
Compounds can be become rather large, e.g. "New/NNP York/NNP Stock/NNP 
Chairman/NNP John/NNP J./NNP Phelan/NNP Jr./NNP". It should be noted that close to 
three-quarters o f nominal compound types consist of two elements.
A careful reader will note that the total number of compound types in Table 2.5 does not add 
up to the number of compound types given in Table 2.4. One large compound was found that 
had eleven elements. On closer examination it appeared that this was a result of a 
typographical error in an article that was left uncorrected but still tagged.
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2.4.2 Caveat Lector
Although the Penn Treebank has been thoroughly checked there are a number of errors in the 
tagging. These would be small compared to the database as a whole. Indeed they may not be 
noticed at all. As the originators of the PT state: "Many texts are not models of good prose, 
and some contain outright errors and slips of the tongue" (Santorini, 1990, pi). Thus the 
results above are suggestive rather than conclusive.
2.4.3 Implications of Results
Nominal compounds occur frequently in the corpus. The actual number of nominal 
compounds found in our experiment is an underestimation. This finding reinforces the 
discussion o f compounds in O'Grady et al. (1993) who suggests that noun-noun compounds 
are widespread. It also ties in with Canon (1987) who reported that up to 55% of new items in 
a given corpus were compounds of existing words.
The interpretation of nominal compounds will be important for any semantic approach to 
language. As a starting point we focus on noun-noun compounds consisting of exactly two 
nominal elements (rather than nominal compounds in general) for two reasons:
1. the frequency of noun-noun compounds
2. duality.
Taking the first reason, clearly, in the corpus examined, noun-noun compounds are the most 
prevalent of all nominal compounds. The second reason suggests that if we know how to 
model how a modifier and head interact in a noun-noun compound, we should be able to deal 
with larger compounds recursively.
2.5 Chapter Summary
This chapter presents an examination o f nominal compounds. Compounds have certain 
properties: asymmetry and duality. A study of compounds in the Penn Treebank, an English 
language corpus was undertaken. This study suggests that nominal compounds are relatively 
frequent in the corpus examined (and extrapolating from this perhaps in English in general). 
The noun-noun compound appears to be the most common of nominal compounds. This is 
interesting as this particular form is the focus of research on concept combination. Two 
reasons as to why noun-noun compounds should be examined were outlined. These reasons 
are: their relative frequency and the duality of compounds.
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Chapter 3 - Theories and Models of Concept Combination
3.1 Introduction
This chapter outlines the main theories of concept combination: Selective Modification 
(Smith, Osherson, Rips, & Keane, 1988), Concept Specialisation (Murphy, 1988), Dual 
Process Theory (Wisniewski, 1997a, 1997b), Constraint Theory (Costello, 1996; Costello & 
Keane, 1998; Costello & Keane, 2000) and the CARIN model (Gagné & Shoben, 1997, 
Gagné, 2001). They are briefly set out in chronological order before being examined in more 
detail in individual sections. Each theory is examined in relation to at least one noun-noun 
compound to demonstrate how each theory approaches the process of concept combination in 
a distinct way. The outline of these theories will reveal that each is incomplete in some way. 
At the end of this chapter the need for a new theory is set forth.
3.2 The Theories Of Concept Combination - A Brief Chronology
The theories of concept combination arc now briefly outlined in chronological order. They are 
examined in more detail in Section 3.4. The chronological order of the theories can be seen in 
Figure 3.1. In this figure, "onwards" highlights the fact that some of these theories are still 
being actively researched.
The first theory is Selective Modification (Smith, Osherson, Rips, & Keane, 1988). The 
model that Smith et al. proposed was to account for adjective-noun combinations but they 
suggested that it could be extended to account for noun-noun combinations. Their proposal is 
that in a combination the modifier selects an aspect of the head and modifies it. In a
combination such as ‘green apple’, an aspect of the concept APPLE is modified. This aspect is 
presumably the co lour  of APPLE.
According to Murphy (1988) Smith et al.'s theory is limited because it could not be extended 
in a straightforward way to account for noun-noun combinations. Murphy pointed out that 
nouns do not often act like adjectives and this was the motivation for his theory of Concept 
Specialisation. One example that Murphy (1988) offers is that of'apartment dog'; here it is not 
clear what exactly APARTMENT selects and modifies. This is a result o f the concept's relative 
complexity. Concept Specialisation suggests that world knowledge plays a role in the 
interpretation of nominal compounds.
The next theory was proposed by Costello (Costello, 1996; Costello & Keane, 1998; Costello 
& Keane, 2000) and is known as Constraint Theory. This approach was largely motivated by 
the need for a theory that accounted for the polysemy of combinations. For example,
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'chocolate bar' could be interpreted as » a  candy bar made of ch o co la te«  or as » a  public 
bar that is predominantly brown in c o lo u r« . In this case bar is ambiguous but multiple 
interpretations can be generated from unambiguous words, e.g. 'pencil bed' in Section 1.5.1. 
Constraint Theory suggests that there are three constraints on the process of concept 
combination: diagnosticity, plausibility, and informativeness. Constraint Theory is also the 
only theory that has been implemented.
Dual Process Theory (Wisniewski, 1997a, 1997b) is the first model to introduce the idea of 
structural alignment into the area of concept combination. Initially this theory was named The 
Structural Alignment View by its originator but is referred to as Dual Process Theory by other 
theories (e.g. Costello & Keane, 1998; Gagné , 2001). Dual Process Theory posits that the 
interpretations that subjects give to combinations can be classified into three different 
categories: property-based, relation-based, or hybrids.
The CARIN model (Gagné & Shoben, 1997) draws heavily on the work o f Levi (1978) and is 
the most linguistic approach o f all the theories. Gagné and Shoben (1997) propose that there 
are a number of relations associated with each noun and that interpreting combinations is a 
question of selecting the most appropriate relation to link the head and modifier. They suggest 
that a native speaker has knowledge of these relations and how frequently they occur with 
certain words. We will argue that this model is not a full theory o f concept combination.
Selective Modification -1988 
Concept Specialisation -  1989 
Constraint Theory -  1996 onwards 
Dual Proccss Theory -  1997 onwards 
CARIN model -  1997 onwards
Figure 3 .1 -  Main theories o f concept combination
3.3 Theory Components
In this section we outline the various component ideas that are needed to describe the theories 
reviewed in the following section in detail. These component ideas are: prototypes, properties, 
frames, slots, values, structured graph representations. They are all concerned with the 
representation of knowledge. Theories o f concept combination attempt to account for how 
different concepts interact to form an interpretation. These concepts are often represented as 
frames as will be seen in Section 3.4.
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3.3.1 Frames And Conceptual Graphs
Luger and Stubblefield (1998) make a distinction between frames and network 
representations, e.g. conceptual graphs. They say that knowledge can be organised into 
complex units which represent situations or objects in a domain. These units are termed 
frames (originally coined by Minsky (1975)). A frame is a data structure used to represent 
well-understood stereotyped situations or objects. An individual frame can be seen as a 
"record" data structure. A frame is made up of a number of slots. These slots have values (or 
fillers), e.g. Figure 3.2 displays a frame for 'hotel bed'.
hotel bed 
Superclass: bed 
Use: sleeping 
Size: king
Part: (mattress frame)
Figure 3.2 - Frame for "hotel bed" (adapted from Luger & Stubblefield. 1998)
When subjects are asked to describe objects they often do in terms of features, properties or 
attributes as well as relations. For example, a CAR may be described in terms of having fo u r  
w heels , an engine, a  driver, p a ssengers  and being  u sed  fo r  transport. Some of these could be 
described as either a property, a feature or an attribute. We will treat the terms features. 
properties and attributes as synonymous and we will use the term property to cover all three 
terms. In a frame the slot and filler attempts to represent the properties of the concept, e.g. a 
hotel bed in Figure 3.2 has the property king size. The slot is the name of the property and the 
filler is the value for this property. So in this example, size is a slot and king is a filler. The 
value can be another frame and frames are rarely used in isolation.
The information represented in Figure 3.2 can also be treated as a graph. In a graph based 
representation the slots can be represented as arcs and the fillers as nodes. This type of 
representation is given in Figure 3.3. Russell and Norvig (1995) suggest that any distinction 
between frames and networks is more apparent than real. This is the view that is also adopted 
throughout this thesis. Both frame and network representations see objects as being nodes in a 
graph, with nodes organised in a taxonomic structure with links between nodes representing 
binary relations. The difference between the two is that in a frame, the binary relations are 
seen as slots in one frame that are filled by another frame. However, in a semantic network, 
the binary relations are thought of as arcs between nodes. Russell and Norvig (1995) suggest
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that the meaning and implementation o f both is often identical. Thus a frame can also be 
viewed as a network based representation. Section 3.4 will show that the majority of theories 
treat concepts in terms of frames rather than networks.
Figure 3.3 - Network representation o f Flotel Bed
3.3.2 Prototypes
It is impossible to talk of prototypes without discussing concepts and categories, which were 
first touched on in Section 1.2.1. Prototype theory is a theory of concepts, a theory that says 
something about the structure of concepts. Discussion of prototypes is set often against the 
backdrop of categorization. Categorization is the process through which a person places a 
concept into a particular category, e.g. is a TOMATO a FRUIT or a VEGETABLE? More broadly it 
involves the discrimination between inputs and so is a fundamental cognitive process.
In the mid-to-late 1970s Rosch (Rosch, 1975; Rosch & Lloyd, 1978) proposed that 
categorization involves comparisons with a prototype of the category in question and the 
prospective member. Some concepts are better examples of a category than others. For 
example a SPARROW is a better example of the category BIRD than an OSTRICH (Aitchison, 
1997). This goodness o f example effect led researchers to suggest that there must be a system 
of family resemblances which determine whether a concept is a good example o f another 
concept or not. This ties in with earlier philosophical investigations by Wittgenstein, e.g. his 
discussions of the concept GAME (Wittgenstein, 1968).
This view of family resemblance proposed by Rosch (Rosch, 1975; Rosch & Lloyd, 1978) 
broke with the prevalent thinking at the time that membership o f a category was based on 
defining features. A view that accepts defining features (necessary and sufficient features) 
also holds there cannot be "good examples" (Aitchison, 1997). A concept is either a member
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of a category' or it is not. If  membership is determined by defining features, all members must 
have these features so no member can be a better member than another. Yet subjects still rate 
items as good examples of concepts or not.
Rosch suggested (Rosch, 1975; Rosch & Lloyd, 1978) that a prototype consists of features, 
attributes and properties but, importantly, each of these is weighted for typicality. 
Diagnosticity is a measure of how typical a feature, an attribute or property is for a group as a 
whole.' This can be calculated in various ways, e.g. by comparing a feature in one concept 
with all other concepts. If a property is fairly uncommon across all concepts then its 
diagnosticity should be high for the category in question. Conversely, a feature that is 
common across all concepts should have a low diagnosticity as it will prove useless in 
determining membership. A good example of a concept should have the most typical features, 
those that have the highest rating for diagnosticity. To be a member of a category an item just 
needs enough typical features to distinguish it from other examples. Both the classic approach 
and the more modern prototype approach do agree on one thing: concepts are made up of 
features, attributes or properties. According to Eysenck and Keane (1995) prototype theoiy 
suggests that concepts should also have information on the diagnosticity of these features, 
attributes or properties. Prototypes can be represented in terms of frames. Frames do not 
usually include information on the diagnosticity of a property. However, a weighting can be 
given to ever}' slot with respect to how typical it is to the category the prototype belongs to.
3.4 The Theories In Detail
This section will examine the main theories of concept combination in detail but this 
examination is constrained by the original presentations of these theories. Constraint Theory 
has had the most detailed exposition in the literature while some models such as Selective 
Modification seem less detailed in comparison. In outlining these theories there will be a 
difference in the amount o f time spent on each theory. Each theory is being examined in as 
much detail as possible; it just happens that some theories are worked out in more detail than 
others. A difference in the depth of examination does not reflect a bias towards certain 
theories over others.
Each theory is presented in terms of its own representations. At least one example is given to 
demonstrate how each theory views the process of concept combination. For each theory we 
outline the problems that it faces. In some cases these problems are substantial. We also list 
combinations that cannot be handled by each theory.
1 Conversely diagnosticity could also be viewed as a measure o f atyp icality as the diagnostic attribute, feature or property would 
be atypical for non-members o f  the group.
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3.4.1 Selective Modification
Selective Modification (Smith et al., 1988) is a theory that developed from research on 
categorisation, most notably prototype theory, and so focuses on the combination of 
prototypes. There are two main views as to what a prototype may be; both are probabilistic 
and recognise that concepts do not have clear-cut boundaries and are often ill-defined 
(Eysenck & Keane, 1995). From the Selective Modification viewpoint (Smith et al, 1988) a 
prototype is "...roughly, a descrip tion  o f  the best exam ples or cen tra l tendency o f  a co n cep t” 
(p486).
Smith et al. (1988) focus largely on adjective-noun combinations, completely ignoring the 
class of noun-noun combinations. The model they propose, Selective Modification, consists 
of three components:
1 . a model for prototype representation
2. procedures for modifying simple prototypes to form combined concepts
3. A mechanism for determining the similarity between a prototype of a category and an 
instance of the same category
Our focus will be on the first two components as these are the most important with respect to 
concept combination.
The first component details how prototypes are represented in their theory. A prototype is a 
pre-stored representation of the usual properties associated with a concept's instances. So a 
prototype for the concept APPLE would include information on properties that are part of 
subjects' common knowledge of APPLES, e.g. has seeds. The properties that make up a 
prototype need not be necessary or sufficient so a representation o f apple may include 
information such as, is red, rou n d  and sm ooth . Properties can be broken into two parts: 
attributes and values. An APPLE prototype would include attribute-value pairs such as: 
colour= red, shape =round, texture =smooth.
A prototype may also have information on the salience of each value. A salient property is a 
property that subjects strongly associate with a concept. Subjects are generally faster in 
deciding that "an apple is red"  over "an apple  is ro u n d ”. The conclusion drawn from this is 
that the attribute red  is more salient than ro und  with respect to the concept APPLE. Further to 
this a prototype may also include information on the diagnosticity of each attribute. 
According to Smith et al (1988) the diagnosticity of an attribute is the measure of how useful 
the attribute is in discriminating instances o f a category from other instances of contrasting 
concepts.
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The representation of a concept in Selective Modification (Smith et al, 1988) includes the 
following:
1. An attribute value structure
2. The salience o f a value
3. The diagnosticity o f an attribute
A representation o f a prototype for APPLE is given in Table 3.1. This prototype is made up of 
three attributes: colour, shape and  texture. As far as Smith et al (1988) are concerned each 
attribute has various values, e.g. an /IPPLE can be red, green  or brow n. The number to the left 
of the attribute represents the diagnosticity of the attribute. The salience o f each value is given 
as a number to the right o f the value. For this example, the scores given for salience and 
diagnosticity have been arbitrarily devised. In Table 3.1 the most diagnostic attribute is that of 
co lour  with a score of 1. The least diagnostic attribute is texture  with a score of 0.25. Note 
that each attribute value has a salience score, even ones with a low diagnosticity. The salience 
of sm ooth  is 25, which is the highest salience score along with that for red. From Table 3.1 it
can be seen that the most salient features of an APPLE are sm oothness  and the colour red.
There may be an overlap between salient properties and diagnostic ones. With Selective 
Modification a distinction is drawn between the attributes and values of a property. Only 
attributes can be diagnostic and only attribute values can be salient.
Table 3.1 - A prototype representation of APPLE (Smith et al. 1988)
APPLE
Diagnosticity - Attribute Value - Salience
1 colour { red 25, green 5, brown... }
0.5 shape { round 15, square, cylindrical 5... }
0.25 texture { smooth 25, rough 5, bumpy... }
The basic proposal of Selective Modification is that each attribute in the adjective concept 
selects the corresponding attribute in the noun concept. Every attribute selected in this way in 
the noun has an associated increase in its salience and diagnosticity. In a combination such as 
'shrivelled apple', if the attributes of SHRIVELLED are shape  and texture  then these are the 
attributes of APPLE that are modified. These attributes would have their diagnosticity scores 
increased. However, the outline of how adjective modification works is given in relation to 
adjectives which are assumed to have only one attribute (Smith et al., 1988). Adjectives are 
not described as being rich in attributes and properties, as nouns are, but are instead modelled 
as single properties. So Selective Modification will have great difficulty in being applied to 
noun-noun compounds as has been originally noted by Murphy (1988).
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In Selective Modification the adjective selects the relevant attribute in the noun. In our view 
this appears to be done via matching between the modifier and the head. If this is the case 
then presumably the attribute associated with the adjective must exist in the head. All the 
salience scores in the head are shifted so that the saliency value of the attribute selected 
increases and the diagnosticity value for the attribute is also increased. In Figure 3.4 there is a 
representation of RED and a partial representation of APPLE (see Table 3.1 for the ftill 
representation). In APPLE the colour attribute has three values, red, green  a n d  brow n, two of 
these have salience values. When the combination process occurs all the salience scores are 
moved to red, so red  becomes the most salient attribute of'red  apple'.
RED
Color { red }
APPLE
1 color { red 25, green 5, 
brown... }
"red apple"
2 color { red 30, green, 
brown... }
¡■'iiiurc 3.4 - Shifting t ic diagnostic and saiicncc values through combination
The selection of the attribute and the changing of its salience value suggest that the attribute 
should already exist in the head concept. But what happens when the attribute does not exist? 
In that case Smith et al. (1988) suggest that the attribute may be temporarily added in. In that 
case, the salience and diagnosticity must still be worked out. Perhaps the salience scores of 
the other attributes are given to this new attribute; Smith et al. (1988) do not go into detail. 
The model deals only with modifiers that can be represented as single attributes. There is the 
possibility that an adjective may involve more than one attribute and so modify more than one 
attribute in the noun. Again, this is not dealt with explicitly in Smith et al. (1988).
3.4.1.1 Problems With Selective Modification
We argue that as it stands Selective Modification cannot deal with noun-noun compounds. 
The structure of nouns cannot be represented in terms of a single attribute. Selective 
Modification implicitly acknowledges this. The representation of APPLE in Table 3.1 is not 
comprised o f a solitary attribute. Rather, this concept has several attributes. A combination 
involving noun-noun compounds immediately poses the problem of which attribute(s) is (are) 
selected to be modified. As suggested above, Selective Modification offers no account of how 
this is to be done.
At a broader level, the combination process may involve the changing of the diagnosticity and 
salience of attributes but it also involves much more than this. Concepts can be linked to each
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other via a third concept or a property of one concept may be applied to another. Selective 
Modification does not account for this as its notion of concept combination is focused on 
accounting for changing salience and diagnostic scores. This is understandable as it is 
concerned with accounting for subjects' typicality judgements for combinations but it ignores 
the problem o f generating interpretations for these compounds.
3.4.1.2 Combinations Selective Modification Cannot Deal With
Murphy (1988) suggests that Selective Modification cannot deal with noun-noun compounds. 
A case might be argued that where concepts are strongly associated with a property this 
salient property is the attribute that is involved in the Selective Modification process. 
However, other models such as Constraint Theory (Costello, 1996; Costello & Keane, 1998; 
Costello & Keane, 2000), which attempt to find the properties of concepts that play a role in 
interpretation, still assume complex conceptual structure. By making this case further 
questions arise, e.g. how do we find the relevant property? This is a question which is dealt 
with by Constraint Theory and Dual Process Theory below. As a model of concept 
combination Selective Modification never really gets off the ground, although it does suggest 
that a slot-filling model may be useful in explaining concept combination.
3.4.2 Concept Specialisation
Murphy's (1988) theory o f Concept Specialisation can be seen as attempt to improve on the 
weaknesses in Selective Modification. His view of concept combination is one of a process 
that takes simple concepts, e.g. ENGINE, REPAIR, to form complex concepts, e.g. "engine 
repair". Murphy defines simple concepts as those that are generally represented as single 
lexemes. A complex concept is made up from these simple concepts and so will be 
represented by two lexemes. His term, complex concept, would be similar to our term, 
combination.
Murphy (1988) suggests that world knowledge is involved in concept combination. Concept 
combination is not a closed process in that information outside of what would typically be 
considered to be a part of either concept is often involved. This information is associated with 
a concept but may not be contained in a representation o f that concept. The nature of this 
association is not outlined by Murphy (1988). However, this extra information effects concept 
combination in two ways:
1 . it picks out the appropriate slot to be specialised.
2 . it cleans-up (elaborates) the combination.
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The term specialised should be explained further. From the Concept Specialisation 
perspective, concept combination involves the modifier specialising an aspect of the head. 
The head is represented as a frame with a number of slots. The modifier acts by picking out 
the most appropriate slot. Consider the combination 'apartment dog'. With regards to Concept 
Specialisation the modifier may change the value of a possible loca tion /hab ita t slot of the 
concept DOG. So, an 'apartment dog' can be interpreted as » a  dog that lives in an 
apartm ent« .
Murphy (1988) argues that by treating adjective-noun combinations and noun-noun 
combinations in the same way Selective Modification ignores:
1. The primary features of a noun (when acting as a modifier) do not always carry over to 
that head.
2. Modifiers do not have the same effect on every head they modify.
3. That point (1) becomes stronger the more complex the structure of the modifier.
The primary features of a noun are probably best described as those that are the most 
associated with a concept. For the concept APPLE, the feature co lour green  might be salient. 
The combination ‘apple grower’, is not however » a  grower who is g re e n « . In this 
combination the salient property of APPLE has not been carried over. Rather it seems that the 
concept APPLE fits into the concept GROWER and forms the new concept 'apple grower'. An 
'apple grower' being » a  person who grows a p p le s« .
Also, it is clear that a modifier can have different effects on different heads even though it 
occupies the same modifier role as outlined by the Table 3.2.
Table 3.2 - A modifier having different effects on different heads 
Combinations with advertising as a modifier
'advertising executive' is » a n  executive in an advertising company« 
'advertising time' is » th e  broadcast duration of an a d «
'advertising recession' is » th e  economic state where advertising companies reduce the 
amount of ads they place on T.V., radio and newspapers«
The representation that Murphy (1988) uses for concepts is frame-based. Figure 3.5 displays a 
representation of DOG. The thrust of Concept Specialisation can be found in the "apartment 
dog" example that Murphy uses. This combination could be interpreted as »  a dog that lives
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in an apartment « .  For Murphy, an interpretation such as this involves the modifier selecting 
a slot in the head and replacing it. In many ways his approach could be described as "selective 
m odification"  (if a theory did not already bear this name), as a slot is selected and modified. 
In fact, to distinguish between the two theories Murphy refers to Selective Modification as the 
Feature Weighting Approach.
Name: dog
Body-parts: Legs: 4,3 
Head: 1 
Hair 
Eyes: 2
Colour: brown, white, black... 
(etc.)
Habitat: home, streets
Functions: best friend, guard home
Behaviours: bark, bite, eat, sleep, chase cats...
Figure 3.5 - A representation of dot: (Muiphv. 1988)
Murphy suggests that when nouns act as modifiers they do so in a more complex manner than 
adjectives. For example, an adjective such as RED appears to refer to a single dimension and 
generally has the same effect on every head noun (unless RED is part of an idiom, e.g. 'red 
herring'). A "red apple" is »  an apple that is red « ,  a "red car" is »  a red coloured car « .  
He suggests that concept combination involves finding an appropriate slot to be filled. In 
concept combination, the modifier replaces the filler of the most appropriate slot.
The selection of this slot is guided by the world knowledge that an interpreter has. For 
example, an 'apartment dog' could be interpreted as »  a dog that functions as apartment « .  
This is an unlikely interpretation as dogs do not usually function as apartments; people cannot 
live in dogs. It is seemingly obvious information like this that participants have available 
when interpreting noun-noun compounds. From this perspective concept combination is not a 
closed process.
Murphy also suggests that the fact that concept combination is an open process can be 
demonstrated in other ways. Using adjective-noun examples he suggests that sometimes 
combinations have properties which belong to neither of the constituents. Consider the 
example, "empty store": a person may report that one o f the properties of empty store is that it
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is lo sing  m oney  but lo sing  m oney  is not a property o f  STORE and does not seem  to be a 
property o f EMPTY either. Murphy (1988) suggests that this information is provided by 
applying world knowledge to the process o f concept combination.
3.4.2.1 Problems With Concept Specialisation
The central problem with the Concept Specialisation theory is lack o f detail. In the Concept 
Specialisation model the modifier selects and specialises an aspect of the head. However, how 
this is actually done is never clearly explained except in vague terms such as, it is "guided by 
world knowledge". As with Selective Modification there is no given mechanism for 
explaining how the modifier selects and specialises (or modifies) some aspect of the head. So 
again this theory misses the point somew'hat. In its favour it suggests that a slot-filling 
approach may be used to model concept combination but then it offers no explanation as to 
how this slot-filling process will take place. Overall, this model suggests that interpretations 
of combinations can be viewed in terms o f a slot-filling process but does not really deal with 
the generation of these interpretations.
3.4.2.2 Combinations Concept Specialisation Cannot Deal With
Concept Specialisation will have problems in dealing with most types o f combinations. 
Although it attempts to tackle the noun-noun compounds that Selective Modification cannot 
deal with it ends up in the same position as this model. The reason is that it does not provide 
details of how the modifier and head interact. In effect it has been left up to later models (e.g. 
Constraint Theory’ and Dual Process Theory) to fill this gap.
3.4.3 Constraint Theory
Constraint Theory (Costello, 1996; Costello & Keane, 1998; Costello & Keane, 2000) marks 
a new direction in research on concept combination. Previous theories focus exclusively on a 
single interpretation paradigm. Constraint Theory, however, examines the polysemy of 
combinations and takes a multiple interpretation approach. Many combinations, especially 
novel ones, can be interpreted in a number of ways. For example, consider the combination 
'chocolate door1. This could be interpreted in numerous ways: » a  chocolate coloured d o o r« , 
» a  bar o f chocolate shaped like a d o o r« , » a  door made of choco la te« . Although some 
combinations may seem more coherent or more likely to occur in the real world than others, 
this does not take from the fact that subjects can generate interpretations for things that may 
not exist in the real world. The area of concept combination has largely focused on finding a 
single interpretation for combinations despite the fact that combinations can be polysemous.
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Although Constraint Theory attempts to examine polysemy, the pragmatics of concept 
combination appear to be the guiding force behind the theory. According to Costello and 
Keane (2000) an interpreter when presented with a combination will make a number of 
pragmatic assumptions about the intentions of the speaker who made the phrase. Assuming 
that the speaker and the listener are co-operating Costello & Keane (2000) make a number of 
assumptions:
1. The combination is one the listener should understand
2. The intended concept is best identified by the two concepts in the combination
3. The intended concept is one for which both words in the combination are necessary 
and sufficient.
Costello (1996) proposes that there are three main constraints on concept combination. Each 
of the three constraints is supposed to reflect the above pragmatic assumptions. The 
plausibility constraint ensures the production of something that should be more-or-less 
already known to the listener. The diagnosticity constraint ensures that interpretations contain 
some properties diagnostic of both the constituent properties. The informativeness constraint 
ensures that an interpretation conveys the appropriate amount of new information. To 
interpret a combination correctly the listener constructs an interpretation which best satisfies 
all three constraints.
The diagnosticity constraint requires that an interpretation contains some predicates which are 
diagnostic of the modifier concept and some predicates which are diagnostic of the head 
concept. The diagnosticity constraint predicts that of the following two interpretations the first 
is the more acceptable:
1. A 'cactus fish' is »  a prickly fish «
2. A 'cactus fish' is »  a green fish «
This is because p rick ly  is more diagnostic o f CACTI than green. In contrast, green  is typical of 
most PLANTS and it is not particularly diagnostic o f CACTI. The constraint does not demand 
that all the diagnostic predicates of each constituent concept are used; only enough predicates
to identify an instance o f a concept well. So the combination 'cactus fish' would probably not
contain the property, grow s-in -deserf.
Research on single interpretations o f combinations (e.g. Wisniewski, 1996) suggests that 
there are three basic types of interpretations. These are:
1. Relational - attempting to find a relation between two concepts.
2. Property-based - suggesting that a property of the modifier concept holds for the 
head concept.
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3. Conjunctions or Hybrids - where the features of the modifier concept and head 
concept are conjoined to form a new entity.
To this Costello & Keane (1997) add:
4. Direct-reference - combinations that refer to already existing concepts, e.g. 
interpreting 'pencil bed' as » a  pencil c a s e «  (Costello & Keane, 1997). This may 
already be subsumed under (1), (2) and (3).
5. Reversals - combinations where the head and modifier appear to exchange roles,
i.e. the head modifies the modifier, e.g. interpreting 'plastic dog' as » p la s tic  shaped 
like a d o g « .
The diagnosticity constraint is applied equally to all interpretation types, however the effect 
of this principle is different for each interpretation type. For each interpretation type the 
following occurs:
1. Property: diagnostic properties o f one concept are asserted of the other.
2. Conjunctive and hybrid: a concept is constructed that contains both the diagnostic 
properties of both constituent concepts.
3. Relational: the diagnostic predicates of the constituent concepts occur implicitly in 
different parts of the interpretation.
Although Costello & Keane (Costello, 1996; Costello & Keane, 1998; Costello & Keane, 
2000) are not explicit as to what happens with reversals and direct reference combinations we 
suggest that the following could occur. Reversals involve reversing the roles of the head and 
modifier. So that (1), property interpretation, and (3), relational interpretation, above could 
also be true of reversals. For example in Section 1.6.1, "bed pencil" was interpreted as »  a 
thin bed « .  Here a property of the head has been asserted o f the modifier. This would 
involve (1) but with the modifier and head roles reversed. The direct reference would be 
found when an interpretation matches a concept that exists in memory.
The plausibility constraint ensures that the interpretation should contain properties that are 
consistent with prior experience. When a person interprets a novel combination the speaker 
will assume that the intended combined concept is describing one that a person more or less 
already knows. This seems to rule out combinations which refer to concepts that may not 
have existed for the listener before the combination process; where it may be the intention of 
the speaker to highlight something new. Consider the combination, 'academic polyfilla', this 
combination could refer to academics on temporary contracts.2 This is a novel combination
This combination was used in conversation the author took part in.
2
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and should impart some novel information about the way academics on temporary contracts 
are treated, i.e. they are a stop-gap measure to fix any apparent holes in a department's 
teaching timetable. People are playful and creative in their use of language; theories of 
concept combination should not ignore this.
The plausibility constraint predicts that of the two combinations below the first is more 
acceptable than the second:
1. A 'shovel bird' is »  a bird with a flat beak it uses to dig for food «
2. A 'shovel bird' is »  a bird which uses a shovel for digging for food «
The first is more in tune with what happens in everyday experience in the world, where BIRDS 
often dig for food. The second could only be understood in terms of a special context, e.g. a 
bird in a cartoon. Plausibility is determined in relation to all the information in the knowledge 
base so information from outside of the original constituents in the combination can be 
brought into play.
The informativeness constraint ensures that an interpretation should convey new information 
such that both words are necessary and sufficient for that information. New information 
should come from both the head and the modifier, not just one of the concepts. The following 
would be unacceptable when the informativeness constraint is applied:
1. A 'head hat' is »  a hat worn on the head «
2. A 'car vehicle' is »  a car «
The first offers no new information in relation to HAT, while the second provides no new 
information about CAR. People have difficulty in interpreting redundant modifiers where the 
modifier provides no new information beyond that already contained in the head. 
Informativeness is only used to determine if a combination is informative or not. The three 
constraints do not contribute equally to the process of concept combination. The constraints
of diagnosticity and plausibility govern the general acceptability of an interpretation. These
are, thus, the most important constraints.
When people interpret combinations they do so quickly and efficiently. For many 
combinations a large number of interpretations are possible. An important requirement on 
theories o f concept combination is that they should be computationally tractable - they should 
produce interpretations in a reasonable time. Plausibility itself may not be a computable
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notion considering how it draws in open-ended world knowledge. However, the notion of 
plausibility, as marked out by the plausibility constraint in Constraint Theory, reduces the 
problem by looking at the overlap of properties between a concept in memory and a potential 
interpretation. The greater the overlap the more plausible the interpretation. Constraint 
Theory, however, does not account for figurative combinations (see Section 3.3.3.2).
The exact details of how Constraint Theory works are fleshed out in the CT3 program, an 
implementation of this theory (Costello & Keane, 2000). Using the compound, 'finger cup', an 
analysis of Constraint Theory will be undertaken. Table 3.3 contains representations needed 
for interpreting finger and cup. Note that this model uses more than two representations. In 
the table there is not just an abstract representation o f FINGER and CUP', there are also 
representations of instances, e.g. there are two types of CUP. Unlike the previously mentioned 
models, the CT3 model uses a large knowledge base.
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Tabic 3.3 - Representation of instances of finger and cup (Costello & Keane. 2000)
Finger Namc[ F, "Finger" | 
Shape[ F, Tubular | 
Sizc| F, Small | 
Consistency! F, Solid | 
Part-ofl F, H |
Name! H, "Hand" | 
Consistency! H, Solid | 
Size| H, Medium | 
Shape! H, Flat |
Holds! H, _ |
Cup Name| C, "Cup" | Namef L, _ |
Shape] C, Hemispherical! 
Size[ C, Small | 
Consistency! C, Solid | 
Contains) C. L |
Consistency! L, Liquid!
Cup Name! D. "Cup" ] Name| E, "Expresso" |
Shape! D, Hemispherical! Consistency! E, Liquid]
Size[ D. Small ] Colour! E. Brown ]
Consistency! D, Solid | Taste| E, Bitter |
Contains! D, E | Temperature! E, 1 lot |
Bowl Name! B, "Cup" | Name! K, _ |
Shapc| B, Hemispherical] Consistency! K, Solid]
Size| B, medium | 
Consistency! B, Solid | 
Contains! B, K J
Wash-in| K, B |
There are three stages to generating an interpretation in the CT3 model:
1. Constructing partial interpretations using diagnosticity
2. Plausibility and the generation of full interpretations
3. Informativeness and overall acceptability
The diagnosticity o f each attribute is a function of its relative occurrence in members against 
non-members of a category. The more frequently an attribute is shared by instances and the
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more frequently it is not shared by non-instances the more diagnostic it is. Diagnosticity was 
a major concern for Selective Modification (Smith, Osherson, Rips, & Keane, 1988) but was 
calculated in a wholly arbitrary way. From viewing the representations we can suggest the 
most diagnostic attributes of FINGER are that its shape is tubular. Remember that the 
interpretation of a compound must have features that are diagnostic of both the concepts. The 
diagnostic features of FINGER and CUP in this example are: shape(sm all) contains (liquid), 
sh a p e(tu b u la r) . Partial interpretations are created based on the diagnostic predicates.
An interesting twist that Constraint Theory puts on diagnosticity is that diagnostic attributes 
can be grouped together. In other models, e.g. Selective Modification, diagnostic attributes 
are treated in isolation. In Constraint Theory attributes can be grouped together if they occur 
within a category' but do not occur in other concepts. Table 3.4 lists some of the diagnostic 
attributes for FINGER and CUP. Scores have been given for each attribute. This score is a ratio 
between its occurrence in a concept (which will always be one) and the number o f other 
concepts it occurs in. If  the attribute only occurs once it is given a value of one.
Table 3.4 - Some diagnostic features o f FINGER and CUP (Costello & Keane. 2000)
FINGER CUP
Shapc[ F, tubular ] 1 
Part-ofI F. H 1 1 
Sizc| F, Small ) 1/3
Sizc[ C, small | &  Contains! C, L ) 1 
Contains! C, L ] 2/3 
Consistency! C, solid 1 1/4
The diagnostic features are then used to form partial interpretations. These partial 
interpretations are then fleshed out by the plausibility constraint. The diagnostic and 
plausibility constraints can be seen as a construction process that creates interpretations. One 
partial interpretation is listed in Table 3.5 where F is a finger and C is a cup. Although only 
one partial interpretation is presented here, several partial interpretations would be generated 
by combining the diagnostic predicates in Table 3.4 exhaustively.
Tabic 3.5 - A partial interpretation of'finger c u d ' (Costello & Keane. 2000)
’finger cup'
Shape[ F, tubular ] 1
Sizcf C, small j &  Contains! C, L | 1
Contains! C, L j 2/3
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A partial interpretation such as the one in Table 3.5 is then examined in relation to prior 
experience, this is the plausibility constraint. Plausibility in the CT3 model is measured by 
examining the degree to which the predicates of a partial interpretation exist in stored 
concepts. If  an interpretation already exists in the knowledge base there will be a complete 
overlap in the shared predicates between the two. The intuition at work here is that the more 
predicates a partial interpretation shares with an existing concept the more plausible it is. 
Where there is an overlap between a partial interpretation and an existing concept, predicates 
from the existing concept are added to the interpretation. This is the mechanism by which 
partial interpretations are fleshed out. In the example, 'finger cup1, this new information may 
be taken from BOWL, e.g. W ash-in [K, B ].
The informativeness constraint takes the full interpretation and compares it against the 
prototypes of the constituent parts. For example, if an interpretation contains all predicates 
that already exist in one of the component parts, i.e. is a subset of this component, it is 
uninformative. This constraint captures the uninformativeness o f combinations such as the 
'head hat' example above.
3.4.3.1 Problems With Constraint Theory
Although Constraint Theory is an extremely powerful model and also the most detailed, there 
is one major weakness with this approach: it places too much emphasis on diagnosticity. 
There may be combinations where diagnosticity does not play a large role. Combinations 
which are generally classified as relation-based do not seem to rely upon diagnosticity. We do 
not claim however, that Constraint Theory cannot deal with relation-based interpretations e.g. 
it can interpret 'finger cup' as »  a cup for washing fingers in « .  We do wish to suggest that 
diagnosticity may not play a large role in relation-based interpretations. Consider an 
interpretation of 'robin snake' which may be » a  snake which hunts robins « .  Here, the 
interpretation suggests that there is a third concept, HUNTING, which links the two in the 
combination. Both the head and modifier appear unchanged, so they will satisfy the 
diagnosticity constraint. Yet we still have to explain where the third concept comes from and 
how the head and modifier can both satisfy the concept, HUNTING.
In the CT3 model new information is given by the plausibility constraint, where new 
predicates may be added. Indeed, the first two constraints are the generative mechanism of 
this model; they are responsible for the creation of interpretations. The addition of new 
predicates to an interpretation is based on finding similar concepts to a partial interpretation in 
the knowledge base. There appears to be no mechanism for judging the appropriateness of 
this new additional information except in terms of informativeness. Informativeness by itself
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is not necessarily a good judge of appropriateness. As informativeness is conceived by 
Constraint Theory it only compares an entire interpretation against the knowledge base and 
disqualifies those interpretations with redundant information. However, the information added 
may not be redundant (i.e. already exist in a category or concept) but may not be appropriate. 
Suppose BOH'L in Table 3.3 contained some information that something is drunk from a bowl, 
D ru n k[ K, B ]  should this be added to 'finger cup'? So that 'finger cup' could mean »  a cup 
from which fingers are drunk « .  This is a possible interpretation that Constraint 'Theory' 
could generate and demonstrates that informativeness may not be a good measure of 
appropriateness.
3.4.3.2 Combinations Constraint Theory Cannot Deal With
Constraint Theory appears to be able to deal with many types o f combination. We suggest 
though, that it cannot account for combinations which are :
(1) Figurative
(2) Which evoke a particular context.
It appears difficult to envisage how Constraint Theory can deal with figurative combinations 
such as 'drug baron'. Consider this combination in terms of its constituent concepts, DRUG, 
BARON and the diagnostic properties of both. The diagnostic properties of a DRUG may be: 
relief-giver, m edication . While the diagnostic properties of BARON may be: pow erfu l, wealthy. 
An interpretation of'drug baron' as »  a powerful drug dealer «  does not seem to rely on the 
diagnostic properties o f DRUG.] In this interpretation the concept appears to refer to another 
concept, 'drug dealer'. Constraint Theory is ill-equipped to deal with these types of 
combination.
Another way o f viewing the 'drug baron' combination is to suggest that the concept DRUG 
draws in the context 'drug dealer'. A 'drug baron' is really a 'drug dealer baron'. The CT3 
model adds new' predicates to an interpretation but does not allow for a concept to refer to 
another concept. It cannot draw in context in this manner. Combinations in which one concept 
refers to related context cannot be dealt with by Constraint Theory.
Constraint Theory may also have difficulty with more mundane combinations. This difficulty 
is a result again of its diagnosticity constraint. Consider the combination 'table leg'. The 
diagnostic property o f TABLE is probably that it has a f la t  surface. While the diagnostic 
properties of LEGS may be that it is a limb u sed  f o r  support. Note that LEGS could already exist
1 This is one possible interpretation o f 'drug baron', Other interpretations are possible, e.g. one reviewer suggested that 'drug 
baron' could be treated as a »  person o f some-but-not-so-much status and wealth (and power )  derived from an association with 
d ru gs .« This interpretation does not seem suitable for providing the extensions that are available with our interpretation, e.g. a 
serf is like user (see Section 5.3.3 for a more detailed interpretation ).
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within the concept TABLE, as p a rts  of that concept. Perhaps this combination refers to 
something that already exists in one of its elements, namely that LEGS will already be included 
in a representation of TABLE. This type of interpretation has little to do with the diagnostic 
values o f attributes o f the constituent concepts. So it appears that not all combinations will 
satisfy this constraint of diagnosticity. We call these interpretations referential.
3.4.4 Dual Process Theory
Dual Process Theory (Wisniewski, 1997a, 1997b) is the first theory to apply structural 
alignment to concept combination. The theory arises from Wisniewski's (1996) examination 
of interpretation types, and accounts for relational and property-based interpretations as well 
as hybridizations. It suggests that concept combination involves two distinct processes:
1. scenario-creation
2. comparison/construction.
The first accounts for relation-based interpretations and the second accounts for property- 
based interpretations. The model has not been implemented and is not as detailed as other 
models, e.g. Constraint Theory (Costello, 1996; Costello & Keane, 1998; Costello & Keane, 
2000 ).
The pragmatics o f concept combination have been the motivation for at least one model of 
concept combination, Constraint Theory, so it is worth examining Wisniewski's (1997a) view 
on this subject. He suggests that there are at least two assumptions that both the speaker and 
listener may make:
1. The combination refers to a new type of category.
2. That the new information conveyed is carried by / marked out by the modifier. 
Comparing these with the Constraint Theory', both Dual Process Theory and Constraint 
Theory agree on assumption 1: concept combination gives rise to new information. The 
second is not assumed by Constraint Theory. It suggests that there is a focal concept in 
concept combination. Although in general it may be the head, the head is not always the focal 
concept. Dual Process Theory places great importance on the modifier.
Dual Process Theory (Wisniewski, 1997a; 1997b) is essentially an extension o f the frame 
based approach with the novel idea that the slot-filling process is carried out by a comparison 
construction model. Wisniewski (1997a; 1997b) makes the same representational assumptions 
about concepts as previous models. However, we should note now that no explicit examples 
of frame representations are ever given in his work, e.g. Wisniewski (1997a; 1997b). This is a 
big drawback for a frame-based approach and has forced researchers to supply their own 
representations when analysing Wisniewski's theory, e.g. Costello & Keane (1998).
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In Wisniewski's (1997a) augmented schema approach (his term) a schema or frame contains a 
scenario which corresponds to a verb with information on actions, events, states with various 
roles. The concept SOAP may have the scenario CLEANING associated with it. This scenario 
would be made up of roles such as recipient, agent and instrument. Indeed some combinations 
appear to involve the form o f a nominalized verb e.g. "blood donor".
Generating a relation-linking interpretation involves finding the most plausible scenario. The 
most plausible scenario is that in which all the concepts can be bound to different roles. The 
roles in the scenario may have preconditions that limit which concept can fill which role. So 
in 'truck soap', TRUCK is the recipient and SOAP is the instrument. Consider this quote: "The 
use o f  scenarios allow s the augm ented m odel to explicitly  indicate the different roles that the 
m odifier an d  head  noun are p la y in g  in an action, event, or state. In contrast, the slot-filling  
p ro cess  o f  schem a m odels derives a relation-linking relation interpretation  by fin din g  a role 
or slo t f o r  the m odifier to fill, w ithout explicitly  indicating the role that the head  noun fills"  
(pl74, Wisniewski 1997a). This is true if slot-filling only allows the direct replacement of an 
aspect of the head with the modifier but a more elaborate model may allow for "scenario 
creation" if  a mechanism can go beyond the initial constituents.
Slot-filling for Wisniewski (1997a) only works on the constituents, whereas relation-linking 
allows for associates of concepts to become involved. The term associates is not elaborated on 
formally. Taking his "truck soap" example an associate is a sub-part o f the head concept as 
this is where the cleaning scenario is found. Yet if  related concepts are allowed to enter the 
process then perhaps slot-filling can account for both property-based interpretations and 
relation-based interpretations. For example, "truck soap" could be described as involving the 
filling o f slots in the concept CLEANING, where TRUCK and SOAP can both fit slots.
Wisniewski has also suggested that, "In order to derive a p ro p erty  interpretation, there must 
be an im portant difference betw een the m odifier and  head concepts that fo rm s the basis o f  the 
in terpretation"  (1997a, pl75). In his view property interpretations are based on differences. 
Interpreting a "zebra clam" as »  a clam with stripes «  suggests that the crucial difference 
between CJ.AM and ZEBRA is stripes. This idea is drawn from Wisniewski's view of the 
computational aspect o f concept combination - people create new combinations to mark out 
new members of a category where the difference between the head category and combination 
is marked out by the modifier.
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The type o f difference marked out by property-based interpretations is known as an alienable 
difference. Consider Table 3.6 which displays frame-based representations of the concepts 
CAR and BIKE. In terms of Dual Process Theory a similarity would be a slot with the same slot 
name and value that occurs in both representations. In Table 3.6, Is-a: VEHICLE would be a 
similarity between CAR and BIKE. A difference would be a slot (incl. slot name and value) 
which does not occur in one of the two representations. An alignable difference would be 
where both representations have the same slot but with different values. For example in Table
3.6 both CAR and BIKE have parts, represented by the p a r t  relation. The representation for CAR 
has DOOR as a slot value while BIKE does not have this value; this would be an alignable 
difference.
Table 3.6- Representation of CAR and BIKE
CAR BIKE
Is-a: VEHICLE, AUTOMOBILE 
Perform s: TRANSPORT 
Parts: DOOR, WHEELS, ENGINE 
W heels: 4
Is-a: VEHICLE,
Perform s: TRANSPORT
P arts: HANDLEBAR, FRAME, WHEELS,
W heels: 2
The comparison process would involve taking every aspect of one representation and 
contrasting it against ever}' aspect o f the second representation. An aspect in terms of Table
3.6 would be a slot consisting of slot name and value, e.g. Is-a: VEHICLE consists of a slot 
name Is-a  and a value VEHICLE. In comparing CAR and BIKE, Is-a: VEHICLE (an aspect of CAR) 
would be contrasted with every aspect of BIKE. Table 3.7 lists the results of a comparison 
process between CAR and BIKE. It displays similarities in which slot names and slot values are 
identical. Alignable differences are in a manner of speaking based on a weaker notion of 
similarity. For example, both CAR and BIKE have parts although they differ in the parts they 
have. Both CAR and BIKE have wheels but differ in the number.
Table 3.7 - Results of a comparison process between CAR and BIKE
Similarities Alignable differences
CAR BIKE CAR BIKE
Is-a: VEHICLE 
Perform s: 
TRANSPORT 
Parts: W HEEUi
Is-a: VEHICLE 
Perform s: 
TRANSPORT 
Parts: WHEELS
Is-a: AUTOMOBILE 
P arts: DOOR 
P arts: DOOR 
P arts: ENGINE 
P arts: ENGINE 
Wheels: 4
Is-a: VEHICLE 
Parts: HANDLEBAR 
Parts: FRAME 
Parts: HANDLEBAR 
P arts: FRAME 
Wheels: 2
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The basic assumption at the heart of this approach is that the interpretation of some noun­
noun compounds is similar to the interpretation of some nominal metaphors, "implying that 
similar processes operate in both domains" (Wisniewski, 1997a, p l 68). However, structural 
alignment in this model is only used for property-based interpretations; it is not applied to 
other interpretation types.
There are always multiple differences between concepts (unless they are identical). So if an 
interpretation is based on difference - which difference is selected, which one is the most 
appropriate? Wisniewski (1997a) suggests that there are a number of factors which may come 
into play:
1. Context - information in the context may point to the relevant property.
2. Nouns sometimes refer to salient properties - 'elephant' seems to refer to large in 
"elephant garlic".
3. Cue validity / category validity - people may pick properties that have a high cue 
validity. The cue validity of a property is a probabilistic measure that a concept with 
this property belongs to a certain category. For example a concept with the property 
w ing  is likely to be (but not necessarily) a BIRD.
4. Plausibility - some properties may not make sense when applied to the head, e.g. 
"fork ball", »  a ball with prongs « .
Point 2 is interesting as it is not accounted for in Wisniewski's description of the comparison / 
construction process and seems more reminiscent of Constraint Theory. Also, nouns may 
refer to salient properties but this does not automatically mean these salient properties form 
the basis of an interpretation. For example, an 'elephant painting' is not so much »  a large 
painting «  (although, it could be) but more probably »  a painting of an elephant « .
Wisniewski (1997a) also suggests that if two concepts are highly similar there is a possibility 
that a hybridization interpretation will occur. The concept ZEBRA and HORSE are quite similar 
compared to say, that of ZEBRA and CLAM. When two concepts are highly similar a subject 
may generate an interpretation such as »  something that is both a horse and zebra «  for 
'zebra horse'. This seems a sensible interpretation, esp. when compared to a hybridization 
interpretation for 'zebra clam', »  something that is both a clam and a zebra « .  However, 
Dual Process Theory (Wisniewski, 1997a, 1997b) does not provide a clear account o f how 
hybridization is invoked, e.g. is there a threshold of similarity that must be crossed before a 
hybridization interpretation can be given?
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The relationship between the scenario creation mechanism and comparison / construction has 
not been outlined by us. Concept combination involves these two processes but do these 
processes compete or do they occur serially? One approach is to argue that scenario creation 
occurs first - people attempt to find a relation that links the two concepts before making a 
property-based interpretation. However, if both concepts are similar, they may have the same 
associated scenario and may fill the exact same role and so would not give rise to relation- 
based interpretation. This may explain why highly similar concepts do not tend to give rise to 
relation-based interpretations. But it appears that people often attempt to compare the 
properties of the concepts first. A person is likely to treat a "mourner dancer" as »  a dancer 
who is also a mourner «  rather than, say, »  a person who performs mourning by dancing
According to Wisniewski (1997a) in the interpretation of a compound, if a property based- 
interpretation is not generated, the second mechanism, scenario creation, kicks in. How the 
actual related scenario is found is quite simple. Wisniewski suggests that every concept has a 
scenario associated with it. However, it appears from the examples that Wisniewski (1997a, 
1997b) uses, scenarios that are only associated with the head and that scenarios associated 
with the modifier are ignored. The interpretation of a compound in terms of scenario creation 
involves fitting the modifier and head into the roles associated with a scenario. Thus, an 
interpretation that a 'zebra clam1 is »  a clam eaten by zebras «  may arise because clams 
have the scenario eating associated with them. This is the weakest part of the model as it 
seems to imply that only one scenario is associated with each concept. As there is no 
mechanism for deciding which is the most appropriate scenarios, there is no hint that there 
may be competing scenarios.
3.4.4.1 Problems With Dual Process Theory
There are several problems with the Dual Process Theory approach, among these are:
1. A lack of detailed representations for the frames
2. The use of augmented frames
3. Concepts may have more than one scenario
4. Implicit assumptions about polysemy
The first of these relates to Wisniewski's (1997a) description o f his model as an extension of 
the frame-based approach. If  Dual Process Theory truly is a frame-based approach then 
examples o f the frames should be given; other theories such as Selective Modification, 
Concept Specialisation do so. Related to this problem is that it makes it difficult for other 
researchers to adequately analyse and test his theory.
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Although no precise descriptions of frames are given, Wisniewski (1997a) does suggest that 
they would contain information on scenarios (which he calls augmented schema). These 
scenarios are activities that may be associated with a concept. We suggest, in theory, that 
these scenarios could be accounted for by using frames. Since activities can also be 
represented in terms of frames, these type of representations are not solely for objects. By 
placing the scenarios directly with the frames the problem of finding the correct scenario is 
avoided but the representations have been weakened. They are not like the representations 
other theories have used and Wisniewski (1997a) offers no psychological evidence for 
adopting these new modified frames.
Another problem with scenarios is that the question of how to deal with multiple scenarios is 
not answered (nor posed). A concept may easily have several associated scenarios. Given a 
combination involving a concept with multiple scenarios there may be competition between 
the related scenarios. Indeed, what if the modifier concept and head concept have related 
scenarios? For example, "truck soap" as »  soap transported by truck «  where the scenario 
is transportation as opposed to the earlier example where it was »  a soap used to clean trucks 
« .  The interpretation of combinations appears to allow for scenarios to be drawn from either 
the head or the modifier. Wisniewski's account suggests that scenarios are associated only 
with the head.
Overall this model is let down by its lack o f detail but it does offer at least one important 
insight into concept combination. For the first time, the comparison process in concept 
combination has been dealt with in terms of structural alignment. It suggests that the 
mechanics of the slot-filling process may be best explained in terms of structural alignment. 
Other models, e.g. Concept Specialisation (Murphy, 1988), are not clear on how slot-filling 
takes place.
3.4.4.2 Combinations Dual Process Theory Cannot Deal With
Dual Process Theory (Wisniewski, 1997a; 1997b) can deal with large classes of property- 
based and relation-based combinations. It cannot however deal with:
(1) Figurative combinations
(2) Referential combinations
(3) Some types of property-based combinations
In some models of metaphor which use alignment (Sapper: Yeale, 1995; SME: Falkenhainer, 
Forbus & Gentner , 1989), the interpretations generated are based on finding multiple points
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of similarity. In Dual Process Theory, when two concepts are compared, they are compared to 
find an alignable difference. Alignment in Dual Process Theory is used in quite a confined 
way. It does not give rise to the types of mapping that are associated with metaphors. This 
will be dealt with in more detail in the next chapter but for the time being we note that Dual 
Process Theory applies alignment to solely find alignable differences. This is quite different 
to how metaphors and analogies are interpreted.
Referential combinations are combinations where one concept refers to a part of another 
concept. The combination 'library book' can be interpreted in this way. A representation of 
library may contain information on books, e.g. that a library stores books. A 'library book1 
may refer to this aspect of library. Both processes in Dual Process Theory cannot account for 
this type o f interpretation as it is not a property-based interpretation nor a relation-based one.
The way in which Dual Process Theory accounts for property-based interpretations is to 
assume that a property of the modifier is inserted into the head. In some combinations the 
modifier itself (and not just a property) can be inserted into the head. For example, in 'fur 
coat' which could be interpreted as »  a coat made from fur « ,  FUR could replace the default 
values o f what a COAT is typically made from. Here, the entire modifier concept is inserted. 
The comparison / construction part of Dual Process Theory does not account for 
combinations such as 'fur coat'.
3.4.5 CARIN Model
The CARIN model (Gagné & Shoben, 1997) views concept combination as the process of 
finding the appropriate relation between the modifier and the head. The acronym stands for: 
competition among relations in nominals. For the CARIN model, the combination ‘mountain 
stream’ would be interpreted in terms of a location relation, » a  stream located in a 
m oun ta in« . This approach proposes a limited number of relations that all combinations will 
fall into.
The complete list of relations is shown in Figure 3.6. Gagné and Shoben (1997) claim that 
these relations have been picked to cover the largest amounts o f interpretation possible. The 
first fourteen are drawn from Gagné and Shoben (1997) the fifteenth relation is taken from 
Gagné (2001) and does not appear in the earlier work. They suggest that each nominal has a 
set o f relations associated with it when acting as a modifier. Given a particular nominal, each 
native speaker has knowledge about the frequency of these relations. When presented with a 
novel combination they can choose the most frequently occurring relation first.
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1. Noun causes modifier -  'flu virus'
2. modifier causes noun -  ’college headache'
3. noun has modifier -  'picture book'
4. modifier lias noun -  'lemon peel'
5. noun makes modifier - 'milk cow'
6 . noun made of modifier -  'chocolate bird'
7. noun For modifier - 'cooking toy'
8. modifier is noun -  'dessert food'
9. noun uses modifier-'gas antiques'
10. noun about modifier •• 'mountain magazine'
11. noun located modifier-'mountain cloud'
12. noun used by modifier-'servant language'
13. modifier located noun -  'murder town'
14. noun derived from modifier-'oil money'
15. noun like modifier - 'beehive hairdo'
Figure 3.6 -  Relations in the CARIN model
As two models o f concept combination Dual Process Theory (Wisniewski, 1997a, 1997b) and 
Constraint Theory (Costello, 1996; Costello & Keane, 1998; Costello & Keane, 2000) agree 
largely on the types of interpretation people generate it is worth comparing the relations 
against these interpretation types. In Dual Process Theory and Constraint Theory there are 
two main types o f interpretation: property-based and relation-based. In a real sense all the 
interpretations that the CARIN model is concerned with are relation-based interpretations. A 
simple question that can be posed o f the CARIN model and any approach that relies on 
relations is: can it deal with property-based interpretations? The clear answer is no. Consider 
the compound 'bumblebee moth' and the interpretation »  a moth with black and yellow 
stripes « .  In this interpretation a property o f BUMBLEBEE is applied to a MOTH. Figure 3.7 
lists all possible interpretations with respect to the relations in Figure 3.6.
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1. moth causes bumblebee
2 . bumblebee causes moth
3. moth has bumblebee
4. bumblebee has moth
5. moth makes bumblebee
6 . moth made «/bumblebee
7. moth fo r bumblebee
8 . bumblebee is  moth
9. moth axes bumblebee
10. mol h about bumblebee
11. moth located bumblebee
12. moth used by bumblebee
13. bumblebee located moth
14. moth derived from  bumblebee
15. moth like  bumblebee
Figure 3.7 -  Possible interpretations for 'bumblebee moth' using thematic relations
The closest interpretation to »  a moth with black and yellow stripes «  in Figure 3.7 is 15. 
Some of the others may be understandable but they do not give the property-based 
interpretation we are searching for. For example, perhaps 11 could be »  a moth that lives in 
the same habitat as the bumblebee « .  Indeed, 15 even seems a rather poor interpretation. To 
describe a 'bumblebee moth' as »  moth like  bumblebee (a moth that is like a bumblebee) «  
is hardly a description at all. This particular interpretation does not say in what respect the 
two are alike.
The reason for the failure o f a relation-based approach to deal with property-based 
interpretations is that these interpretations involve concepts associated with the compound. In 
interpreting a 'bumblebee moth' as a »  a moth with black and yellow stripes « ,  the concept 
BUMBLEBEE is used to refer to a property of itself, namely having b lack  a n d  ye llow  stripes. 
The relation-based approach (as taken from Figure 3.6) can only deal with the actual 
constituents and not other concepts related to one o f the constituents.
Accepting that a thematic relation model will have difficulty in accounting for property-based 
interpretations we now examine the CARIN model in more detail. The range of the relations 
and the different ways in which they interact with the head and modifier point to the
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complexity of concept combination, Gagné and Shoben (1997) propose that subjects actually 
have information on the way modifiers generally act, e.g. when MOUNTAIN is used as a 
modifier in a combination it is generally in association with located. This relation can be used 
to interpret combinations such as ‘mountain stream’, ‘mountain goat’.
Choosing the most appropriate relation is the central problem in the CARIN model. The 
relation chosen for an interpretation depends on the strength of a candidate relation against 
the weight of the alternatives. In other words, the relations compete against each other to be 
selected (hence the acronym, CARIN). The method for selecting the relation can be Luce's 
choice rule (Luce & Raffia (1957), as cited in Gagné and Shoben (1997)). This is not the only 
possible way but is a relatively straightforward one. Taking an example directly from Gagné 
and Shoben (1997), consider the two concepts: MOUNTAIN and JUVENILE, and what thematic 
relations may be associated with them. Table 3.8 lists the thematic relations associated with 
each concept. Note that the relations differ from those listed in Table 3.6, e.g. there are 
actually two has  relations but only one is presented in Table 3.8. This is not a deliberate 
mistake by the present author but how Gagné and Shoben (1997) name the relations 
associated with MOUNTAIN and JUVENILE. The percentages in Table 3.8 do not add up to 
100%, we assume that the missing values are associated with other relations.
Table 3.8 - Relation scorcs for mountain and ju venile
Mountain Juvenile
Locative - 82% For - 34%
About - 10% Has - 20%
Uses - 2% About - 15%
Made of - I % Is - 10%
When interpreting a combination, each thematic relation is measured against the others using 
the Luce choice rule. To work out the score of locative  against a b o u t  for MOUNTAIN see Table 
3.9. The difference between the locative, relation and a b o u t  relation is quite large, especially 
when compared to the situation with the concept JUJ'ENILE. The difference between the scores 
between the has  and f o r  relations is a lot smaller in the concept JUVENILE. The Luce choice 
rule can be described as follows (Wills, Suret and McLaren, 2000):
v i 
ii
2*7
/= !
52
P(i) is the probability of choosing a relation i from n alternative relations and v, is relation 
magnitude term for the jth  alternative.
Table 3.9 - Calculating competing thematic relations
Mountain:
Locative 0.82/(0.82 + 0.1 + 0.02 + 0.01) = 0.86
About 0.1/(0 82 + 0.1 +0.02 + 0.01) = 0.11
Juvenile:
F o r 0.34/(0.34 + 0.2 + 0.15 + 10) = 0.43
H a s 0.20/(0.34 + 0.2 + 0.15 + 10) = 0.25
Essentially, Gagné and Shoben (1997) are attempting to explain ease of interpretation but the 
central point of concept combination seems to be interpretation generation. Strangely this 
theory seems to be lacking in this area. Yes, the interpretation of a combination involves 
selecting the correct relation. A sympathetic reading would suggest that the strongest relation 
is chosen first but we still do not know if  it is appropriate. CARIN is not currently a model of 
concept combination. It is concerned with ease of interpretation over the actual generation of 
the interpretation. It could be adapted to be a model of concept combination but this would 
involve dealing with plausibility.
More fundamentally, thematic relations may not give the most appropriate interpretations. 
Consider, 'picture book' in Figure 3.6, which is interpreted as »  a book that has pictures « .  
But this is not what a 'picture book' is. For example a children's version of a classic novel may 
have pictures but it is not a picture book. A 'picture book' is »  a book where the usual text is 
largely replaced with pictures « .
3.4.5.1 The CARIN Model And Figurative Combinations
The CARIN model can deal with figurative combinations (Gagné, 2001), primarily by 
positing the addition of a similarity relation signifying that 'modifier is like noun'. For 
example 'beehive hairdo' can be interpreted in terms o f relation (15) in Figure 3.6, »  a hairdo 
that's like a beehive « .  However, these types o f interpretations raise serious questions. In 
metaphor research, interpretations involve more than the finding o f a relation. For example, 
consider the metaphor "John is a fox". Is it enough to suggest that this means that » J o h n  is 
like a fox in some s e n se « ?  Clearly interpretations such as these are just too vague to stand 
on their own as interpretations; they require further elaboration. It is this elaboration which 
bears the brunt o f giving real meaning to the interpretation.
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The vagueness of the interpretations is not just a problem with how the CARIN model deals 
with figurative combinations, literal combinations are also given vague interpretations. 
Treating a combination such as 'bumblebee moth' as »  a moth like a bumblebee «  is not an 
adequate interpretation. In terms of the relations in Figure 3.6, 'prize fighter' could be 
interpreted as »  a fighter f o r  prize « .  This interpretation still needs some work to be fully 
understood. Another problem for an approach with a fixed set of relations is that all 
interpretations must be created in relation to this set. A slot-filling based approach is limited 
to the names of the slots and the fillers, however these need not be drawn from a fixed set and 
may allow more creativity in the generation of an interpretation.
3.4.5.2 Problems With The CARIN model
Ultimately, the CARIN model is not really a model of concept combination but more a model 
of ease of interpretation. To qualify as a model for concept combination there would have to 
be a number of additions to the model, such as:
1. Explaining plausibility
2. Dealing with concepts outside of the immediate constituents of the compound
It may well be the case that subjects have knowledge on past combinations and may apply 
this knowledge during the combination process. But knowledge of relation frequency is only 
part of the explanation. A thematic-relation based approach should also explain why certain 
thematic relations are appropriate, especially where more than one is possible. The CARJN 
model does not deal with the plausibility of its relations.
As the model currently stands, it also has difficulty in accounting for combinations where 
concepts other than the constituents are involved. This is often the case with property-based 
interpretations. For Constraint Theory the diagnostic features of the modifier are brought into 
play. In Dual Process Theory other concepts are involved in the process when there are 
alignable differences. This lack o f concepts outside the constituent concepts seriously 
hampers the CARIN model as an explanation of concept combination.
3.4.5.3 Combinations CARIN Cannot Deal With
The CARIN model can deal with most combinations. However, the problem here is with how 
it deals with these combinations. The manner in which figurative combinations and some 
literal combinations are dealt w'ith invites further elaboration. It could be argued that this 
further elaboration is post the concept combination process but this is not something assumed 
by the other models which attempt to find the most informative interpretations immediately. 
Saying a 'beehive hairdo' is »  a hairdo like a beehive «  is true but hardly informative.
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3.5 The Need For A New Theory?
The five theories outlined above do share some similarities as well as a great deal of 
differences. O f the five theories, four rely on frame-based representations with the CARIN 
model (Gagné & Shoben, 1997) being the only one that does not. The theories also range in 
the amount of detail with which they describe the process o f concept combination. The five 
theories o f concept combination can also be compared and contrasted as to how they deal 
with the three problems of combination outlined in Chapter 1, namely: polysemy, world 
knowledge, and figurative interpretations. Table 3.10 shows these comparisons. The table 
shows that none of the current models deal with all three problems simultaneously. Where a 
question mark occurs in the table, it is the opinion of the present author that a problem could 
be dealt with in some way by the model, even the if  the original theories have not dealt 
explicitly with this problem.
Table 3.10 - Comparison of models and theories
Models Problem 1: 
Polysemy
Problem 2: 
World knowledge
Problem 3: 
Figurative combinations
Selective
Modification
No No No
Concept
Specialization
No Yes No
Constraint
Theory
Yes Yes No
CARIN model ? No Yes
Dual Process 
Theory
? Yes No
Accounting for world knowledge was first suggested by Murphy (1988). Combinations can 
draw in outside information. Our review suggests that this problem has yet to be successfully 
tackled. Murphy (1988) does not specify how exactly world knowledge plays a role. 
Constraint Theory (Costello, 1996; Costello & Keane, 1998; Costello & Keane, 2000 ) can 
draw in outside information but cannot account for combinations where one of the constituent 
concepts appears to act as a reference to another concept. Dual Process Theory (Wisniewski, 
1997a, 1997b) does allow for some world knowledge to be brought in terms of a scenario in 
which the components o f the combination may be involved. Yet this is still quite limited. 
However, Dual Process Theory and Concept Specialisation and Constraint Theory are marked 
in Table 3.10 as attempting to deal with world knowledge.
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The problem o f polysemy is only dealt w ith explicitly by one model, Constraint Theory 
(Costello, 1996; Costello &  Keane, 1998; Costello &  Keane, 2000 ). In theory a number o f 
the current theories, however, could deal w ith polysemy. Dual Process Theory (Wisniewski, 
1997a, 1997b) can give rise to several interpretations o f the combination ‘ robin snake’ . In the 
CARIN model (Gagné &  Shoben, 1997) polysemy can be seen to result from more than one 
relation being involved in a combination. These theories would need some modification to 
account for polysemy more fully. There is no mechanism for ranking combinations in Dual 
Process Theory. The Luce choice rule could be used to rank polysemous combinations in the 
CARIN. Constraint Theory does apply constraints to decide on the rankings o f possible 
interpretations. In Table 3.10 only Constraint Theory is marked as dealing with polysemy, 
while Dual Process Theory and CARIN model are marked with a question mark.
Only one model deals w ith figurative interpretations, the extended CARIN model. To do so 
Gagné (2001) has had to modify the number o f relations that the original model proposed (i.e. 
relation 15 was added to Figure 3.6). The types o f interpretation this model generates are 
meagre. These interpretations necessitate some form o f elaboration. This problem affects the 
CARIN model's ability to deal with world knowledge as well. Consider the combination 'drug 
baron': this is a figurative combination but it does not involve the like relation in the sense 
that a 'drug baron' is not » a  baron that's like a drug in some w a y « . It appears that DRUG 
draws in the context of'drug dealer', so the interpretation » a  drug dealer that's like a baron in 
some w a y «  seems better. The CARIN model does not allow for the drawing in o f world 
knowledge, in this case 'drug dealer'. Even i f  it could come up with the interpretation, » a  
baron that's like a drug dealer in some w a y « , it would still need further elaboration.
This suggests that a new model is needed, one that attempts to deal simultaneously with all 
three problems. I f  concept combination can give rise to interpretations that draw in world 
knowledge (e.g. 'drug dealer' in 'drug baron'), then a model o f concept combination should 
account for this. Also, i f  concept combination can give rise to multiple interpretations, then 
again a model o f concept combination should account for this. Finally, i f  concept combination 
can give rise to interpretations that are figurative, then a model o f concept combination should 
certainly account for this. A  model that attempts to do this is presented in Chapter 5.
3 .6  B o r r o w in g  F r o m  T h e  E x is t in g  M o d e ls
Although our review o f the theories o f concept combination may have been largely critical we 
see a number o f important points in each o f these theories. The model we offer in Chapter 5 is 
based on structural alignment which is a model o f a comparison process. Without getting into
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the minutiae o f structural alignment (which are dealt with in the next chapter) we w ill briefly 
outline here why the comparison process is important for concept combination.
A  comparison process already exists im plic itly  in a number o f the models. Slot filling, e.g., 
seems to involve a comparison process. The calculation o f diagnosticity also seems to involve 
a comparison process, especially as described by Constraint Theory' (Costello, 1996; Costello 
&  Keane, 1998; Costello &  Keane, 2000). The plausibility constraint o f Constraint Theory 
involves a comparison process where partial interpretations are compared with existing 
combinations. W ith the exception o f the CARIN model (Gagné and Shoben, 1997), all the 
models rely on a comparison process in some way. O f course, the comparison process does 
not have to be dealt w ith in terms o f structural alignment but we w ill show that it can be 
effective in modelling concept combination in the next chapter and especially in Chapter 5.
Another way to view the model that we w ill propose is to see it as partially borrowing from 
the existing models. The elements o f previous models that are borrowed are the following:
(1) Use a knowledge base for representations
(2) Use frame-based representations
(3) Apply structural alignment
Constraint Theory (Costello, 1996; Costello &  Keane, 1998; Costello &  Keane, 2000) makes 
use o f a large knowledge base to derive interpretations. There are several reasons for using a 
large knowledge base, e.g. in Constraint Theory it w ill allow for the calculation o f diagnostic 
scores. From our viewpoint, an extensive knowledge base can allow for the introduction o f 
related concepts. It is this what Murphy (1988) alludes to as world knowledge. Wisniewski 
(1997a) also maintains that concepts have associates, namely scenarios. These associates are 
part o f the representations o f concepts, so perhaps 'associates' is a misnomer. The use o f a 
knowledge base allows us to suggest that where combinations involve outside knowledge this 
information can be found in the knowledge base.
In our model, the representation o f knowledge that w ill exist in the knowledge base w ill be 
frame-based. The model o f concept combination we w ill propose in Chapter 5 could be 
described loosely as a slot-filling one, following in the footsteps o f Selective Modification 
and Concept Specialisation. The process o f slot-filling w ill be carried out using structural 
alignment. W hile the application o f structural alignment to concept combination could be said 
to be borrowed from Wisniewski (1997a), we envisage it as a more fundamental process. In 
reality, Dual Process Theory only deals w ith property-based interpretations in terms of
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structural alignment. Furthermore, the actual process o f structural alignment is not well 
specified ( i f  at all) by Dual Process Theory. Even within Dual Process Theory there are 
several ways it could be implemented. In contrast, our model w ill be specific in its 
implementation.
3 .7  C h a p te r  S u m m a r y
In this chapter the current theories o f concept combination were reviewed. The theories varied 
considerably in the detail with which each examines concept combination. Constraint Theory 
is perhaps the most detailed and formally explicit. Dual Process Theory is only informally 
represented in the available literature. The theories were examined in chronological order. 
The first theory, Selective Modification, is not suitable for noun-noun compounds but can 
deal with some adjective noun compounds. Concept Specialisation points to a number o f 
interesting aspects o f concept combination, e.g. the use o f world knowledge, but is not 
explicit enough in how world knowledge is used. Constraint Theory sees the combination 
process as governed by three constraints, although only two generate the actual 
interpretations. This model may fail to account for a number o f compounds due to its reliance 
on the diagnosticity constraint. The CARIN accounts for ease o f interpretation but not 
concept combination.
It was also pointed out that most o f the theories are successful in relation to one or two o f the 
problems arising in the interpretation o f compounds outlined in Chapter 1, but not to all three. 
No theory can deal simultaneously w ith the role o f polysemy, world knowledge and figurative 
interpretation. Constraint Theory can deal with polysemy. Constraint Theory, Concept 
Specialisation and Dual Process Theory attempt to deal with the role o f world knowledge. A  
number o f the models, e.g. Constraint Theory, can possibly be extended to deal with all three 
problems, but how this extension is to occur is not completely clear. The lack o f a model that 
deals with all three problems arising in the interpretation o f combinations suggests that each 
is, in an important respect, incomplete, and that a new, more comprehensive model is 
required. Such a model is presented in Chapter 5. As this model is based on structural 
alignment, our approach to this comparison process is outlined in the next chapter.
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Chapter 4 - Structural Alignment
4 .1  I n tr o d u c t io n
This chapter examines structural alignment (SA), which models a comparison process. 
Initially, the area o f sim ilarity is discussed. Simple feature-based models do not account for 
some o f the phenomena in similarity judgements. Subjects seem to use structural information 
as well as simple features in similarity judgements. Structural similarity is discussed in 
relation to analogy and examples o f how subjects take account o f structural information are 
given. The principles o f structural alignment, one-to-one mapping, parallel connectivity, and a 
systematicity principle are then set out. W ith these principles in mind, rules for mapping are 
discussed. Different approaches (e.g. Veale, 1995; Falkenhainer, Forbus &  Gentner, 1989) 
apply different mapping rules but still adhere to the principles o f structural alignment.
Following our introduction to structural alignment we present the view o f structural alignment 
adopted in this present dissertation. This view, which is based on the work o f Veale (1995), 
suggests that the comparison process gives rise to two types o f mapping: shallow similarity 
and deep similarity. To conclude this chapter, arguments against applying structural 
alignment to concept combination are examined. It has been suggested that SA should not be 
applied to concept combination (Keane and Costello, 2001) but we argue that the evidence 
does not support this view.
4 .2  S im ila r ity
We cannot talk about a comparison process without mentioning similarity and its related 
topics, such as discrimination. To compare and contrast two things is to both look for 
similarities (a similarity process) and differences (a discrimination process). As mentioned in 
Chapter 3, some researchers suggest that finding a difference between the head and modifier 
may be crucial in understanding some types o f combination, especially in property-based 
interpretations.
Similarity however, is a rather empty notion, as is illustrated from this quote by W illiam 
James: "The moon is similar to a gas-jet, it is also similar to a football; but a gas-jet and a 
football are not similar to each other. When we affirm the similarity o f  two compound things, 
we should always say in what respect it obtains. Moon and gas-jet are similar in respect o f  
luminosity, and nothing else; moon and foot-ball in respect o f rotundity, and nothing else... 
Similarity, in compounds, is partial identity". (p579, James, 1890/1995). James suggests that 
when comparing one object with another, e.g. a gas-jet and a football, it appears we do so
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w ith  re sp ec t to  th e  p ro p ertie s  that th e se  o b je c ts  h a v e . It is  g e n e r a lly  th e s e  p ro p ertie s  w h ic h  
m a k e  th e  e n tit ie s  sim ila r .
A  furth er p r o b le m  is  th at an y  tw o  o b jec ts  in  p r in c ip le  w il l  sh are  so m e  c o m m o n  p ro p ertie s . F or  
e x a m p le , le t  u s  sa y  an  ACTRESS is  lik e  a  HORSE. T h e y  b o th  e x is t , b o th  are p h y s ic a l, b o th  eat, 
b oth  in h ab it th e  earth . T h e  o th er  s id e  to  th is  is  that th e  n u m b er  o f  d if fe r e n c e s  b e tw e e n  th e  tw o  
e n tit ie s  is  a ls o  en o r m o u s . O n e  is  a  h u m an , th e  o th er  is  n o t, o n e  p erform s o n  th e  s ta g e  w h ile  
th e  o th er  ty p ic a lly  d o e s  n o t, o n e  g en era lly  l iv e s  in  a s ta b le  th e  o th er  d o e s  n o t. Y e t  su b jec ts  can  
q u ic k ly  f in d  s im ila r it ie s  and  d if fe r e n c e s  b e tw e e n  c o n c e p ts .
O n e  o f  th e  m o s t  w id e sp r e a d  m o d e ls  o f  s im ila r ity  is  th e  con trast m o d e l o f  T v ersk y  (1 9 7 7 ) .  In 
short, w h e n  co m p a r in g  an  o b je c t A  and  an  o b jec t B  th e  s im ila r ity  o f  o n e  to  th e  o th er  is  a  
fu n c t io n  o f  th e  fea tu res th e y  sh are  m in u s b o th  th e  fea tu res  th at A  h as but B  d o e s  n o t  and  th e  
fea tu res that B  h as b u t A  d o e s  not. (T h e  m o d e l a llo w s  fo r  p articu lar w e ig h t in g s  to  b e  
in c lu d e d ). T h is  is  a  se t  b a se d  ap p roach  to  s im ila r ity . S im ila r it ie s  are th e  in te r se c tio n s  o f  se ts , 
e .g . th e  red  in te r se c tio n s  in  F ig u re  4 .1 .
T h e  co n tra st m o d e l m a k e s  at le a s t  o n e  p r ed ic t io n  o n  s im ila r ity , n a m e ly  th at th e  m o re  d ifferen t  
tw o  o b je c ts  are, th e  e a s ie r  it sh o u ld  b e  to  f in d  d if fe r e n c e s . C o n s id e r  th e  d is s im ila r  p a ir  in  
F ig u re  4 .1  b e lo w , in  th e s e  tw o  se ts  a n y th in g  th at is  n o t  in  th e  in ter sec tio n  is  a  d if fe r e n c e . T h e  
sa m e  is  true o f  th e  s im ila r  p a ir  b u t c lea r ly  th e  fo rm er  h a s  m o re  d if fe r e n c e s . T h e  in ter sec tio n s  
in  F ig u r e  4 .1  are h ig h lig h te d  in  red , th e  g rea ter  th e  area  o f  th is  red  z o n e  th e  g rea ter  the  
n u m b er  o f  s im ila r it ie s .
Dissimilar pair Similar pair
F ig u r e  4 .1  - S im ila r ity  a s th e  In ter sec tio n  o f  S e ts
R e c e n t  resea rch , h o w e v e r , h as su g g e s te d  that th e  m o re  s im ila r  tw o  o b je c ts  are, th e  m ore  
d if fe r e n c e s  su b jec ts  c a n  rep ort b e tw e e n  th e m  (M ark m an  &  G en tn er , 1 9 9 3 ). T h is  m a y  se e m
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counter-intuitive and is actually counter to the contrast model (Tversky, 1977). In Figure 4.1 
there are clearly more differences between the dissimilar pair and so it should give rise to 
more reported differences. There should also be less differences to report for the similar pairs 
as there are much less differences between them. This has not been found to be the case in 
empirical studies. Markman and Wisniewski (1997) examined subjects' ability to list the 
differences between various objects. Interestingly, the more similar two items were the more 
differences the subjects were able to list. This finding does not f it  the contrast model. 
Markman and Wisniewski (1997) suggested that the type o f differences subjects return are 
alignable differences (see Section 3.3.4). This type o f difference is based on similarity and so 
the more similar two items are, the more like ly they are to have alignable differences.
4 .2 .1  S im ila r ity  A n d  S tr u c t u r e
Similarity is o f great interest to researchers on metaphor and analogy. Lakoff and Johnson 
(1980), in their influential work, suggested that metaphors occur frequently in everyday 
language. Metaphors involve finding similarities between seemingly dissimilar entities. For 
example, speakers o f English often describe the concept ARGUMENT in terms o f the concept 
WAR. They speak o f arguments as i f  they were literally wars. This can be seen as a generative 
metaphor schema: "argument is war". Below are some utterances that rely on this metaphor 
(adapted from: Lakoff &  Johnson, 1980, p4)
1. "He attacked every weak point in my argument".
2. "Your criticisms are right on target”.
3. "If you use that strategy, you '11 get wiped out".
4. "He shot down all o f  my arguments".
In the metaphor "argument is war", there are a number o f similarities between the two 
concepts. Firstly though we should note that arguments have points, but these points may be 
called arguments themselves. These points are positions that can be defended, attacked or 
abandoned. The opposite sides o f the argument are opposing forces. Arguments can be the 
weaponry that attacks, as in (2) above. Arguments can be physical positions that are defended 
and attacked. They can also be weaponry that is attacked, (4). This suggests that the subparts 
o f one domain, e.g. points in an argument, are similar in some way to the positions armies 
hold in a war.
Early models o f metaphor suggested that metaphors can be understood in terms o f simple 
feature-matching. For example, Ortony (1979) proposes a Salience Imbalance approach to 
metaphor. The problem with models such as Ortony's is that concepts may in fact be best
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represented in terms o f structure rather than a simple set o f features (simple in that these 
features may be unconnected with one another). This is a problem, as it appears that 
phenomena such as metaphor and analogy involve similarities based on structure. The 
similarities are not just simple feature commonalities but involve complex groups o f 
interconnected features.
Lakoff and Johnson (1980) argued that metaphors such as "argument is war" can be 
understood in terms o f cross domain mappings. In short, one domain is described in terms o f 
another and in doing so a hearer must place both domains in correspondence to see what part 
o f what domain maps onto another. The work o f Gentner (e.g. Markman &  Gentner, 2000; 
Bowdle &  Gentner, 1999; Gentner 1998; Ferguson, Forbus, &  Gentner, 1997; Gentner &  
Markman, 1997) on analogy offers a rich model o f how cross-domain mapping occurs. These 
cross-domain mappings can be viewed as points o f similarity.
4 .2 .2  A n a lo g y  a n d  S tr u c t u r a l  A lig n m e n t
Markman and Gentner claim that similarity and analogy can be modelled in terms o f the 
alignment and mapping o f structured representations (Markman &  Gentner, 2000). These 
structured representations "...consist o f  hierarchical systems that encode objects, attributes o f  
objects, relations between objects, and relations between relations", ( p i52, Gentner &  
Markman, 1997). To understand how a comparison process works we present an example 
from Markman &  Gentner (1993). The example is based around a question: why is Jupiter 
like Mars? Consider the representation in Table 4.1. Both concepts are alike because apart 
from sharing common features (which are not shown) they share the same place in a similar 
relational structure. Viewing (1) and (2) in Table 4.1 JUPITER and MARS f ill the same roles. 
This is one o f the central insights o f structure mapping: similarity can be based in structure 
(structural similarity) and not just feature matching.
Table 4 .1 - Why is Jupiter like Mars?
1. cause(greater(mass(Sun), mass(Jupiter)), revolvc(Jupilcr. Sun))
2. cause(grcater(mass(Stm), inass(Mars)), rcvolve(Mars, Sun))
The importance o f the relational structure can be seen using a further example where one 
object occurs twice but in different roles, see Table 4.2. Consider the situation where we ask 
what is JUPITER similar to? I f  we focus solely on attribute relations then in Table 2 then we 
would say that JUPITER maps onto JUPITER (as they are identical). However, it should be clear
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that JUPITER maps onto the SUN as they both occupy the same place (role) in the overall 
structure. Similarity, then, is a question o f relational structure and not just simple features.
T a b le  4 .2  - C om p arin g  the relationships b e tw e en the S u n  and  Jupiter, and Jupiter and  E uropa
1. cause(greater(mass(Sun), mass(Jupiter)), revolve(Jupiter, Sun))
2. cause(greater(mass(Jupiter), mass(Europa)), revolve(Europa, Jupiter))
The similarities found between different domains, e.g. JUPITER and MARS, can be described as 
mappings between the two domains. The term mapping is used to suggest some sort o f 
conceptual connection between aspects o f the two domains and these mappings are 
similarities.
4 .2 .3  P r in c ip le s  O f  S tr u c t u r e  A lig n m e n t
When performing matches between two domains there should be a one-to-one mapping. A 
feature should not be mapped onto several features in another domain. For example, when 
asked to find comparisons between the G u lf War and World War Two (WW2), the types o f 
mappings subjects give can be predicted (Spellman &  Holyoak, 1992). Subjects do not 
generally break from one-to-one mappings. Consider the four questions in Table 4.3. These 
questions asks a subject to draw an analogy between the G u lf War and WW2 and then to 
make some specific mappings. Taking the questions in this table, a one-to-one mapping 
suggests that subjects should only give one answer to these questions. For example, taking 
question 4, subjects are unlikely to say the CHURCHILL is like GEORGE BUSH and JOHN MAJOR. 
They are likely to only take one o f these persons to be like CHURCHILL.
Depending on a subject's political views a person is likely to suggest that perhaps SADDAM 
HUSSEIN is like HITLER as answer to Q l .1 I f  this answer is given then the answer to question 2 
should be IRAQ. Although, GERMANY did take part in the G ulf War it seems that by saying 
SADDAM HUSSEIN is like HITLER we have to say that IRAQ is like GERMANY. This is likely 
because o f the relationships between these leaders and their countries. For example, Figure
4.2 gives a simplistic representation o f the concepts HUSSEIN and HITLER. Both are leaders but 
more importantly the relationship between these leaders and their countries is similar. It is this 
relationship that leads subjects to suggest that i f  HITLER is like HUSSEIN then GERMANY is like
1 T he E nglish  version o f  his full nam e is "Saddam  H ussein  al-M ajd  al-T ikriti" , w ith  "al-M ajd" being the equivalent 
o f a  surnam e W e have chosen  to re fer to him  in our exam ples as Hussein.
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IRAQ. This finding suggests that when a mapping is made, subjects take note o f structure to 
find further mappings.
Table 4.3 - Points o f comparison between W W II and the G u lf War
1. i f  the G u lf  W ar is lik e  W W 2 . w h o  is H itler?
2 . I f  the G u lf  W a r  is lik e  W W 2 . w h o  arc G erm an y?
3. I f  th e  G u lf  W ar is lik e  W W 2 , w h o  is  C h u rch ill?
4. I f  G eo rg e  B u sh  is lik e  C h u rch ill, th en  w h o  is like F D R ?
Figure 4.2 - Simple representations o f H itler  and Hussein
Furthermore, subjects exhibit a preference fo r similarities that involve more related structure 
to those that do not. This may reflect the fact that similarities based on related structure w ill 
be richer (carry more information) than simple feature based ones. Where there is a choice o f 
interpretations, subjects prefer the one that preserves the largest connected relational structure 
(Gentner, Rattermann &  Forbus, 1993). This is known as the systematicity principle.
Table 4.4 - Principles o f Structural Alignment
1. Onc-to-oue mapping
2. Parallel connectivity
3. Systematicity principle
The basic principles o f SA are outlined in Table 4.4 (Gentner &  Markman, 1997). Thus far 
only 1 and 3 have been discussed. The other principle, parallel connectivity, is related to the 
principle o f  a one-to-one mapping, as they both ensure structural consistency. Parallel
64
connectivity suggests that when two predicates are matched their arguments should be 
matched as well. The crux o f parallel connectivity is an attempt to define what further 
mappings should be made with respect to initial mappings. For example, in Figure 4.2 i f  IRAQ 
is mapped onto GERMANY then HUSSEIN should be mapped onto HITLER. How this parallel 
connectivity is actually worked out depends on the mapping rules adopted, In the next section 
two views o f parallel connectivity are examined.
4 .3  R u le s  F o r  M a p p in g
In general, SA can be viewed as involving mappings between domains. These domains can be 
represented as graphs. SA then becomes a process whereby graphs and sub-graphs are placed 
into correspondence. The main problem in SA, from this perspective, is to find out what parts 
o f each graph should be placed in correspondence, Figure 4.3. This includes what parts 
should be in itia lly mapped and how parallel connectivity should be organised.
Figure 4.3 - Main problem o f structural alignment
The short answer to the question - what is mapped in SA? - is that it is the similarities 
between the two domains that gets mapped. We w ill briefly look at how two different models 
have suggested how mappings occur. Both have been implemented as computer programs. 
The first is based on the work o f Gentner (e.g. Markman &  Gentner, 2000; Bowdle &  
Gentner, 1999; Gentner 1998; Ferguson, Forbus, &  Gentner, 1997; Gentner &  Markman, 
1997 ), the second is based on a broader conception o f cognition and how central SA is to 
human thinking (Veale, 1995). Both attempt to account for metaphor and analogy, where an 
interpretation is the largest isomorphic sub-graph found. However, we are not so much 
interested in how a final interpretation is created but with how each model in itia lly finds 
mappings. We w ill only examine the processes that find the initial mappings and we w ill not 
delve into procedures for cleaning mappings, i.e. the removal o f irrelevant mappings, or how 
an actual interpretation is generated for a metaphor or analogy.
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4 .3 .1  S M E  (T h e  S tr u c t u r e  M a p p in g  E n g in e )
SME is short for the structure mapping engine and was devised to account for analogy 
(Forbus, Ferguson &  Gentner, 1994; Falkenhainer, Forbus &  Gentner, 1989). The way the 
alignment works in the structure mapping engine is set out in Table 4.5. Returning to the 
question o f similarity raised in Section 4.1, similarity becomes a structural question. Cross­
domain mappings should take place between corresponding sub-structures.
Table 4.5 Alignment Rules
1. O b jects in the b a se  and  target are p laced  in c o rresp o n d en ce .
2 . R e la tio n s b e tw e e n  o b je c ts  in the b a se  are  m ap p ed  a c r o ss  to  s im ilar  
rela tion s in the target.
3 . M ap  the a rg u m en ts  o f  th e  re la tion s m ap p ed  in  2. A b o v e .
4. A p p ly  th e  p r in c ip le  o f  sy s te m a tic ity  and  g a th er  th e  largest o f  m ap p in gs
The rules for finding the largest isomorphic subset involve the removal o f a number o f 
mappings. Only one-to-one mappings between the in itia l relations and the arguments o f 
relations are allowed. Mappings, which break with this one-to-one mapping, are discarded. 
Mappings between objects that are not involved in any other system o f relations are also 
discarded.
The rules become clearer when the representations o f the domains is understood. Figure 4.4 
shows the representation o f two domains: simple water flow  and heatflow. The analogy 
behind these representations is that in simple terms heat flow  is like water flow. Note that the 
domains are represented in terms o f objects and more importantly the relations between 
objects. Objects are referred to as entities. Expressions involve relations between objects and 
other expressions.
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(defD escrip tion  w ater-flow  
entities
(w ater beaker vial pipe) 
expressions
(((flow  beaker vial w ater pipe) :name w flow ) 
((pressure beaker) :nam e pressure-beaker)
((pressure vial) :nam e pressure-vial)
((greater p ressure-beaker pressure-vial) :nam e 
>pressure)
((greater (d iam eter beaker) (diam eter vial)) :nam e 
>diam eter)
((cause > pressure  w flow ) :nam e cause-flow)
((flat-top w ater))
((liquid w ater))))
W ater flow:
(defD escrip tion  heat-flow  
entities
(heat coffee ice-cube bar) 
expressions
(((flow  coffee ice-cube heat bar) :nam e hflow) 
((tem perature  coffee) :nam e tem perature-coffee) 
((tem perature ice-cube) :name tem perature-ice-cube) 
((g reater tem perature-coffee tem perature-ice-cube) 
:nam e > tem perature)
((flat-top  coffee))
((liquid coffee))))
H eat Flow:
F mure 4.4 - Representations o f water flow and heat flow
The exact implementation o f SME (Forbus et al., 1994; Falkenhainer et al., 1989) adheres 
broadly to the notions o f SA that were outlined in the parent section. To sum up the mapping 
rules o f SME there are three basic steps:
1. Objects in a domain are mapped
2. Relations are mapped
3. The arguments o f relations are mapped recursively
In SME all possible mappings, according to the rules (1), (2) and (3) are made. From this 
large set o f mappings a great number are culled or removed. Taking the examples in Figure
4,4 the following mappings would occur. In itia lly all objects are mapped against each other. 
So water maps onto heat, beaker, vial etc. In itia lly there are no one-to-one mappings for 
objects. Relations with similar predicate names and the same number o f arguments are 
mapped. For example the relations named wflow maps onto hflow (in Figure 4.4 relations are 
given specific names or abbreviations), as both are relations with the predicate name flow  and 
both have the same arity. The relations >pressure and >diameter both map onto 
> temperature. The next stage is to map the arguments o f relations. This is done recursively, 
so mapping >pressure onto >temperature results in mapping pressure-beaker onto
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temperature-coffee and pressure-vial onto temperature-ice-cube. The arguments o f these 
relations are then mapped, this results in beaker being mapped onto coffee and vial being 
mapped onto ice-cube.
So far these mappings appear to have little in common w ith the principles o f SA which we 
outlined. There seems to be unconstrained mapping between the two representations in Figure 
4.4. However, in the cleaning up stage mappings which break with the principles are 
removed. We w ill not go into further details as to how an interpretation is generated. But 
essentially the largest connected set o f mappings is sought. A t the start o f the mapping 
process all objects are mapped onto each other. However, when the arguments o f relations are 
mapped then further object mappings are found, e.g. mapping beaker onto coffee. These 
mappings are selected over ones that are not related to other mappings. When there are two or 
more conflicting mappings (i.e. there is a one-to-many mapping) the mapping which 
harmonises with the most other mappings is kept, all the others are removed. Both the 
principles o f systematicity and parallel connectivity are upheld by favouring mappings that 
involve the largest set o f mappings between connected relations.
Mapping or the alignment process in itia lly  involves attempting to create all possible 
mappings between the two representations. Rules are then applied to tidy up these mappings. 
Obviously, the larger the representations, the larger the number o f mappings. In general, all 
models o f structural alignment have to deal with large numbers o f mappings.
4 .3 .2  S a p p e r
The Sapper model (Veale, 1995) is more than just a model o f metaphor; Sapper is based 
around a parallel network model o f memory. The process o f SA results in new links being 
created in the network. The central idea behind using a model o f memory is that the cross­
domain mappings which SA models actually occur in memory and so a prospective model 
should reflect this. This in turn makes the approach cognitively plausible. It is also similar to 
the approach that Constraint Theory (Costello, 1996; Costello &  Keane, 1998; Costello &  
Keane, 2000) takes, where concept combination involves a large knowledge base.
Apart from the fact that cross-domain mappings occur in memory and that this should be 
modelled, one other crucial point should be noted. Allow ing cross-domain mappings to occur 
across a model o f memory allows the researcher to draw in knowledge outside o f the concepts 
being compared but which is still part o f the network. This cannot be done with SME 
(Falkenhainer, Forbus &  Gentner, 1989), the initial representations are the sole information 
that SME works on.
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The name Sapper is derived from the fact that the model attempts to recognise cross-domam 
bridges. These cross-domain bridges are really types o f similarity that are used to create 
interpretations later on. They exist in the network as a part o f memory. There are two types o f 
cross-domain bridges: ones resulting from the "triangulation rule", ones resulting from the 
"squaring rule". Before the rules are outlined the nature o f the representations used should be 
examined. The types o f representation that Sapper uses are presented in Figure 4.5, which 
gives a representation for SPORTSCAR. The network w ill consist o f numerous other concepts, 
e.g. representations o f 'car paint1, 'car seat', 'combustion chamber'. The whole network is the 
input that the squaring rules and triangulation rules take.
D efconcept(sports_car,
[[isa, autom obile, vehicle, m ode_of_transportation],
[surface, car_paint],
[part, car_bodyw ork, car_w heel, car_hood],
[interior, chassis, car_seat],
[attr, b ig, fast, sleek],
[interior, com bustion_cham ber, catalytic_converter, engine]]).
Figure 4.5 - Representation o f SPORTSCAR
The triangulation rule builds a bridge between concepts that share similar properties. Consider 
the concept SCALPEL and the concept CLEAVER. Both are knives, both are sharp and both are 
instruments. In essence, the representations o f concepts are checked to see i f  the same slot and 
slot value occur in both concepts. For example, i f  both representations had the relation 
a ttribu te  SHARP then a similarity would be found. This similarity would result in a link being 
built between the concept SCALPEL and the concept CLEAVER. In Figure 4.6 this link is marked 
(1). The squaring rule builds on the links created by the triangulation rule. When a similarity 
is found between concepts, a link is also placed between parent concepts. A  parent concept 
for SCALPEL could be a concept such as SURGEON. A parent concept for SCALPEL might be 
BUTCHER. A link would be placed in memory between the concepts SURGEON and BUTCHER. 
The concept SURGEON must link to the concept SCALPEL with the same link as BUTCHER to 
CLEAVER. For example, both might con tro l the respective KNIFE concepts. The bridge built by 
the squaring rule is marked (2) in Figure 4.6.
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F igu re 4 .6  - S q u arin g  and  tria im u la lio n  ru les in S ap p er  (V e a le . 1995)
T a k in g  th e  m etap h or "A g e n e r a l is a su rgeon"  a s  a starting  p o in t, w e  w ill o u tlin e  th e  m ap p in g  
p ro cess  o f  S ap p er, a lth o u g h  w e  w ill  not o u tlin e  a fu ll in terpretation  for this m etaphor. It 
sh o u ld  a lso  h e n oted  that in F igu re 4 .7  and 4 .7  the rep resen ta tio n s form  part o f  a  larger  
n etw ork  and  so  arc in c o m p le te  ( in c o m p le te  in that m ore in form ation  is required  for S ap p er to  
su c c e e d ) . B y  co n tra st, in F igu re  4 .4  the rep resen ta tio n s arc c o m p le te , th e se  arc all S M E  
requires.
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defconcept(general, [
[isa, 0.5, soldier, person],
¡prototype, george_patten, napoleon],
[attr, 0.6, old, 0.7, influential, control, 
powerful, 0.5, intelligent, educated, 
military school, warlike, arrogant, agressive, 
battlefield],
[control, 0.5, army, nerve gas, atomic bomb, 
command centre, snub_fighter, bomber_plane, 
soldier],
[depend, 0.5, army],
[create, 0.5, military_propaganda, plan], 
[affect, 0.5, army, -0.7, enemy_army, 
enemy soldier, 0.8, soldier],
[perform, 0.5, bombing_raid, 0.1, 
cavalrycharge],
[part, 0.5, military_uniform]
])•
G eneral:
defconcept(surgeon, [
[isa, 0.5, profession, doctor, person],
[depend, -0.7, cardiac arrest, 0.5, 
medicaltextbook],
[attr, 0.7, intelligent, 0.85, educated, 0.9, 
precise, 0.6, dextrous, 0.8, skilful, 0.6, 
influential, 0.75, well_paid, 0.5, 
operating-theatre, 0.8, delicate, 0.25, blood, 0.9, 
medicalschool],
[affect, -0.7, cancer, 0.5, life, 0.05, corpse,
0.8, patient, 0.5, circulatory_system, 0.7, 
humanflesh],
[perform, 0.5, hypocratic oath, pre op, 0.9, 
surgery],
[control, 0.5, circulatory system, 
radiation therapy, disinfectant, scalpel],
[part, 0.5, surgical glove, surgical mask, 
whitesmock]
])•
Surgeon:
Figure 4.7 - Representation for GENERAL and SURGEON
Soldier: Patient:
defconcept(soldier, [ Defconcept(patient, [
[isa, 0.5, element, combatant, person], [isa, 0.5, person],
[part, 0.5, torso, arm, leg, head], [part, 0.5, torso, arm, leg, head],
[attr, 0.7, healthy, 0.5, military uniform, [attr, 0.7, healthy]
combat, expendable] ])•
])■
F igu re 4 .8  - R ep resen ta tion  fo r  SOLDIER and  PATIENT
We have described two rules for mapping, the triangulation and squaring rules. These are 
applied to all concepts in the network. These rules note the similarity between concepts and 
are build what are known as bridges. For this example such a bridge may be built between 
SOLDIER and PATIENT. Both share a number o f similarities, they are p erso n s  and share similar 
parts, e.g. torso, leg. As a result o f the triangulation rule a bridge is built between these two
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concepts. The squaring rule builds bridges between the parents o f these concepts. For 
example, a bridge would be built between SURGEON and GENERAL. However this would not be 
the only bridge created, any concept that is one link from either SOLDIER and PATIENT would 
also have a bridge built between them. Depending on the size o f the network the number o f 
bridges could be huge. For example, i f  the concept SURGERY is linked to PATIENT and WAR 
linked to SOLDIER then a bridge would be built between SURGERY and WAR. Considering the 
metaphor "a general is a surgeon" this may be an interesting mapping. However, other bridges 
would be built, e.g. perhaps a bridge could be made between the concept TANK and the 
concept HOSPITAL.
I f  structural alignment is a comparison process that gives rise to mappings then the products 
o f the triangulation rules and the squaring rules, the bridges, are the mappings. O f course the 
actual interpretation o f the metaphor w ill be more complex than we have shown. Particular 
mappings or bridges w ill have to be favoured over others. For example, although SOLDIER 
maps onto PATIENT it would also map onto SURGEON and DOCTOR, but these bridges are the 
ones that Sapper creates. The interpretation o f a metaphor w ill involve the selection o f the 
most appropriate bridge
4 .4  C o m p a r in g  S M E  a n d  S a p p e r
SA was introduced as a process that generates cross-domain mappings or correspondences 
between domains. This notion o f cross-domain mappings is central to the Contemporary 
Theory o f Metaphor (Lakoff, 1993). As SA has been modelled by Sapper (Veale, 1995) and 
SME (Forbus et al., 1994; Falkenhainer et al., 1989) SA is a comparison process that places 
conceptual structures in correspondence. Dual Process Theory (Wisniewski, 1997a; 
Wisniewski, 1997b) has attempted to apply this process to concept combination, albeit in a 
limited way.
Sapper (Veale, 1995) and SME (Forbus et al., 1994; Falkenhainer et al., 1989) can be 
examined more abstractly in terms o f a process that has inputs and outputs. For example, 
SME takes two inputs and generates an output. Figure 4.8 shows a very simple representation 
o f this. The main point to note is that the comparison can only access the two input boxes. 
These boxes would contain information such as that displayed in Figure 4.9, no other 
knowledge is accessed. Dual Process Theory (Wisniewski, 1997a; Wisniewski, 1997b) treats 
alignment in the same way. Both the head and modifier are the only inputs and no further 
information is drawn. Alignment in Dual Process Theory is only involved in property-based 
interpretations.
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Figure 4.9 - Inputs in SME
Sapper (Veale, 1995) introduces a clever variation on this. In Sapper, SA does involve two 
inputs but in a sense there is just one input: the model o f memory. In Figure 4.10 the large 
rectangular box with the dotted lines represents the model o f memory in terms o f a network. 
The inputs are part o f this network. The process o f alignment involves activating parts o f this 
network. The actual inputs used depend on what has been activated. Information outside o f a 
usual representation o f a concept is found within the range o f activation. In general, this leads 
to the possibility o f world knowledge being brought into play.
Figure 4.10 - Inputs in Sapper
The type o f representation that Sapper (Veale, 1995) uses offers advantages over the other 
approaches. Using a network model o f memory, world knowledge can be brought to bear on 
the interpretation process. This world knowledge would consist o f information that is related 
to the inputs. This related information can be found by seeing what the inputs are linked to. 
We suggest that models o f SA should adopt this type o f representation,
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What are to be the representations that w ill make up the network or knowledge base? Again 
there is a choice between Sapper (Veale, 1995) and SME (Forbus et al., 1994; Falkenhainer 
et al., 1989). SME assumes that representations are structured and that they are made up o f 
entities, attributes, functions and relations. These "building blocks" can be defined as follows:
1. Entities - objects (e.g. building-1) .
2. Attributes - representational elements that provide descriptive information (e.g. 
ta ll[ building-1 ]) .
3. Functions - map values onto the other "building blocks" (e.g. color(building-l) = 
gray).
4. Relations - these are representational elements that relate two or more entities, 
attributes or other relations (e.g. tallerf building-1, building-2 ]).
This is quite different to the types o f representations that have been used in accounting for 
concept combination (e.g. Table 3.1, Figure 3.4). The difference can be highlighted by 
examining Tables 4.1 and 4.2. The representations here are not representations o f the planets 
themselves; they are representations o f relations between these concepts. SME has a tendency 
to not so much provide a representation o f an object but o f situations. Objects are only treated 
within this context o f situations. This suggests it may be unsuitable with respect to concept 
combination. The representations that Sapper uses are similar to the ones used by models o f 
concept combination.
The representations that are chosen also affect the type o f similarity rules that are applied. 
Simply speaking, it is d ifficu lt for SME (Forbus et al., 1994; Falkenhainer et al., 1989) and 
Sapper (Veale, 1995) to have the same sim ilarity rules as the rules reflect the representations. 
As both have different representations, it is not surprising that they have different similarity 
rules. SME for example, places little emphasis on what is termed attributes but emphasises 
similarities based on relations to capture structural similarity. Sapper also emphasises 
structural similarity but does so using the attributes that SME largely disregards.
As noted in Section 3.5 we have actually already committed ourselves to a type o f 
representation. We have adopted a frame-based approach to representation (following 
Selective Modification (Smith et al., 1988 ) and Concept Specialisation (Murphy, 1988)). 
These frames w ill be organised into a knowledge base (following Constraint Theory 
(Costello, 1996; Costello &  Keane, 1998; Costello &  Keane, 2000)). This is actually the same 
approach that Sapper adopts to nominal metaphor interpretation. This suggests that the
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mapping rules o f Sapper or something very similar w ill be suitable for our approach to 
concept combination.
4 .5  D e e p  a n d  S h a llo w  S im ila r it ie s
Having settled on what inputs the comparison process takes, a new question arises: what does 
the comparison process result in? We argue that the comparison process gives rise to two 
types o f similarity: one based on simple features (commonalities) and one based on structural 
similarity. In Section 4.2, similarity was discussed, as was the contrast model o f Tversky 
(1977), which is based on contrasting the simple features that exist between concepts. 
However, we also pointed out that in relation to similarity-based comparisons, simple 
f e a t u r e -b a s e d  approaches were not sufficient to account for subjects' similarity judgements 
(e.g. Markman &  Wisniewski, 1997). Research on metaphor and analogy, e.g. Markman &  
Gentner (1993), suggests that subjects can also find s t r u c tu r a l  s im ila r it ie s  between concepts. 
Ultimately, subjects can find similarities based on both simple features and structure. We 
suggest that the comparison process gives rise to at least two types o f mapping:
1. Shallow similarities - based on simple features (commonalities)
2. Deep similarities - based on structural similarity
Interestingly, both these types o f similarity are captured to some extent by the Sapper model 
(Veale, 1995). The first type o f sim ilarity is one where an aspect o f one structure exists in 
another. In our work it involves the same slot existing in both the contrasted representations. 
Consider the concepts CAT and DOG. How are these two concepts similar? One response may 
be to say that both are PETS. To represent that a CAT or a DOG is a PET an Is-a slot may be used 
where the slot value is PET. I f  both representations contained this same slot name and slot 
value, then a similarity has been found. This corresponds to a simple feature based model o f 
similarity and to the triangulation rule o f Sapper (Veale, 1995). We w ill to this as a shallow 
similarity and elaborate further on this component o f our model at the end o f this section.
Structural similarity can be captured in many ways. In Section 4.3, two models, SME (Forbus 
et al., 1994; Falkenhainer et al., 1989) and Sapper (Veale, 1995), each with different mapping 
rules were outlined. We favour the approach o f Sapper as it already captures similarity based 
on commonality (via the triangulation rule). The squaring rule o f Sapper notes structural 
sim ilarity between conceptual representations, we refer to this type o f similarity as a deep 
sim ilarity. We w ill now consider both types o f similarity, shallow similarity and deep 
similarity, in relation to two examples: a comparison between CAT and DOG, and an extended 
comparison between SCALPEL and CLEAVER (first introduced in Section 4.3.2).
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In Table 4.6 the concepts CAT and DOG are represented. These concepts share a large number 
o f commonalities. Apart from both being PETS, both CAT and DOG share similarities in relation 
to body parts. Overall, this suggests that the two concepts are actually quite similar. The 
commonalities between the concepts CAT and DOG are presented visually in Figure 4.11. On 
the basis o f these commonalities we suggest that a shallow sim ilarity exists between the 
concepts CAT and DOG.
T a b le  4 .6  - R ep resen ta tio n  o f  CAT and DOG
DOG CAT
Is-a: PET, CANINE 
Parts: LEG, HEAD, TORSO, TAIL 
Noise: BARK 
Pesonality: LOYAL
Is-a: PET, FELINE 
Parts: LEG, HEAD, TORSO, TAIL 
Noise: MEOUW 
Personality: INDEPENDENT
Figure 4 .11- Shallow similarity between CAT and DOG
The second type o f sim ilarity is one that is found in Sapper (Veale, 1995), and is based on the 
notion that though in itia lly  one concept may be mapped onto another, further mappings can 
be created from these in itia l mappings based on the larger structure that the initial mappings 
are part of. For example, in terms o f a frame representation, suppose a concept A  is like 
another concept B i f  both A  and B share a number o f identical attributes and value pairs, i.e. 
both concepts share a shallow similarity. Two further concepts that link to concept A  and B
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may also now be linked together, i f  they share the same link label. This should become 
clearer as we look at an example involving the concepts SCALPEL and CLEAVER, and the 
concepts BUTCHER and SURGEON. This similarity encompasses shallow similarity but captures 
the structural similarities between representations.
Table 4.7 describes the concepts SCAL,PEL and CLEAVER in terms o f a frame, with properties 
described in terms o f slot name and slot value pairs. The concepts represented in Table 4.7 
should be part o f a wider network that has information on what a KNIFE is and who uses a 
SCALPEL and CLEAVER and so on. It is d ifficult to define concepts in isolation as they exist and 
are understood in relation to other concepts.
Table 4.7- Representations for SCALPEL and CLEAVER
SCALPEL CLEAVER
Isa:
Part:
Attribute:
UsedJor:
KNIFE, INSTRUMENT 
BLADE, HANDLE 
SMALL, NARROW, 
SHARP 
CUTTING
Isa:
P a rt:
A ttr ib u te :
UsedJor:
KNIFE, INSTRUMENT 
BLADE, HANDLE 
BIG, WIDE, SHARP
CUTTING
Viewing the contents o f Table 4.7 it can be said that a scalpel is like a cleaver in the following 
ways:
1. Both are knives
2. Both are instruments
3. Both are sharp
4. Both are used for cutting
A ll these similarities (1 - 4) are commonalities. For example, (1) can be found because both 
the representations for SCALPEL and the concept CLEA VER have the same slot name is-a  and 
same slot value. (3) can be found because both have the slot name attribute and slot value 
"sharp". Figure 4.11 shows that the concept SURGEON links to the concept SCALPEL via the 
relation control. The link between the concepts BUTCHER and CLEAVER is also the control 
relation.
The deep sim ilarity mapping suggests that on the basis o f the shallow similarity between 
SCALPEL and CLEAVER the concepts SURGEON and BUTCHER should also be linked. This 
mapping is termed deep similarity as it builds on the first type o f similarity and it captures 
structural similarity. The appropriateness o f these mappings is only apparent when they are
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used in a suitable context. In interpreting the metaphor "M y surgeon is a butcher" it may be 
profitable to see the similarities between the concepts SCALPEL and CLEAVER and the concepts 
SURGEON and BUTCHER. Consider also Figure 4.10 again, many deep similarities can be 
created on the basis o f the shallow similarity between the concepts CAT and DOG. For 
example, CANINE can map onto FELINE as both have the same relation (isa ) and occupy the 
same corresponding place in the structure. However, the deep similarity mappings that are 
found for Figure 4.12 should also include mappings between NARROW and BIG which seem 
inappropriate for any context. What mappings are used depends on the context o f the 
interpretation. In the next chapter we w ill suggest that the interpretation o f noun-noun 
combinations are based on deep similarities or shallow similarities.
F igu re 4 . 1 2 -  C reation  o f  d e e p  s im ilarity  b e tw e e n  SCAI.PE!. and CLEAVER
Having given an outline o f shallow and deep similarity we now present in Table 4.8 our 
conception o f the rules for how these two similarities should be computed between concepts. 
We also suggest that deep similarities should be treated recursively, so they can encompass as 
much structure as possible and also ultimately be grounded in shallow similarities or i f  
possible, other deep similarities. These rules also reflect an interesting distinction between the 
two. Deep similarities capture structural similarity while shallow similarities are based on 
shared attributes and features between concepts.
Figure 4.13 the concepts A1 and Cl share two commonalities, X I  and Y1 via the links p  and 
k, respectively. As the concepts E l and D1 link to A1 and C l via the same relation, g , a deep
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similarity can be found between the two concepts E l and D l. Our mapping rules differ from 
Sapper (Veale, 1995) as discussed in Section 4.3.2 above, in that a shallow similarity requires 
two or more commonalities, whereas in Sapper a bridge can be based on a single 
commonality. Sapper, however, includes numerical weights to indicate the strength o f a 
bridge (mapping) based on the number o f supporting commonalities. Note, though, the 
similarity between Figure 4.13 and Figure 4.6.
Table 4.8 - Rules for finding shallow similarities and deep similarities 
Shallow Similarity:
W h ere  a  c o n c e p t A  and a c o n c e p t B sh are  at lea st tw o  c o m m o n a lit ie s  a sh a llo w  sim ila r ity  
e x is t s  b e tw e e n  both  c o n c e p ts .
Decp Similarity:
W h ere  a  c o n c e p t A  and  a c o n c e p t B sh are  at lea st tw o  sh a llo w  s im ila r it ie s , a  d eep  s im ila r ity  
can  b e  created  b e tw een  a n y  tw o  c o n c e p ts  that link to  A  and  B r e sp e c t iv e ly  th rou gh  th e  sa m e  
relation .
Further to  th is, w h e n  a  c o n c e p t A  and  a  c o n c e p t B sh are  a d eep  s im ila r ity , a  further d eep  
s im ila r ity  can  b e crea ted  b e tw e e n  a n y  tw o  c o n c e p ts  that link  to  A  and B  r e sp e c t iv e ly  through  
the sa m e  re la tio n . T h is  c a n  be a p p lied  recu rsiv e ly .
One o f the basic tenets o f structure-mapping theory is that there should be a one-to-one 
correspondence between concepts and/or relation names. When SME (Forbus et al., 1994; 
Falkcnhainer et al., 1989) is run, many mappings are generated. Mappings, which break with 
this tenet, are dropped. In Sapper (Veale, 1995) the firs t dormant bridge (mapping) becomes 
the basis for the interpretation. We suggest that shallow similarities can be given a score 
based on the number o f commonalities they are based on (which would be a score o f at least 
two). Where there is a choice between a mapping based on a deep similarity and a shallow 
sim ilarity then the deep sim ilarity w ill be favored. I f  a concept can be mapped onto more than 
one concept via different deep similarity relations, then the deep similarity built on the largest 
structure w ill be used to generate an interpretation.
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C o m m onality D eep sim ila rityShallow  s im ila rity
Figure 4 13 - Commonality, shallow similarity and deep similarity 
4 .6  A n  E x a m p le :  A p p ly in g  S A  T o  C o n c e p t  C o m b in a t io n
Our discussion o f SA has suggested that it gives rise to two types o f similarity: shallow and 
deep. However, it has not been stated how these either o f these two types o f similarity can 
account for concept combination. As already mentioned, the next chapter attempts to answer 
this question in detail but as a first pass the combination 'robin snake' is examined in SA 
terms. The combination 'robin snake' can be interpreted as a »  a snake that hunts robins « .  
Taking this as our example, we w ill outline how SA can account for this interpretation. Firstly 
the concepts ROBIN and SNAKE are represented as frames in Table 4.9. These representations 
attempt to capture general knowledge about these concepts. It also contains prototypical 
information about these concepts, e.g. robins generally hunt worms, snakes generally eat 
rodents, such as mice.
Table 4.9 - Representations o f ROBIN and SNAKE
ROBIN SNAKE
Is-a: ANIMAL, BIRD,
P erform s: FLIES, 0.6, HUNTS, 0 .4  
E ats: WORM
P a n s :  RED BREAST, WINGS,
A Hr: SMALL, WEAK
Is-a: ANIMAL, REPTILE 
P erform s: SLITHERS, HUNTS 
H unts: MOUSE
P a rts: FORKED TONGUE, SCALES,
A Hr: LONG, THIN, CYLINDRICAL, STRONG
The alignment process would compare ROBIN and SNAKE. This would be achieved by 
comparing every sub-concept o f ROBIN with every sub-concept o f SNAKE. This process can 
give rise to shallow and deep similarities ( i f  any exist). We suggest that ROBIN could be 
mapped onto the MOUSE concept o f SNAKE. Why would this mapping take place? Depending 
on the representation o f MOUSE there may be a number o f commonalities between MOUSE and
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ROBIN. Perhaps both are small and weak and a shallow similarity could be mapped between 
the two. Thus, ROBIN could replace this concept in SNAKE. Alternatively, an interpretation o f 
'robin snake', such as »  a snake eaten by a robin «  may involve the concept SNAKE 
replacing WORM in ROBIN. Note that we have found these interpretations via the similarities 
that exist between the concepts and their related concepts. In the next chapter we describe six 
combination types in terms o f SA. SA gives rise to both deep and shallow similarities and 
both are important for interpreting combinations.
4 .7  Is  C o n c e p t  C o m b in a t io n  th e  S a m e  as M e ta p h o r ?
One o f the central ideas behind the SA view o f concept combination is that concept 
combination and metaphor have the same underlying process but are distinct cognitive 
entities. Both Sapper (Veale, 1995) and SME (Forbus et al., 1994; Falkenhainer et al., 1989) 
deal w ith similar classes o f problems: metaphor and analogy. Yet concept combination is not 
metaphor nor is it analogy. SA involves a comparison process between conceptual structures. 
The conceptual structures can be treated as graphs or trees. In metaphor the largest 
isomorphic sub-graph is found. This is probably not the case w ith a large class o f noun-noun 
compounds. Our assumption about concept combination is that it does not always give rise to 
the largest isomorphic sub-graphs, rather several distinct things can happen with respect to the 
alignment o f the modifier and the head. In the next chapter we w ill show that concept 
combination can be treated in terms o f fixed patterns o f alignment. It is these fixed patterns o f 
alignment that distinguishes concept combination from metaphor and other processes based 
on SA. A t its simplest the interpretation o f a combination w ill be based on a deep similarity or 
a shallow similarity.
In terms o f the two types o f similarity we have introduced we suggest that the interpretation 
o f a metaphor can be conceived as building the largest set o f linked deep similarities. For 
example, interpreting "a composer is a general" would involve finding deep similarities 
between subconcepts o f the base and target but also probably deep similarities between the 
daughters o f these subconcepts. O f course this set o f nested deep similarities would have to 
conform to the principles o f structural alignment, i.e. involve one-to-one mappings, display 
parallel connectivity and systematicity. The interpretation o f combinations, however, may 
rely on shallow similarities as well as deep similarities. We suggest that this is one o f the 
critical differences between metaphor and concept combination.
4 .8  A r g u m e n ts  A g a in s t  A p p ly in g  S tr u c t u r a l  A l ig n m e n t  T o  C o n c e p t  C o m b in a t io n
A t this stage it should be acknowledged that here have been a number o f arguments put 
forward against SA being involved in concept combination (Keane &  Costello, 2001). These
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arguments arise from discussions between the proponents o f Dual Process Theory 
(Wisniewski, 1997a, 1997b) and Constraint theory (Costello, 1996; Costello &  Keane, 1998; 
Costello &  Keane, 2000). Although these arguments are directly applied to Dual Process 
Theory they should be examined here as we are arguing that SA is central to concept 
combination. There are six main arguments in Keane &  Costello's (2001):
1. Speed o f interpretation
2. Analogies can be extended
3. Analogy and concept combination serve different functions
4. Combinations have alternative meanings which analogy does not have
5. Limited pragmatic context
6. Empirical findings
We outline each o f these briefly and suggest that they are, in the main, weak arguments 
against applying SA to concept combination.
1 Speed o f interpretation
Keane &  Costello (2001) point out that the interpretation o f combinations is rapid whereas 
the interpretation o f analogies is often slow and considered. This is interesting as it suggests 
that we cannot have fast interpretations via SA. Taking this to its logical conclusion, we could 
argue that any metaphors or figurative language that occur in common discourse cannot be 
the result o f SA. This seems to contradict much o f the work done in the area.
2 Analogies can be extended
It is quite clear that many analogies can be extended. In terms o f SA we can suggest that 
further mappings can occur. Keane &  Costello (2001) say this is not true o f concept 
combination. However, there are some combinations that can be extended. These 
combinations are often figurative, e.g. when interpreting 'maths clin ic1, it could be said that a 
"teacher is like a doctor" and so on. The fact that many combinations cannot be extended, 
which we concede to Keane &  Costello (2001), does not by itse lf mean that the interpretation 
o f combinations is based on SA.
3 Analogy and concept combination serve different functions
Keane and Costello (2001) suggest that concept combination and analogy serve different 
functions in language. However, this just suggests that concept combination and analogy are 
distinct, not that SA cannot occur in concept combination. Consider metaphor and analogy, it 
could be argued that they both serve a different purpose in language. An analogy is more
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pedagogical than metaphor and often people are explicitly given more o f the mappings in an 
analogy than in a metaphor. So when a subject uses the 'Rutherford atom' analogy we should 
expect them to say things such as "the nucleus is like the sun". This is to be expected because 
analogies are often used to teach people. Yet we would not say that because o f this different 
purpose metaphor does not involve SA.
4 C o m b in a tio n s  h a v e  a ltern a tiv e  m ea n in g s  w h ich  a n a lo g y  d o es  n ot h a v e
Many combinations are extremely polysemous, in that they w ill have multiple meanings. 
Keane &  Costello (2001) say that this is not true o f analogies where there is generally only 
one interpretation available. Again, we can simply say that they have demonstrated that 
analogy and concept combination are different.
Related to this is the fact the metaphors can also be quite polysemous, although context may 
often serve to hide this. Consider that when Romeo says 'Juliet is the sun', we gather from the 
context o f the story that Juliet is not a large fiery mass. But in a situation without a context 
this is only one possible interpretation. Other interpretations are possible, e.g., »  Juliet is the 
sun - because she never comes out at n igh t« ,  »  Juliet is the sun, i f  you get too close you'll 
be destroyed « .  Considering this, we would not say that metaphor cannot involve SA. 
Polysemy in itse lf offers no evidence o f this. We must remember that we use combinations in 
everyday language where the context must remove much o f the polysemy. I f  this were not the 
case, we would have extreme difficulty in even carrying out the simplest conversation due to 
the large number o f meanings that could be derived from the speaker's utterances.
5 Limited pragmatic context
Here, we find ourselves disagreeing with Keane and Costello (2001) in the strongest terms. 
They suggest that the pragmatic context o f combinations is limited in that they are only used 
to convey information in a compact and concise way. This just simply is not the case. 
Combinations occur wherever language is used and so must be used in practically every 
context - contexts, where people are serious, where people are playing and where people are 
lying.
The clearest example that we can offer o f  this is in the use o f euphemism. A  euphemism is 
generally defined as the use o f a word or a phrase in substitution o f something more 
offensive. Sometimes these euphemisms are used to hide the truth, e.g. we now have terms 
like 'collateral damage' for »  civilian deaths «  and 'friendly fire' for »  troops killed by 
their own side « .  These combinations do not involve the conveying o f information in a 
compact and concise way.
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6 Empirical findings
The sixth point that Keane and Costello (2001) make is based on empirical findings. 
However, these findings involve comparisons between Dual Process theory and Constraint 
Theory. We would like to suggest that Dual Process Theory is the straw man o f SA. It does 
involve SA but proposes an additional process o f scenario-creation. As such it is a step in the 
right direction but is in itse lf unw illing to see SA as the fundamental underlying process. Over 
the last number o f years Costello and Keane have largely shown that their model offers the 
best fit to the phenomena o f concept combination when compared to Dual Process Theory 
(e.g. Costello &  Keane, 1997; Costello &  Keane, 1998; Costello &  Keane, 2000). However, 
this in itself does not absolutely rule out that SA is involved. It merely suggests that Dual 
Process Theory is not as successful as Constraint Theory. There is also some evidence for SA 
that Keane and Costello (2001) did not consider, the existence o f figurative combinations.
In essence, we suggest that concept combination is not analogy. This does not mean though, 
that concept combination cannot involve SA. I f  we were to take this view then we put 
ourselves in a strange position where someone could argue that the same goes for metaphor: 
metaphor is not analogy, and so cannot involve SA. Even when many researchers (e.g. Veale, 
1995, Markman &  Gentner, 2000) assume that it  does seem to share the same underlying 
process.
4 .9  C h a p te r  S u m m a r y
This chapter opened by introducing similarity. A  comparison process gives rise to similarities 
and differences. We suggested that similarity involves more than simple features but also 
structural similarity. Examples from analogy were given to show how structural similarity is 
important. The principles o f SA were then outlined. They are: one-to-one mapping, 
systematicity, parallel connectivity. Different rules for implementing these principles were 
given. Our view o f SA was then set forth. SA should be set against a background o f a 
knowledge base or a network. The representations in this network should be like the ones 
used in concept combination research already, i.e. they should be frame-based. The alignment 
process gives rise to shallow similarity and deep similarity. The process o f concept 
combination relies on both. An example o f SA in concept combination was given where an 
interpretation relied on deep similarity. In the next chapter, more examples w ill be given 
when six combination types are introduced. The arguments against applying SA in concept 
combination were looked at. Although interesting, these arguments do not really suggest that 
SA cannot be applied to concept combination.
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Chapter 5 - A Structural Alignment View of Concept Combination
In this chapter a new approach to concept combination is set out. This approach sees 
structural alignment as the core process in concept combination. This model is motivated by 
an attempt to account for world knowledge, polysemy and figurative language in concept 
combination with a single mechanism. This model also suggests that a single syntactic form, 
the noun-noun compound, can give rise to several distinct types o f semantic interpretations. 
These distinct types o f interpretation involve different patterns o f structural alignment. Some 
interpretations o f noun-noun compounds require little processing, some require a great deal.
We explain how this new structural alignment approach deals with the three main problems o f 
concept combination. W ith respect to the problem o f world knowledge a number o f the 
combination types depend on finding a suitable context to generate an interpretation. This 
context is found in the knowledge base (a network o f concepts) and we outline how it can be 
found. Polysemy in the structural alignment approach largely results from a combination 
falling into more than one combination type. In addition, the polysemy o f an interpretation 
could also result from the lexical polysemy o f constituent nouns. Figurative combinations are 
found in the same way that literal ones are, i.e. one mechanism can generate both. After 
accounting for the three problems we outline how a rule-based implementation o f our model 
can be created.
5 .1  I n tr o d u c t io n
The structural alignment view o f concept combination suggests that structural alignment (SA) 
is the underlying mechanism in concept combination. This entails that the interpretations that 
are generated for the concept combination process are the result o f SA. SA has already been 
used to model cognitive processes, e.g. metaphor and analogy. We now argue that it can also 
be used to account for concept combination.
The division o f compounds into property-based and relation-based interpretations is one that 
is not found in our view o f concept combination. It is clear that the interpretations o f 
compounds can be divided into groups but this does not necessarily mean that the process 
itself can be similarly divided. That is, there does not have to be two distinct processes in 
concept combination because there are distinct types o f interpretation. 1
1 as, e.g. Dual Process Theory (Wisniewski, 1997a, 1997b), suggest.
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5 .1 .1  A  P u r e  S A  B a se d  A p p r o a c h  v s .  D u a l P r o c e s s  T h e o r y
The careful reader w ill have noted that SA was first introduced into the area o f concept 
combination by Dual Process Theory (Wisniewski, 1997a, 1997b). Dual Process Theory 
suggests that SA is involved in the generation o f property-based interpretations. Another 
mechanism, scenario-creation, is used to account for relation-based interpretations. This 
division o f concept combination into multiple processes suggests that SA cannot on its own 
account for concept combination, otherwise no additional mechanisms would be required. 
Our approach disagrees with Dual Process Theory and on this point suggests that SA (among 
others) can account for a large group o f combinations, including those that may be classified 
as property-based or relation-based interpretations. Our perspective on SA was given in the 
last chapter. Essentially, SA is a comparison process that gives rise to two types o f similarity: 
shallow or surface similarity and deep or structural similarity. These similarities are used to 
support different interpretations when conccpts are compared.
5 .2  A  N e w  M o d e l  B a s e d  O n  S A
The main burden in proposing that SA underlies concept combination is to describe how one 
process can generate a range o f different interpretations. Consider the compounds in Table 5.1 
and their respective interpretations.
Table 5.1 A  range o f interpretations
1. 'book cover' - » T h e  front cover part o f a b o o k «
2. 'book review' - » A  review o f a b o o k «
3. 'book shop' - » A  shop that primarily sells b oo ks«
4. 'book pirates' - »Peop le  who illegally copy and sell boo ks«
The interpretation for (1) in Table 5.1 suggests that the combination refers to an aspect o f 
BOOK. It is not so much a type o f COVER but more a part o f a BOOK. Interpretation (4) refers to 
PIRATES but does not involve pillage on the open sea, it rather seems to refer to illegally 
copying and selling books. A ll the compounds above have the same syntactic structure, they 
are made up o f a noun-noun sequence. Although they have the same syntactic structure, the 
semantic range is not so neat. The interaction between the constituent elements is not the 
same across every combination. It is proposed that there are several distinct types o f 
combination at the semantic level, and for each o f these there is a schematic pattern in terms 
o f SA.
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Figure 5.1 shows that compounds operate at both the syntactic and the semantic level. The 
semantic level may be more complex than the syntactic. In the figure, the noun-noun 
compound can give rise to several interpretations. The straight lines from the noun-noun 
compound to what we w ill refer to as the "combination types" suggest that one or more o f 
several interpretations may be possible. We suggest that the semantic form o f compounds (the 
combinations) can be categorised into combination types. Most approaches to concept 
combination have to deal w ith problems related to complexity. To reduce this complexity, we 
propose that most interpretations o f noun-noun compounds w ill fall into just one o f several 
combination types. Some o f these combination types w ill require little processing while 
others w ill require a great deal. This assumption is examined in more detail in Section 5.5.
Each combination type reflects a schematic pattern o f alignment between the concepts 
referred to by the head and the modifier. I f  the alignment falls into one o f the six patterns we 
specify in Section 5.2, then an interpretation is generated. This schematic pattern o f alignment 
may involve only one or both types o f similarity (deep and shallow) that we mentioned in 
Section 4.3. Some o f the schematic patterns o f alignment involve accessing o f world 
knowledge, some do not.
Before analysing the various combination types separately, we classify all interpretations into 
one o f two broad groups: the referential and the constructive. The division o f interpretations 
into these two groups is motivated by our desire to show that two distinct but similar 
phenomena appear to be occurring in concept combination. Sometimes, interpretations appear 
to refer to structures that already exist in memory, e.g. 'book cover'. A t other times 
interpretations are constructive: they construct something new that may be added to memory, 
e.g. 'book pirates'. O f course, when an interpreter understands a combination, its meaning is 
added to memory. We expect that when the same combination has to be understood at a future
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date, the meaning is retrieved from memory rather than reconstructed anew. A t its broadest 
the structural alignment model attempts to account for the two broad types o f combination: 
the referential, and the constructive.
5 .2 .1  C o m b in a t io n  T y p e s
To summarise, we propose that there are a number o f combination types that operate at the 
semantic level. These combination types involve fixed patterns o f alignment. Six combination 
types are proposed. These combination types are not assumed to be exhaustive but are 
expected to offer a good coverage o f all interpretations. The combination types are listed in 
Table 5.2. From this section onwards we use the terms modifier concept and head concept in 
our discussion o f combination types. The modifier concept is the concept referred to by the 
modifier while the head concept is the concept referred to by the head. We wish to emphasise 
the conceptual approach o f our work and to reinforce that the focus o f this current research is 
aimed at the semantic level, not the syntactic. Each o f the combination types listed in Table
5.2 is outlined in the next section.
Table 5.2 - Combination types
Referential:
1 . Meronymous Combinations, e.g. 'book cover'
2. Catachrestic Combinations, e.g. 'table leg'
Constructive:
3. Contextual Combinations, e.g. 'drug baron'
4. Insertion Combinations, e.g. 'fur coat'
5. Context Insertion Combinations, e.g. 'mink coat'
6. Conjoined Combinations, e.g. 'house boat'
5 .2 .1 .1  M e r o n y m o u s  C o m b in a t io n s
This type o f combination is the simplest o f the referential type, where the head concept is 
already a part o f the modifier concept. The combination is used to refer to a part o f the 
modifier concept. Consider that in the combination 'library book', a representation o f LIBRARY 
would have information regarding books, e.g. books are stored in a library and people borrow 
these books. So a 'library book1 would be » a  book from a library that can be borrowed«. 
Other examples o f this type o f combination would be: 'book cover', 'chicken wing'. 
Meronymous combination is taken from the term meronymy.2 Meronymy is the lexical 
relation between words that denote parts and wholes o f the same concept, e.g. this
This relation is also known as parlonymy.2
relationship holds between shirt and sleeve since a sleeve is part o f a shirt. A  sleeve is a 
meronym o f shirt (and a shirt is a holonym o f sleeve).
5 .2 .1 .2  C a ta c h r e s t ic  C o m b in a t io n s
These types o f combination are slightly more complicated than the meronymous combination 
type, since the head concept is actually a metaphorical reference to an aspect o f the modifier 
concept. So as in meronymous combinations, the combination refers to a feature that already 
exists in the modifier concept. However, in this case we do not have a clear lexical term for 
this feature and use the head concept as a metaphorical reference to it. These type o f 
combinations are usually so commonplace that we are often unaware o f the metaphors 
involved. An example o f this type o f combination would be 'book spine', where S P I N E  is an 
exemplar o f back support and is used to name a part o f B O O K  that fills  a similar role. Other 
examples o f this combination are: 'bottle neck', 'table leg'. This type o f combination is named 
after the term catachresis. which is a term used in traditional rhetoric for the misapplication o f 
a word for another. However, Black (1962) uses this term for the metaphors that people use to 
f i l l  lexical gaps which appears to be the case with combinations such as 'table leg'.
5 .2 .1 .3  C o n te x tu a l  C o m b in a t io n s
One o f the assumptions behind the proposed model is that certain types o f combinations are 
knowledge intensive, in that they often appear to require a great deal o f outside information or 
world knowledge. So, it appears that some combinations draw in larger contexts. This is not 
surprising i f  one adopts a representational approach to meaning where words refer to concepts 
and these concepts are in turn made up o f other concepts. From this perspective a seemingly 
simple concept can become quite complex once analysed.
In a contextual combination the modifier concept refers to a larger conceptual structure which 
is then aligned with the head concept. Consider the combination 'loan shark1. It appears that 
the modifier concept LOAN acts as a reference to the broader context o f MONEY-LENDING, with 
an aspect o f this, MONEY-LENDER, being mapped onto SHARK. In a sense the combination is a 
'money lender shark'. Subjects appear to cram as much meaning into the noun-noun lexical 
structure as they can. Other examples o f this combination type include: 'drug baron', and 
'book pirate'. We suggest that a contextual combination can always be paraphrased in terms o f 
the imported context e.g. 'drug baron' can be paraphrased as 'drug dealer baron' and 'book 
pirate' can be paraphrased as 'book publisher pirate'.
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5 .2 .1 .4  I n s e r t io n  C o m b in a t io n s
This type o f combination does not involve drawing large amounts o f information; instead the 
modifier concept refers to an aspect o f the head concept that the modifier concept then 
replaces. Consider the combination 'fur coat'. Here the prototypical m a d e -o f feature value o f 
COAT, CLOTH, is replaced by FUR. We understand a 'fur coat' as »  a coat that's made from fur 
« .  This process involves comparing the modifier concept w ith every aspect o f the head 
concept. A  suitable aspect for insertion and replacement is found when the aspect most 
similar to the head concept is discovered. The modifier concept then replaces this aspect.
This combination type is a very broad category and it can encompass some relation-based 
interpretations and some property-based interpretation o f compounds. The example, 'fur coat' 
is a property-based interpretation. It may not be clear how this combination type also covers 
relation-based interpretations. Ultimately, it depends on how concepts are represented. 
Consider the combination 'robin snake' and the interpretation that it is » a  snake that hunts 
rob ins« . I f  the representation o f SNAKE contains information that the snake is-a  PREDATOR 
and hun ts PREY then ROBIN may be similar to the PREY aspect o f this representation. The ROBIN 
concept and its subparts then could replace this aspect. This combination type is similar to the 
types o f interpretations that Concept Specialisation (Murphy, 1988) attempts to deal with. We 
w ill, in contrast to Murphy (1988), demonstrate how slots are selected (see Section 5.3.4).
As this combination type gives rise to what could be seen as property-based and relation- 
based interpretations, it suggests that there is not a neat correspondence between the 
distinctions that Dual Process Theory (Wisniewski, 1997a, 1997b) makes and our approach. 
This could be because in our approach the classification o f the interpretation o f compounds 
into property-based and relation-based occurs a fter the process o f concept combination, and 
does not reflect the internal mechanics o f the process o f concept combination itself.
5 .2 .1 .5  C o n te x t  I n s e r t io n  C o m b in a t io n s
This type o f combination is similar to the insertion type except that the modifier concept now 
refers to another concept or context which is then inserted into the head concept replacing a 
corresponding structure in that head. I f  we consider the combination 'video recorder', VIDEO 
can refer to a large number o f contexts e.g. 'video games', 'video conferencing', 'video 
cassette' and 'video phone'. In this combination we replace the prototypical cassette of 
RECORDER with 'video cassette'. Again like the contextual combination types, the context 
insertion types can be paraphrased in terms o f the context. 'Video recorder' seems to be the 
conceptual shorthand for 'Video-cassette recorder'.
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Now consider the combination 'mink coat', i f  this interpreted as » a  coat made o f m in k «  it 
seems that a subpart o f MINK, namely FUR, is aligned with an aspect o f the head concept. The 
interpretations that this combination type gives rise to could be regarded as property-based by 
Dual Process Theory (Wisniewski, 1997a, 1997b). However, note that the context in these 
insertion combinations may not just involve sub-properties o f the modifier concept, but also 
concepts in which the modifier concept itself is a sub-property.
5 .2 .1 .6  C o n jo in e d  C o m b in a t io n s
This combination generally involves the conjunction o f features between the modifier concept 
and the head concept. This combination when interpreted would be classified as a conjunction 
or hybridization. A  conjoined combination is in some sense both a member o f the modifier 
concept category as well as that o f the head concept category. For example, in the 
combination 'servant girl' the person referred to is in some sense both a GIRL and a SERVANT.
This does not mean that all conjoined combinations involve the simple conjunction o f all the 
properties o f both modifier concept and head concept. It is still possible that a certain amount 
o f accommodation between the two concepts must occur. In the case o f 'house boat' which is 
in some sense both a house and a boat, a subject would map the structure o f BOAT onto HOUSE, 
perhaps even replacing the structure o f floor  in house with hull. This type o f conjoined 
structure is more akin to hybridization in Dual Process Theory (Wisniewski, 1997).
5 .3  T h e  C o m b in a t io n  T y p e s  In  T e r m s  o f  S A
In this section each o f the combination types is modelled in terms o f SA. In each o f the 
examples a figure or number o f figures w ill be presented and then used to discuss how the 
combination type works. Each o f the examples below can be treated as a schema or template 
for how the combination type works in structural alignment terms. To understand these 
examples properly, the typography used should be explained. Figure 5.2 shows a frame based 
representation o f the concept and a visual representation o f the same concept. Note that both 
representations convey or carry the same information. The visual representation allows us to 
see the structure o f the representation in a more graph-like way, where concepts are nodes and 
relations are arcs. In general, the concept that is being represented w ill be placed in the centre 
o f the graph and its properties w ill surround the concept. For example in Figure 5.2, the visual 
representation shows the concept BANK and so it is placed in the centre. The properties o f 
BANK are placed around it, e.g. TELLER, MONEY and so on.
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Figure 5.2 -  Frame and Visual representations o f the concept BANK
I t  should also be noted that the representations in Figure 5.2 are token representations. As we 
envisage that concepts should be represented w ith in a semantic network, it is the network that 
holds all the information. The representation o f bank in Figure 5.2 would only be a selective 
representation when compared to the network as whole. When giving examples o f how the 
combination types work in SA terms we w ill present information that exists in the network 
selectively. Not every concept that is linked to another w ill be presented, as in space terms 
this would prove impossible. Rather the most relevant parts o f the semantic network w ill be 
presented. In Chapter 6 it w ill be seen that more elaborate representations are actually used.
To demonstrate the structural alignment process, the typography in Figure 5.3 is used. As 
previously described, SA involves a comparison process. This comparison process can give 
rise to two types o f similarity: shallow and deep similarity. These similarities are based on 
commonalities and so these are also shown. The arrows in Figure 5.3 signal that a shallow 
sim ilarity has been found based on two commonalities. The graphical conventions used for 
similarities are shown in Figure 5.4. Figure 5.3 shows that the COVER aspect o f BOOK is in a 
shallow sim ilarity relation with the COVER concept. The arrows in Figure 5.3 can also be 
described as mappings. A ll mappings in the various diagrams mark out one o f the two types 
o f sim ilarity that SA can give rise to or the commonalities that give rise to these similarities.
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Figure 5.3 - A  representation o f alignment
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Figure 5.4 - Graphical representations o f sim ilarity types
A  number o f terms are also used w ithin the coming sections that should be explained. The 
term subconcept refers to concepts such as, BUSINESS, INSTITUTION, MONEY, TELLER etc. with 
respect to the representation o f BANK in Figure 5.2. In essence all concepts that are linked to 
another concept are subconcepts o f the concept they are linked to. The term aspect is used 
interchangeably with subconcept and so both are considered to have the same meaning in this 
present context.
As mentioned in the last chapter, a deep similarity is based on at least two shallow similarities 
or another deep similarity. Figure 5.5 shows a graphical comparison o f both. We suggest that 
some o f the combination types we have outlined could involve both types o f similarity. The 
more information that occurs in the knowledge base the easier it would be to find deep 
similarities. When outlining each combination type we w ill state whether it  is based on a 
shallow similarity, a deep sim ilarity or, in some cases, it can involve both. In Figure 5.5 a 
shallow similarity is formed between the concepts A1 and C l because they have at least two 
commonalities. A  deep sim ilarity can be found between E l and D1 because they each have 
the same relation, g, w ith A 1 and C l respectively.
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Fi mi ic 3.6 - Concepts TELLER and BANK
Figure 5.7 - Mappings in 'bank teller'
Abstracting from the example in Figure 5.7, meronymous combinations appear to work in a 
particular schematic way. I f  the modifier concept is seen as a graph structure, called A, then 
the head concept, B, is a sub-graph o f A. This sub-graph is found by matching every sub-node 
o f B with every sub-node o f the graph structure A. The head concept and the sub-graph o f A  
w ill be identical. This is shown in Figure 5.8 where the head concept already exists in the 
modifier concept. It should also be noted that it was suggested that the relationship between 
the modifier concept and the head concept is one where the head concept fills a part role (see 
Section 5.2.1.1). Thus in terms o f Figure 5.8 the link between the node A1 and A3 in the 
modifier concept would probably be the part relation, although other relations are possible, 
e.g. in Figure 5.6 and 5.7 the relation is employs. We expect the part relation to be the most
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frequently found in this type o f interpretation and this may allow for a shortcut in the 
processing o f these types.
5 .3 .2  C a ta c h r e s t ic  C o m b in a t io n s
This combination is similar to the meronymous combination but with one critical difference. 
In this case the head concept is a metaphorical reference to an aspect o f the modifier concept. 
It was noted in Section 5.2.1.2 that catachrestic combinations f i l l  lexical gaps, where the 
aspect o f the modifier concept they refer to may not be easily lexicalized. In Figure 5.9 the 
concepts BOOK and SPINE are represented. In the interpretation o f the compound 'book spine' 
the concept SPINE is aligned w ith every subpart o f the concept BOOK. I f  SPINE is similar to an 
aspect o f the modifier concept then the head concept is a reference to this aspect o f the 
modifier concept.
In aligning BOOK and SPINE it should be found that the concept SPINE can be placed into 
correspondence with LONG_THIN_PART. The concept LONG_ THIN PART may have a strange 
name but we need to name a part o f BOOK which cannot be easily lexicalized.
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Figure 5.9 - Representation o f concepts in 'book spine'
The alignment process would compare SPINE with all concepts linked with BOOK. This means 
that according to Figure 5.9, SPINE would be aligned with: CHAPTERS, SHEETS, PAGES, 
AUTHOR, READER, and LO NGTHIN PART. In Figure 5.9 only the subparts o f LONG THINPART, 
AUTHOR and READER are given. In reality, each o f the subconcepts o f BOOK would also be 
represented. Comparing SPINE and LONG THIN PART there are a number o f shallow 
similarities. Both arc strong, both offer support, and both are long. From these similarities we 
suggest that SPINE can be matchcd with LONG_ THIN PART, since there is a shallow similarity 
between the two. These mappings can be seen in Figure 5.10. Checking to see where 
LONG THIN PART fits into BOOK would generate the interpretation for 'book spine'. It is a part 
o f BOOK and has the follow ing attributes: strong, support, and long. So 'book spine' could be 
interpreted as » a  part o f a book that offers support, is strong and lo n g « .
97
Modifier C oncept Head C oncept
P E R S O N
AUTHOR
Written by
CHAPTERS
p a r t .
part PAGES
WQ&
READIER rea d  bXV i\  SHEETS 
\part /  
LONG THIN PART*
a t t r  
S U P I ’O R T  a f 'r ,
a t t r
THIN
STRONG
a t t r - '
LONG
LUMBAR THORACIC
B O D Z ____P a r \  / p a r t
P a r t  »  S P I N E
■STRONG 
*  ^LONG
Figure 5.10 - Mappings in 'book spine'
Taking the example 'book spine', we can abstract as to how a catachrestic combination works 
in relation to SA. In a catachrestic combination, i f  the modifier concept is a graph A, then the 
head concept can be mapped onto a subpart o f A  in terms o f a shallow similarity. In Figure 
5.11 node A3 is mapped onto node B2 as a result o f shallow similarities between similar 
nodes in the modifier concept and head concept. The difference between this combination and 
the meronymous one is that when the shallow similarity is found between the head and an 
aspect o f the modifier, every subconcept o f each is identical. This is not necessarily the case 
with the catachrestic combination type.
G r a p h  A  (  M o d if ie r  C o n c e p t  ) G r a p h  B  (  H e a d  C o n c e p t )
F igure 5 .1 1 -  A lignm ent schem a fo r catachrestic  com bination  types
5 .3 .3  C o n te x tu a l C o m b in a t io n s
In contextual combinations more than just the modifier concept and head concept are 
involved in the alignment process. In this combination type the modifier concept refers to a 
context that is then aligned with the head concept. One example o f this type o f combination is 
'drug baron' where DRUG appears to refer to DEALER or a PUSHER and it is this that is aligned 
with BARON. But one may very well ask how we know that DRUG refers to a PUSHER in this 
context? In the previous combination type the head concept was aligned with all concepts 
linked to the modifier concept. A  context may be found by finding all concepts that have the 
concept DRUG as a feature, e.g. depending on the representations used this could include: 
PUSHER, DOCTOR, NURSE, PATIENT, CHEMIST, USER, or MEDICINE. To see this more clearly, 
examine Table 5.3 which lists representations o f the concepts DOCTOR and PUSHER in terms o f 
slot names and slot values.
Table 5.3 - Representations o f DOCTOR and PUSHER
DOCTOR PUSHER
I s -a
Attribute
Perform
Prescribe
PERSON, ANIMAL 
SKILLED
DIAGNOSIS, MEDICINE 
DRUG
Is-a
Attribute
Perform
Buys
Sells
P e r s o n , anevial
POWERFUL, DANGEROUS 
BUYING, SELLING 
DRUG 
DRUG
In Table 5.3 both concepts refer to the concept DRUG. The concept DOCTOR involves the 
prescription o f drugs, while a PUSHER buys and sells drugs. These may be suitable contexts 
for the concept DRUG. Figure 5.12 provides a visual representation o f this.
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Figure 5.12 - Possible contexts for DRUG
The alignment in a contextual combination primarily involves finding all suitable contexts o f 
the modifier concept. The most simple approach to this is to assume that any concept that lists 
DRUG as a feature or attribute is a suitable context. These contexts are then aligned with the 
head concept. This can be computationally expensive when a large number o f contexts occur. 
Furthermore, the compound 'drug baron' may involve several contexts. A ll these contexts are 
aligned w ith the head concept, BARON. This involves looking for similarities between the 
context and BARON. A PUSHER may provide the most similarities w ith BARON since a PUSHER 
exercises control o f the USER, and a BARON exercises control o f his SERFS. Both are powerful, 
both are dangerous and both control other people. In Figure 5.13 there are a number o f 
possible matches between BARON and PUSHER. The most important is between SERI*’ and USER. 
This match is based on the fact that both the serf and user are weak and poor. Importantly, 
both are also controlled. There is a deep similarity between PUSHER and BARON. So ultimately 
a contextual combination depends on deep similarity between the head concept and the 
context.
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Figure 5.13- Representation o f PUSHER and BARON
It may be possible that the contexts are evoked in different ways, another possible way is to 
see i f  the modifier concept exists in a taxonomy where perhaps concepts above it may be 
possible contexts. Another way may be to reverse this, to see what concepts below the 
modifier concept may provide suitable contexts.
The example of'drug baron' can be abstracted into the alignment schema in Figure 5.14. This 
alignment is d ifficu lt to capture visually. In this diagram the node A1 represents the modifier 
concept. In reality the modifier concept would be a graph with many nodes. Some o f these 
have not been entered to avoid cluttering the figure. The nodes that A1 is linked to are 
considered possible contexts. As was stated above, there are certain criteria for what 
constitutes a possible context in this example: where A 1 is a node in a larger graph, the node 
it is linked to in the larger graph is the possible context. I f  a context can be mapped onto the 
head concept via a deep similarity, then a context combination can be found. In this example, 
C l is mapped onto E l due the shallow similarity between C2 and C2. This relies on finding 
one or more deep similarities between C l and E l .
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F igu re 5 . 1 4  - A 1 innm ent sc h e m a  for co n tex tu a l co m b in a tio n  type
5 .3 .4  In s e r t io n  C o m b in a t io n s
In the in sertion  co m b in a tio n  ty p e  th e  m o d ifie r  c o n c e p t refers to  an a sp e c t  o f  the h ead  co n cep t  
that the m o d ifie r  c o n c e p t th en  rep laces. T h is  is s im ila r  to  th e  s lo t - f i l l in g  approach  o f  a  num ber  
o f  m o d e ls , e .g . S e le c t iv e  M o d if ic a tio n  (S m ith  et a l.,  1 9 8 8 ) and C o n cep t S p ec ia lisa tio n  
(M u rp h y , 1 9 8 8 ). In F igu re 5 . 1 5 ,  th ere are tw o  rep resen ta tio n s , o n e  fo r  the co n c e p t FUR the  
o th er  for the c o n c e p t COAT. A  su ita b le  a sp ec t o f  th e  head  c o n c e p t has to be fou n d  and  
rep laced . T h is  is d o n e  b y  m a p p in g  the m o d if ie r  co n c e p t o n to  e v e n '  c o n c e p t l inked to the h ead  
co n cep t: SLEEVES, GARMENT, CLOTH, PROTECTION, POCKETS, and BUTTONS.
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Figure 5 .15- Representation o f FUR and COAT
The aspect which w ill be replaced is found by discovering a similar subconcept. In this case 
COAT has been represented as being made from CLOTH. This is more similar to FUR than the 
other aspects o f COAT (see Figure 5.15). We envisage that, depending on the representation 
used, this sim ilarity w ill either be a deep similarity or a shallow one, although a deep 
similarity would be preferred for generating an interpretation. Consider that in Figure 5.16 
there is a shallow sim ilarity between FUR and CLOTH. However, in Figure 5.17 there is a deep 
similarity between FUR and CLOTH based on a shallow similarity between fine-hairs and 
fibres. We would argue that the interpretations based on shallow similarities are more 
common, since to find a deep similarity there has to be an already existing shallow similarity 
between a subconcept o f the modifier concept and a subconcept o f an aspect o f the head 
concept. Comparing the two Figures 5.16 and 5.17 there is clearly some similarity between 
cloth and fur. This is reinforced by the deep similarity in Figure 5.17.
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F igu re 5 . 1 6  - M ap p in g  b e tw e e n  FUR and CLOTH b ased  on  a  sh a llo w  sim ilar ity
Figure 5.17- Mapping between FUR and CLOTH based on a deep similarity
Whether an interpretation is based on a deep similarity or shallow similarity the modifier 
concept then replaces the most similar aspect of the head concept in the exact same way. This 
will result in a new combination being created (see Table 5.4). In Table 5.4 the slot value of 
m ade o f  has been replaced by FUR.
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T able 5.4 - R epresentations o f 'f u r  coat' and COAT
COAT 'fur coat'
Isa GARK4ENT Isa GARMENT
Part g u t t o n s , Part BUTTONS,
j l.s r L-».))
POCKETS
1 ¿ilJ,
POCKETS
Made of CLOTH Made of FUR
Abstractly this combination type involves replacing an aspect of the head concept with the 
modifier concept. This aspect is found by aligning the modifier concept with every 
subconcept of the head concept and finding the subconcept with the most similarities with the 
modifier concept, this similarity will either be a deep similarity or a shallow similarity. In 
Figure 5.18, the modifier concept has a number of matches with B4 in terms of either a 
shallow similarity or a deep similarity. This provides a suitable aspect for the modifier 
concept to replace. When the modifier concept replaces B4 it replaces B4 and its 
substructures. A new structure is created. Thus, a situation such as Figure 5.18 arises.
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Modifier Concepì Head Concept
Shallow Similarity
M o ilifii i Co nccp t Head Concept
Deep Similarity
F igu re  5 . 1 8  - A lig n m e n t sc h c m a  fo r  in sertio n  co m b in a tio n  ty p es
In F igu re 5 . 1 9  th e m o d if ie r  c o n c e p t a c tu a lly  rep la ce s  part o f  the h ead  co n c e p t. H o w e v e r , the  
o r ig in a l h ead  c o n c e p t  is kep t in th e n etw ork  and  a n e w  c o n c e p t is ad d ed , o n e  that reflects  the  
n e w  stru ctu re created  b y  th e  in sertion  co m b in a tio n . F igu re  5 . 1 8  sh o w s  the crea tio n  o f  a  n ew  
c o n c e p t b a sed  o n  sh a llo w  s im ila r ity  a s  w e ll a s  d eep  s im ila r ity .
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Figure 5.19- The result of an insertion combination
5 .3 .5  C o n te x t  I n s e r t io n  C o m b in a t io n s
In this combination the modifier concept refers to a context which is then inserted into the 
head concept. Compared with the last combination we outlined (the insertion combination) 
there is a further step, that of drawing in a suitable context. Remember thought that we found 
two scenarios where an insertion combination could be found, one via a deep similarity and 
one via a shallow similarity. The finding of a context is an extra stage on top of the 
interpretation of the insertion combination. Consider the combination 'mink coat1. In this 
particular combination an aspect of MINK is aligned with the an aspect of COAT. This process 
would involve taking every subconcept of the modifier concept and aligning it with every 
subconcept of the head concept.
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Figure 5.20 - Representation o f concepts in 'mink coat'
In Figure 5.20 there are really three concepts represented: MINK, FUR and COAT. Every subpart 
o f MINK is compared with every subpart o f COAT. As was stated in Section 5.3.4, the concept 
FUR shares a number o f similarities with one aspect o f COAT, CLOTH. The similarities were 
shown in Figure 5.15. Thus in comparing a context insertion combination and an insertion 
combination the only significant difference is that the modifier concept refers to a context 
which then acts as an insertion combination. These type o f combinations can be paraphrased 
in terms o f the context, a 'mink coat' is really shorthand for 'mink fur coat'.
This combination type can be examined more abstractly in terms o f SA. In Figure 5.21 the 
nodes numbered from E l to E4 represent the modifier concept. In a context insertion 
combination type a context o f the modifier concept is aligned with the head concept. This 
context w ill be a node that is linked with the modifier concept or is part o f the modifier 
concept. This context is aligned with the head concept where it replaces the aspect o f the head 
concept with which it is the most similar. In this example the context forms a shallow 
similarity w ith the part o f the head concept it replaces but in a context insertion combination 
this replacement could also be based on a deep similarity. In a case where rival interpretations 
are based on a shallow similarity and a deep similarity, the deep similarity would be 
preferred.
The new information that this combination type adds to the network is a compound. This 
compound is essentially the structure o f the head concept with the context replacing the 
aspect o f the head the context was aligned with. For example, in 'fur coat' the cloth aspect o f
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COAT would be replaced by FUR. This is shown in Figure 5.22 where the head concept o f 
Figure 5.20 has had the concept CLOTH replaced by the concept FUR. The modifier concept 
remains unchanged, as does the head concept. However, a new entry is created in memory for 
'fur coat'.
Figure 5.21 - Alignment schcma for contcxt insertion combination tvpe
Fimirc 5.22 - Creating the compound: 'mink coat1
5 .3 .6  C o n jo in e d  C o m b in a t io n s
This combination is the most d ifficu lt to analyse in terms o f structural alignment. It involves 
establishing an equivalence between the modifier concept and the head concept. It is probable
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that this equivalence is based on shared category- membership. For example, a 'servant g irl1 
which is interpreted as »  a person who is both a g irl and a servant «  would be both a 
PERSON and an ANIMAL. In the case o f 'house boat' both concepts are STRUCTURES. Moreover 
though, it seems that there cannot be a conflict between the modifier concept and the head 
concept in this combination type. The lack o f a conflict could be marked by a number cross­
domain mapping(s) between the modifier concept and the head concept. The mappings could 
be o f two types: deep similarities or shallow similarities. So perhaps where little or no 
mappings can occur no conjoined interpretation is possible. Figure 5.23 displays a 
representation o f 'house boat'. The concept HOUSE and the concept BOAT are both 
STRUCTURES. This is a shared category. A  subpart o f each concept also share similarities, 
FLOOR and DECK share a number o f similarities. We suggest that these similarities are either 
shallow or deep similarities. The 'house boat' example involves a deep similarity.
Figure 5.23 - Representation o f concepts in 'house boat'
The structure o f the representation in Figure 5.23 is similar to that o f Figure 5.13. This 
suggests that the combination 'drug dealer baron' could also be interpreted as » a  person who 
is both a drug dealer and a baron« . Although the existence o f such a person is unlikely the 
interpretation is still understandable. This is just one place where polysemy can arise. 
Polysemy and the other two problems o f concept combination are examined in next section.
The abstraction o f the conjoined combination type is given in Figure 5.24. The nodes A1 and 
B1 share a common category, C. In a conjoined combination type the concepts share a
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common parent. We also suggest that a subconcept o f both the modifier and the head should 
share a deep similarity. In Figure 5.24 the nodes A1 and B1 form a deep similarity based a 
shallow sim ilarity between A3 and B2. We have not shown the mapping but have marked out
some o f the shallow similarities, i.e. nodes D and E.
Figure 5.24 - Alignment schema for the conjoined combination tvpe
5 .3 .7  S u m m a r y
The relationship between the combination types and the types o f similarity are summarised in 
Table 5.5 Where a combination is followed by the phrase "(or Deep similarity)" in Table 5.5 
we are suggesting that the finding o f a deep similarity can also give rise to an interpretation. 
Only one combination is based solely on deep similarity and that is the contextual 
combination. This is interesting, as it is the most like nominal metaphor o f any o f the 
combinations. Deep similarities are used in nominal metaphors to give rise to interpretations 
(Veale, 1995). We would expect combinations based on deep similarities to give rise to 
figurative interpretations. Yet, w ith some combination types, e.g. the insertion combination 
type, a deep sim ilarity does not necessarily result in a figurative interpretation. In addition to 
this, the catachrestic combination type which w ill always give rise to a figurative 
interpretation is based on a shallow similarity, not a deep similarity. The distinction between 
literal and figurative interpretations o f combinations is not clear-cut when based on 
assumptions about the roles o f either shallow or deep similarities.
I l l
T able 5.5 - C om bination  types and the sim ilarity  types
Combination type: Interpretation based on:
Mcronytnous Shallow similarity
Conjoined Shallow similarity (or Deep similarity)
Insertion Shallow similarity (or Deep similarity)
Context insertion Shallow similarity (or Deep similarity)
Catachrestic Shallow similarity
Contextual Deep similarity
5 .4  D e a lin g  W ith  T h e  T h r e e  P r o b le m s  o f  C o n c e p t  C o m b in a t io n
So far we have not explicitly said how our model can deal with the three problems in concept 
combination we outlined in Chapter 1. The three problems are:
1. Accounting for world knowledge.
2. Accounting for polysemy.
3. Accounting for figurative combinations.
We have suggested that all these problems can be overcome by using SA. Let us deal with 
each o f these problems.
5 .4 .1  A c c o u n t in g  F o r  W o r ld  K n o w le d g e
In our model world knowledge is not set out as, e.g. a naïve physics, rather it is accounted for 
by involving associated concepts. Firstly, rich conceptual structures are used, secondly, all 
concepts are treated as occurring in a wider domain, with aspects o f this domain being drawn 
in as context. This model has worked relatively well in the field o f metaphor where the 
interpretations that models have to generate are often extremely complex, e.g. Sapper (Veale, 
1995).
Two o f the combination types, the context insertion combination and contextual combination, 
explicitly attempt to find a context (another concept) that can be drawn in to flesh out the 
interpretation. The way in which these contexts are found assumes that all the concepts exist 
w ithin some type o f semantic network memory. A  context is found by looking at the links 
between concepts in the semantic network. Consider the combination 'computer wizard'. An 
interpretation o f this combination is »  a computer user with good computer s k ills « . Note 
that COMPUTER seems to refer to 'computer user'. There are in fact many concepts that 
COMPUTER could refer to, e.g. 'computer company', 'computer printer', 'computer
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programming', 'computer language'. When interpreting 'computer wizard' which o f the various 
concepts that COMPUTER refers to is actually used to generate an interpretation? The 
assumption that structural alignment theory makes in relation to suitable contexts is that the 
modifier concept w ill in some way be similar to the head concept. In 'computer wizard', 
whatever context the modifier concept, COMPUTER, refers to, it is likely to be similar to the 
head concept, WIZARD. This similarity w ill be based on cross-domain mappings.
In our model world knowledge is brought into play in terms o f retrieving appropriate 
contexts. Treating concepts as graphs, contexts are retrieved by examining the connection 
between nodes. Any node that is linked to another node may be a possible context. These 
connections between nodes w ill in reality take two forms: they w ill either link to parent 
concepts or to child concepts. I f  a concept A  is linked to a concept B by an isa relation, i.e. A 
is a type o f B, then B can be considered a parent o f A. When a concept A  is linked to a 
concept B by a part relation, i.e. B is part o f A, then B can be considered a child o f A. In 
terms o f the combination types, the context insertion combination appears to largely draw in 
parent concepts, i.e. concepts which the modifier concept is a subconcept of. The contextual 
combination type appears to rely on child concepts, i.e. subconcepts o f the modifier concept. 
This is a point that could be useful when computationally treating these types.
Some combination types involve insertion into the head concept. In the insertion combination 
type the modifier concept is inserted into the head concept whereas in the context insertion 
combination type a concept related to the modifier concept is inserted into the head concept. 
Fitting one part o f a concept into another is done purely in terms o f the structure o f the two 
concepts. Consider the example o f 'fur coat' again. This combination is understood by 
inserting the modifier concept into the head concept. The point o f  insertion is found in terms 
o f cross-domain mappings. Structural alignment theory suggests that the modifier concept 
replaces that aspect o f the modifier concept with which it is the most similar.
Reasoning about the integration o f concepts is dealt with purely in terms o f SA. No 
information other than the representation o f concepts is used. There are no separate but 
associated scenarios (as e.g. in Dual Process Theory ) or extra functional models. What aspect 
is to be inserted into what is dealt w ith using cross-domain mappings. What context is the 
most appropriate is found by aligning possible contexts with the head concept and picking the 
one which gives rise to cross-domain mappings. In a sense, all reasoning is dealt with in terms 
o f the structure o f the concepts. Using SA, we have a powerful tool for accounting for world 
knowledge.
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5 .4 .2  A c c o u n t in g  F o r  P o ly s e m y
Combinations can be polysemous; they can have more than one interpretation. There are 
three ways in which polysemous combinations can occur within our model. These are:
1. A  combination fits into two or more combination types.
2. A combination can be interpreted in similar but distinct ways in terms o f the same 
combination type.
3. A  combination involves a mixture o f (1) and (2).
As the list above suggests, lexical ambiguity is not considered here. In general, theories o f 
concept combination assume that concept combination occurs using either the most prevalent 
sense or the sense that has been marked out by the context. As our model attempts to work 
within the area o f concept combination research, we also adopt this view. This topic is 
discussed further in Section 7.5.5 in relation to the major findings o f this thesis.
The first form o f polysemy listed above is that a combination may f it  into more than one 
combination type. Consider the combination 'robin snake'. This could be interpreted as a 
»snake  that hunts ro b ins« , or as » a  snake with a red underbelly«. The first interpretation 
would result from treating 'robin snake' as an insertion combination. The second 
interpretation would result from treating 'robin snake' as a context insertion combination. 
Indeed, more bizarre interpretations can be generated, e.g. »  an animal that is both a robin 
and snake «  which would be an conjoined combination type.
The second form o f polysemy involves a combination that gives rise to slightly different 
interpretations o f the same combination type. This could happen in the insertion combination 
type i f  the modifier concept matched more than one aspect o f the head concept. Then 
interpretations based on each o f these aspects could be generated. For example, i f  a 
'bumblebee moth' is interpreted as »  a moth with a sting «  or »  a moth with black and 
yellow stripes « ,  these would both be context insertion based interpretations. The difference 
between the two is the context, in one it is a STING, in the other is the STRIPES o f the 
BUMBLEBEE.
The third form o f polysemy is combination o f the first two. This type o f polysemy is in theory 
possible but we can offer no examples. We suggest that the first type o f polysemy is probably 
the most likely. The second might only occur with certain combination types, e.g. insertion 
combinations and contextual combinations.
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5 .4 .3  A c c o u n t in g  F o r  F ig u r a t iv e  C o m b in a t io n s
In our model figurative language is accounted for in the exact same way as literal language. 
The model makes no distinction between the two at the semantic level as structural alignment 
is assumed to be able to account for all combinations. The separation o f combinations into 
literal and figurative combinations is assumed to be done after the process itself. However, 
looking at the classification o f combination types it is clear that some by their definition w ill 
give rise to figurative inteipretations: contextual combinations and catachrestic combinations.
Both the contextual combination type and the catachrestic combination type w ill always be 
figurative. In the first type the modifier concept refers to a context w ith is then aligned with 
the modifier concept, e.g. 'drug baron'. This alignment is very similar to metaphor. I f  the 
context for DRUG in 'drug baron' is 'drug dealer' then we are suggesting an interpretation such 
as » d ru g  dealer is like a baron« . In the catachrestic combination the head concept is a 
metaphorical reference to an aspect o f the modifier concept and so is by definition figurative, 
e.g. 'table leg'. Both combination types give rise to combinations that can become fossilised 
and they may not often be perceived as being figurative.
Our approach to concept combination applies the same mechanism o f SA to literal 
combinations. The following combination types should give rise to literal interpretations: 
meronymous combinations, insertion combinations, context insertion combinations and 
conjoined combinations. A ll these combinations are understood in terms o f SA. An insertion 
combination works by aligning the modifier concept and head concept and finding a suitable 
aspect o f the head concept to replace. The suitable aspect is found by finding that aspect o f 
the head concept which w ill provide the most cross-domain mappings with the modifier 
concept. In short, in our model both literal and figurative interpretations can be accounted for 
using SA.
It may appear that any deep similarity w ill give rise to a metaphorical interpretation. This is 
not really the case. Although both catachrestic and context insertion combinations involve 
deep similarity, deep similarity does not in itself make interpretations metaphorical. One 
example in the last chapter referred to similarities between the concepts SCALPEL and 
CLEAVER. A  deep sim ilarity was found between the two but to say a SCALPEL is like a CLEAVER 
is not figurative. In a larger context o f "my surgeon is a butcher" this similarity may be seen 
as figurative.
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5 .5  C o n c e p t  C o m b in a t io n  A s  A  P r o c e s s
So far we have outlined six combination types and suggested how SA can account for the 
three problems o f world knowledge, polysemy and figurative language. Now we describe 
how the process o f concept combination works according to our model. Taking a combination 
such as 'robin snake' we argue that there are several interpretations o f this combination. The 
alignment process w ill attempt to see i f  the prospective combination can f it  into any o f the 
combination types. The order in which the combination is checked against the combination 
types is assumed to proceed in from the computationally simplest to the most complex. In 
general the order w ill be:
1. Meronymous
2. Conjoined
3. Insertion
4. Context insertion
5. Catachrestic
6. Contextual
Regardless o f the order, the process w ill generate several interpretations i f  such are available. 
These interpretations have to be ranked. Ultimately, the process o f concept combination can 
give rise to several interpretations and subjects seem to able to rank interpretations. We 
suggest that given several interpretations, subjects w ill favour the most simple over the most 
complex. The most complex in this context w ill be those interpretations that involve a great 
deal o f mapping. We suggest that people w ill favour interpretations in the same order that we 
have suggested that combination occurs in, i.e. meronymous first.
The principle behind this assumption is that subjects are likely to favour interpretations that 
they first come across. In discourse, interpretations must be made quickly and the simplest 
should be found first. However, it is probably the case that when interpretations have to be 
ranked, not every combination type w ill be reflected in the interpretations under 
consideration. The ranking w ill probably never involve all six combination types, as it is hard 
( if  not impossible) to imagine a combination that could be interpreted in six different ways 
according to the combination rules.
Ultimately, concept combination in the structural alignment view o f concept combination sees 
the combination process as one o f conceptual integration. When presented with a noun-noun 
compound a subject w ill try to f it  the conceptual structure o f the compound into each o f the 
combination types. I f  a f it  is found, then an interpretation is generated. I f  more than one
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interpretation is found, we hypothesise that the most simple interpretation w ill be the one that 
is ranked as being the most appropriate.
5 .6  T o w a r d s  A n  I m p le m e n t a t io n  O f  T h e  S A  V ie w  O f  C o n c e p t  C o m b in a t io n
The model we have outlined should lend itself (easily) to the development o f a computer 
program. Each o f the combination types can be viewed in terms o f a schema or a template 
which describes how structural alignment works for that particular combination. The 
approach lends itself to the creation o f a rule-based mechanism. When a combination is 
processed it can be checked against the alignment templates for each combination type. I f  a 
combination satisfies one o f these templates, then an interpretation is returned. Each template 
can be used as a rule and the order o f the application o f these rules w ill reflect the order given 
in the last section, where the simplest is tried first.
This rule-based approach w ill, at first glance, add a certain rigidity to the model. But we 
suggest that the range o f the combination types w ill give enough cover to produce good 
interpretations. "Good interpretations" are, in this context, interpretations that subjects would 
generate. Our approach w ill be outlined in detail in the next chapter when the INCA 
(Interpreting Nominal Compounds using Alignment) program is outlined.
5 .7  C h a p te r  S u m m a r y
We outlined our approach to concept combination, the structural alignment view. This view is 
substantially different from Dual Process Theory, the first model to introduce the application 
o f SA to concept combination. Our model suggests that at the semantic level there are six 
types o f combination: meronymous, catachrestic, contextual, insertion, conjoined, context 
insertion. These combination types range from those that are referential to those that are the 
constructive.
The process o f concept combination is a process o f conceptual integration. When presented 
with a noun-noun compound a subject w ill try to f it  the conceptual structure o f the compound 
into each o f the combination types. I f  a fit is found, then an interpretation is generated. I f  
more than one interpretation is found, the most simple interpretation w ill be the one that is 
ranked the most appropriate.
Each o f the combination types was outlined in terms o f how they operate in relation to SA. 
This outline w ill form the basis for a rule-based computer program (INCA) presented in the 
next chapter which implements the model presented this chapter.
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Chapter 6 - INCA: Interpreting Nominal Compounds using Alignment
6 .1  I n tr o d u c t io n
In this chapter an implementation o f the structural alignment model outlined in Chapter 5 is 
presented, This implementation is dubbed 1NCA: interpreting nominal compounds using 
alignment. INCA is a computer program and employs a knowledge base or semantic network 
to represent concepts. The knowledge base also includes information on the potential 
similarity between all the representations o f concepts in the knowledge base. In the previous 
two chapters we have mentioned deep and shallow similarity. Our knowledge base contains 
information on the deep and shallow relationships between all the representations o f concepts 
in the knowledge base.
There are two algorithms at the heart o f INCA, each involving the testing o f an input against 
rules which model each combination type. One algorithm searches for all interpretations (the 
order o f types is not important for this algorithm), the second returns the simplest 
interpretation and only this interpretation (the order o f types is important for this algorithm). 
Each o f the combination rules is briefly explained and the algorithmic design o f INCA is then 
set forth. A  sample interaction with the program is then given. INCA is user driven: the user 
poses queries to the system and INCA attempts to return several interpretations based on the 
combination rules. We conclude this chapter by discussing possible ways o f testing INCA.
6 .2  I N C A
The structural alignment model o f Chapter 5 is here implemented as a computer program, 
named INCA. It is implemented in PROLOG, a language that has proved popular among 
European A I and natural language processing researchers (Bratko, 1990). PROLOG allows 
(procedural) knowledge to be represented in a declarative fashion. The outline o f INCA w ill 
be broken into five parts:
1. Representing concepts
2. Building the knowledge base
3. Modelling the combination types
4. Returning an interpretation
5. Algorithmic design
This breakdown w ill include some sample code (in PROLOG). Further sample code for 
INCA can be found in Appendix C. The INCA system operates over a knowledge base which 
represents the structure o f various concepts. The program employs a number o f combination
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schemas implemented as logical procedures which are used to generate interpretations. The 
user can interact directly with INCA by posing different queries. When a query to interpret a 
combination is posed, the system attempts to find as many interpretations as it can for the 
combination, unless a special "simplest interpretation first" mode is used (we assume that this 
will be an informative interpretation and this assumption is examined in the next chapter).
6.2.1 Representing Concepts
Concepts in INCA are represented via frames. Frames are made up o f slots and fillers. These 
slots and fillers in turn are represented via PROLOG assertions that take four arguments. This 
stmcture can capture many relations and properties. The basic form is as follows: 
relation(conceptl, concept2, relation, weight). Figure 6.1 below shows an example o f such an 
assertion which states that the concept D R U G  is  a  c o m m o d i t y .  The fourth argument is a rating 
of diagnosticity for the property or relation and these are always set to 0.5 by default. Initially 
no property or relation is marked as being more diagnostic than another. However, when the 
entire network has been set up, the diagnosticity scores for each property can be worked out. 
These scores are not used in the current implementation o f INCA.
relation(drug, commodity, isa, 0.5)
Figure 6.1 - Example relation
Each concept is thus represented as a collection of relation/4 assertions.1 In Table 6.1 the 
representation o f the concept R O B IN  is provided, together with an equivalent paraphrase in 
English for each relation. R O B IN  is considered a concept as it occupies the first argument in 
several relation/4 assertions. Other concepts may link (using relation/4) to R O B IN  but as robin 
w ill be listed as the second argument these links are not considered part o f the concept RO BIN . 
(This is the case for all concepts, e.g. like TELLER, in Section 5.3.1). In general for every 
concept the most common and typical attributes are listed. This information usually involves 
the categories that a concept belongs to (via the i s a  relation), the parts the concept comprises, 
and the functions that are associated with a concept. There are a core number of relations that 
are used. In INCA these relations are not exhaustive but sufficiently high-level to be o f  use in 
many domains of interest. The relations are listed in Figure 6.2.
1 The /4 marks the arity of the assertion, so relation/4 is a PROLOG assertion that has four arguments.
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Table 6.1 - Example representation of the concept robin
Relations English equivalents
reIation(robin, bird, isa, 0.5) A robin is a bird.
relation(robin, sm allanim al, isa, 0.5) A  robin is a small animal.
relation(robin, animal, isa, 0.5) A  robin is an animal
rclation(robin, flying, perform, 0.5) A robin can fly.
relation(robin. red breast, attr. 0.5) A robin has a red breast.
relation(robin, wing, part, 0.5) A robin has aw ing.
relation(robin, breast, part, 0.5) A robin has a breast.
relation(robin. beak, part, 0.5) A robin has a beak.
fs a  (X  is  a  ty p e  o f Y )  
a t tr  (X  i s  a n  a t tr ib u te  o fY )  
p a r t  (X  is  a  p a r t  o f Y )  
u s e d j o r  ( X  is  u s e d  f o r  Y) 
e ffe c t  ( X  h a s  a n  e f fe c t  o n  Y) 
d e p e n d  ( X  d e p e n d s  o n  Y) 
c o n tr o l  ( X  c o n tr o ls  Y)
Figure 6.2 -Types o f relations in the system
6.2.2 Building The K nowledge Base
The knowledge base mainly consists o f relation/4 assertions that represent the component 
parts o f  concepts. However, other information is also stored in the network capturing the 
similarities that hold between concepts. These are stored in the form o f two types of 
assertions: shallow_similarity/3 and deep_similarity/3. We will now discuss the computation 
o f these assertions which capture the similarities between concept representations and reflect 
our understanding o f the commonalities that drive structural alignment as set out in Chapter 4.
Firstly, a commonality is asserted wherever two concepts share a third concept as a property 
via the same relation. In Figure 6.3, C is this third concept, as it exists in both concept A  and 
concept B and so is a point of similarity between the two. Figure 6.3 also suggests that 
concept A  and concept C should not be the same, as is also the case with concept B and 
concept C (otherwise the similarity process is trivialised). Two versions o f the commonality
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rule are shown in Figure 6.3, commonality/3 returns the point o f similarity as a third 
argument.
com m onality (A, B) com m onality(A, B, [C , FJ)
relation(A, C, F, ), relation (A, C, F, _J,
re la tio n a l C, F, ), relation(B, C, F, ),
A  \== C, A \= =  C,
B \= =  C. B  \== C.
Figure 6.3 - Commonality rules
Shallow similarity is based directly on commonalities and Figure 6.4 lists the 
shallow_similarity/3 procedure as defined in INCA. As the definition in Figure 6.4 suggests 
shallow similarities are sets of commonalities. W e suggest that there must be at least two 
commonalities for a shallow similarity to be found. This threshold can be changed, but for the 
purpose o f this thesis it is set to two, as anything less than this could give rise to similarities 
that may not be useful for our purposes.
Shallow similarity in INCA:
shallow _sim ilarity(A , B, L)
setof(X, com m onality (A, B, X), L), 
length(L, Num2),
N um 2  >  1.
Figure 6.4 - Shallow similarity rule
Deep similarity can be seen as an implied correlation arising from a richness of surface 
similarities. In INCA a deep similarity is found by seeing if any shallow similarities or deep 
similarities exist between two concepts (see Figure 6.5). As was discussed in Section 4.1, any 
two concepts can in theory have a number o f similarities. To take account for this, a threshold 
is can be set where a deep similarity is not found unless there is at a given number of shallow 
similarities between the concepts being compared. A t present we have set this threshold to 
two or more shallow similarities.
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Two concepts share a deep similarity if they link to the same concept with the same link 
name.
deep_similarity(A, B, L)
relation(A, C, F, _), 
relation(B, D, F, _), 
sim ilar(C , D, R),
Where
sim ilar(X , Y, Z)
shallow  simUarity(X, Y, Z).
sim ilar(X, Y, Z)
deep  sim ilarity(X , Y, Z),
Figure 6.5 - Deep similarity rule
These rules give rise to the similarity facts that are computed and then asserted into the 
knowledge base. They are applied as the INCA program is loaded, rather than being applied 
on-the-fly as the program runs. Indeed, when the system is first loaded all the original 
relation/4 and the computed deep similarity/3 and shallow_similarity/3 facts are asserted into 
the PROLOG database. This ensures a faster processing at run-time when a query is posed to 
the program.
6.2.2.1 Properties o f The K nowledge Base
In this section a number of the properties o f the knowledge base are set out. Firstly, the 
knowledge base is quite flat; by that it is meant that if the isa  relation is used to analyse the 
network in terms of a tree there are a small number of levels in that tree. In the sample run- 
through in Section 6.3 there are only 4 levels. In this knowledge base the average concept will 
most likely have one parent but have several siblings. The representations o f concepts in the 
knowledge base are created solely around relations and properties. This is in contrast with 
other models, e.g. WordNet (Miller, Beckwith, Fellbaum, Gross and Miller, 1993), which are 
built around hyponymous, meronymous, antonymous and synonymous relations that hold 
between concepts. Meronymous relations exist in the INCA network but they are not used to 
structure the network. In fact if the representations used in the knowledge base are compared 
with WordNet our focus is on attributes, an aspect that is for the most part downplayed by 
WordNet (or at least confined to the glosses).
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Figure 6.6 shows a simplistic representation o f the network where concepts are represented by 
circles, and these concepts are connected by links to each other. In reality the representation 
of concepts in the knowledge base is highly interconnected, but this is difficult to represent 
visually. Figure 6.6 shows that concepts in the knowledge base are quite closely related while 
the network itself is quite flat. Owing to this property of the network, we view concept 
combination as a process that finds particular groups of links (hence, the structural schema in 
Chapter 6) between concepts. In Figure 6.6 a combination is interpreted by finding particular 
links between concepts, this group of links and concepts are marked out in bold. We have 
proposed six ways conceptual structures can be linked together, namely the combination 
types. This leads us to implement INCA as a rule-based program that attempts to find the 
links between concepts that best match the structural schema with the contents of the 
knowledge base.
6.2.3 M odelling The Com bination Types
The last chapter suggested that there are six types of combination, and for each of these 
combinations an alignment schema was suggested. These schemas have been implemented 
using logical procedures in PROLOG in a declarative fashion This approach is highly 
dependent on the knowledge base. This also means that if written correctly (in terms of 
PROLOG), the logical procedure that can interpret combinations can also be used to generate 
combinations that will satisfy the procedure.
Initially, each combination type was designed to handle at least one paradigmatic example. 
For example, the insertion combination type was developed with respect to the combination 
'mink coat'. Concepts were thus created for M IN K , C O A T  and other related concepts. The idea 
behind this was to model a combination type in relation to a paragon of that same 
combination type. Subsequently, the combination rules were tested with examples that fell 
outside the original specific examples. N ew  combinations were introduced into the 
knowledge base and the combination rules were tested with these new concepts.
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6.2.3.1 M eronymous
The implementation of the meronymous combination type can be summarised as the question: 
does the head concept exist within the modifier concept? There are at least two ways of 
finding this out. The first is by seeing if a part o f the modifier concept is identical with the 
head concept. Identicality consists o f every part of one concept aligning with every part of  
another concept. All these correspondences would be shallow similarities. A  rule is shown in 
Figure 6.7 for this combination type. The second way is a shortcut (cheat) that sees if the head 
satisfies the following relation: relation(Modifier, Head, Part, _). We refer to this as a cheat 
since it does not rely on structural alignment.
M e ro n y m o u s (A , B )
s u b c o n c e p t(A , C), 
id e n tic a l(B , C), 
r e la tio n (A , B , R e t, _ W).
Figure 6.7 - Basic rule for the catachrestic combination type in INCA
The actual interpretation given to the user is based on finding out what the relationship is 
between the head concept and the modifier, within the head concept. In Figure 6.7, relation(A, 
B , _ R e l, _ W ) .,  is used to find the relationship between the modifier and the head. If the 
combination was 'snake fangs' and F A N G S  was already part o f SN A K E  then the relationship 
would be based on p a rt. This relation would be returned as part o f the interpretation.
6.2.3.2 Conjoined
In Section 5.3.6 we suggested that a conjoined combination may be based on shared category 
membership. This approach is implemented in INCA. Firstly, we see if there is a related 
context that both the concepts share. This related concept is assumed to be the shared 
category. If such a shared category is found then there should also be at least one deep or 
shallow similarity between one of the subconcepts o f the modifier and the head. This is the 
idea behind the code in Figure 6.8.
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conjoined(Base, Target) conjoined(Base, Target)
context(Base, Scenario), context(Base, Scenario),
context(Target, Scenario), context(Target, Scenario),
subconcept (Base, C), subconcept (Base, C),
subconcept (Target, C l), subconcept(Target, C l),
deep sim ilarity(C , C l, ). shallow  sim ilarity(C , C l, J .
Figure 6.8 - Basie rule for the conjoined combination rule
6.2.3.3 Insertion
In the insertion combination type the modifier concept is inserted into the structure of the 
head concept. This is done by finding an aspect o f the head that can be replaced by the 
modifier concept. This aspect will have a deep similarity or shallow similarity relation with 
the modifier concept. So the basic rule for this combination type will involve finding a 
subconcept o f the head that possesses a deep similarity or similarity with the modifier 
concept, as in Figure 6.9.
insertion(A, B) insertion(A, B)
subconcept(B, C), subconcept(B, C),
deep sim ilarity(A , C, J . shallow  sim ilarity(A , C, J .
Figure 6.9 - Basic rule for insertion combination type in INCA
6.2.3.4 Context Insertion
In a context insertion combination the modifier concept refers to a larger context which is 
then inserted into the head concept. Here, w e envisage that the context could be one of two 
types: (a) a subconcept o f the modifier, or (b) a concept o f which the modifier is a 
subconcept. Both these situations are accounted for in INCA as shown Figure 6.10. As with 
the insertion combination there are two forms of the rule, one for finding a shallow similarity 
and another for finding a deep similarity.
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Context as a subconcept of A Context as a super-concept o f  A
context insertion(A, B)
subconcept(B, C), 
subconcept(A, D), 
deep sim ilarity(D , C, _).
context insertion(A, B)
subconcept(B, C), 
subconcept(D , A), 
deep sim ilarity(D , C, _).
context insertion(A, B)
subconcept(B, C), 
subconcept(A, D), 
shallow  sim ilarity(D , C, ) .
context insertion(A, B)
subconcept(B , C), 
subconcept(D , A), 
shallow  sim ilarity(D , C, _),
Figure 6 .10 - Basic rule for a context insertion combination in INCA
6.2.3.5 Catachrestic
The implementation o f the catachrestic combination checks to see if  a deep similarity exists 
between the head concpet and the modifier concept. To locate this point o f similarity, a 
subconcept o f the modifier concept must be found which has a deep similarity with an aspect 
of the head concept. The basic rule for this is shown in Figure 6 .11.1 A  subconcept of the 
concept A  is any concept B that satisfies the following goal: relation(A, B, _).
catachrestic(A , B)
subconcept(A, C),
\+(subconcept(A , B)), 
shallow _sim ilarity(C , B, ).
Figure 6 .11 - Basic rule for catachrestic combinations in INCA
6.2.3.6 Contextual
In the contextual combination type the modifier concept appears to act as a context which is 
then compared with the head concept, and this comparison may be quite complex. Apart from 
a deep similarity between the concept and the head, there may also be deep similarities 
between some of their respective subconcepts. This combination type is very common in 
metaphors, especially nominal metaphors. Figure 6.12 outlines the base rule for this 
combination type in INCA.
contextual(A, B)
context(A, C),
deep s im ila rity(C, B, _).
Figure 6.12 - Basic rule for contextual combinations in INCA
1 '\+' is the built-in predicate for 'not' in SICStus.
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6.2.4 Returning an Interpretation
Each of the combination types that are listed above are implemented in two different logical 
procedures. One procedure merely returns true or false as to whether the corresponding 
combination type is satisfied. These procedures are the ones listed in Figures 6.7, 6.8, 6.9, 
6.10, 6.11 and 6.12. The alternate procedures return an interpretation as an argument based on 
satisfaction o f the procedure. Table 6.2 lists the information that is returned by the second 
type o f combination procedure. For each combination only the most important information is 
returned.
Table 6.2 - Information g iven for an interpretation 
Meronymous: return the relation lhat links the modifier concept to the head, this is usually the part 
relation.
Identity: return the shared category and at least one similarity between the subconcept o f each.
Insertion: return the concept that the modifier replaces and the relation that exists between this concept 
and head concept.
Context Insertion: return the context and the subconcept o f  the head concept that the subconcept 
replaces.
Cataehrestic: return the concept that the head concept is a metaphoric reference to.
Contextual: rcnirn the context that is referred to by the modifier concept and die similarities that exist 
between this context and die head concept.
Figure 6.13 displays two versions of the procedures or rules for the meronymous combination 
type, with the second procedure returning an output as a third argument. All the procedures 
that return interpretations are of this form. The output takes the form o f a list with the type of  
combination listed as the first element. This first element is used later to aid in providing the 
user with an insight into interpretation.
Procedure 1 Procedure 2
m e r o n y m o u s  (A, B ) m e ro n y m o u s (A , B , [m e ro n y m o u s , R el, B ,A  ] )
s u b c o n c e p t(A , C), s u b c o n c e p t(A , C),
id e n tic a l(B , C), id e n tic a l(B , C),
re lc itio n (A , B , , _). re la tio n (A , B , R e l, W).
Figure 6.13 - Two types of procedure. The first only takes inputs. The second takes two inputs 
but also returns an output as the third argument
6.2.5 Algorithm ic Design
The design of the INCA algorithm is a reflection of both the combination rules used and the 
specific properties of the knowledge base. The knowledge base has a relatively flat structure. 
Since the application of the rules works best on this type o f structure, a more general structure
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would result in the need for more dynamic rules or ones that allowed for a greater depth o f  
links between concepts.
The design o f the basic algorithm at the heart o f INCA is motivated by the desire to return 
coherent interpretations for a combination. Firstly, the conceptual inputs to the program 
should exist within the knowledge base, and this input is expected to be the names of two 
concepts. The first argument is the modifier concept and the second is the head concept. If 
these do not denote existing concepts then the program terminates. Otherwise the concepts are 
compared against every combination rule exhaustively. The rules used are o f the type which 
return an interpretation, i.e. rule 2 in Figure 6.14.
INCA:
IF In p u ts  e x is t  w ith in  th e  k n o w le d g e  b a se  
Return interpretations
ELSE
R e tu r n  fa l s e
Return interpretations:
WHILE(M e r o n y m o u s  R u le  sa tis fie d )
R e tu r n  an in te rp r e ta t io n  
W H J L E (C o n jo in e d R u le  sa tis fie d )
R e tu r n  an in te rp r e ta t io n  
W H I L E f ln s e r t io n  R u le  sa tis f ie d )
R e tu r n  an  in te rp r e ta tio n  
WI\ \L E ( ( 'o n t e x t  In s e r t io n  sa tis fie d )
R e tu r n  an  in te rp r e ta tio n  
WHI L E ((  'a ta c h r e s tic  R u le  sa tis f ie d )
R e tu r n  an in te rp r e ta tio n  
W H IL E (C o n te x tu a l  R u le  sa tis f ie d )
R e tu r n  an  in te rp r e ta t io n  
Figure 6.14 - Pseudocode o f INCA algorithm
The overall design o f  the INCA program is a rule based one, which involves taking a 
relatively simple approach to a complex problem. Concept combination becomes a process o f  
taking a concept pairing and seeing if it satisfies any of our combination rules. In Figure 6.14, 
a combination is passed to each o f the combination rules and if an interpretation is found then 
it is returned. Each rule is applied to the combination exhaustively, allowing INCA to return 
different interpretations for the same combination.
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Our intuition is that some combinations will require more processing than others, and that 
when combinations are interpreted, the simplest interpretation is the best. We term this the 
simple-first rule. When people are interpreting a combination, the first generated 
interpretation is the best. As we imagine that the process interpretation starts from the 
simplest to the most complex, the first combination found will be simpler than other 
subsequent combinations found. In general use, INCA is run without the simple-first rule as 
we are interested in how many possible meanings a given combination can possess. The 
INCA algorithm which implements the simple-first rule is shown in Figure 6.15.
INCA:
IF In p u ts  e x is t  w ith in  th e  k n o w le d g e  b a se
SWITCH
CASE (Meronymous)
Return Interpretation
CASE (Conjoined)
Return Interpretation
CASE (Insertion)
Return Interpretation
CASE (Context Insertion)
Return Interpretation
CASE (Catachrestic)
Return Interpretation
CASE (Contextual)
Return Interpretation
DEFAULT
Return false
ELSE
R e tu r n  f a l s e
Figure 6.15 - Pseudocode of the INCA algorithm (simple first)
In the last chapter, when discussing a number o f combination types we noted that novel 
interpretations can be absorbed into the semantic network. Procedures exist for this within our 
current implementation (as will be seen in the sample interaction) but have not been included 
in the version o f INCA presented here, i.e. both algorithms do not add new compounds to the 
semantic network. The reason for this is a desire to keep the semantic network relatively 
static, so that any new concepts or compounds are added under the guidance of the user. 
INCA does not automatically add new compounds to the network, although it could do so.
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Rather, it is for users to decide what compounds should enter the network and manually insert 
these themselves.
6.3 INCA: A Sample Interaction
Initially in creating INCA each combination type was tested and developed with respect to 
one paradigmatic example. These types o f  examples, however, do not always give rise to 
polysemous interpretations. To counter this, concepts were added which had nothing to do 
with the original development o f the combination type, e.g. concepts related to 'robin snake'. 
This combination was chosen as it was already clearly described as being polysemous in the 
literature (Wisniewski, 1997a).
A  run-through of the INCA program will now be presented. In this run-through we will 
describe the initial set up o f the program and then see how it treats the combinations 'robin 
snake' using the basic algorithm which returns all interpretations (see Section 6.1.5). Before 
w e perform this run-through, some information on the knowledge base is given in Table 6.3. 
There are forty-eight concepts in the network (see Appendix C for a complete list). These 
range from quite complex representations to those that are quite simple. Also note that when 
creating representations for concepts, our model depends on these representations possessing 
a rich structure. This entails creating representations for most o f the subconcepts as well.
Table 6.3 - Basic information on the knowledge base 
Number o f concepts: 48 
Average number of relations per concept: 7.125
Range in number of relations in each concept over entire network: 1 - 1 7
Table 6.3 states that there were 48 concepts used in the run through. It should be noted that 
there are only 24 concepts which have more than six relations. So the information in the 
knowledge base is not extensive, but it should provide an adequate basis for running the 
model. When the systems is loaded, the knowledge base is set up. This knowledge base 
consists o f a large body o f relation/4 assertions and the shallow_similarity/3, 
deep_similarity/3 assertions computed (see Section 6.1.1).
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' SICStus 3.8.6 <x86-win32-nt-4): Tue Apr 3 01:59:03 2001
File Edit F[ags Settings Help
yes
| ?- incaC robin, snake ) .  
CONJOINED:
^conjoined,robin,snake,  
Iconjoined,robi  n , snake, 
Iconjoi ned, robi n , snake,
both , a r e ,a n im a l , 
b oth , a r e , animal , 
both , a r e , an ima l ,
beak,mouth]] ] ]  
red_breast, b e l ly ]  ] ] ] 
red_breast, s c a le s ] ] ] ]
INSERTION:
[ [ i n s e r t io n 2 , r o b in , s n a k e , [ re p la c in g ,p re y , i  n , hunt ing] ] ]
CONTEXT INSERTION:
;c o n te x t_ in s e r t io n , s n a k e ,p a r t , beak , [ rep lac ing ,m outh] ] ]  
:context_i  n ser t i  on, s n a k e ,p a r t , red_breast , [ r e p l a c i n g , b e l l y ] ] ]  
;context_ inser t i  on, s n a k e ,p a r t , red_breast , [ r e p la c in g ,s c a le s ] ] ]
yes
I ? -  I
J
_ij
Figure 6.16 - Sample interaction with INCA
INCA is a PROLOG program and generally such programs involve an a goal-driven 
interaction between the user and the underlying theorem-prover. Typically the user will pose 
a goal and the system will attempt to resolve or satisfy this query goal. In Figure 6.16 the user 
asks for an interpretation for the compound 'robin snake'. This results in a number of 
interpretations which are listed in Table 6.4.
Table 6.4 - Interpretations for 'robin snake'
Context Insertion
'robin snake' is a snake with a beak (replacing mouth)
Tobin snake' is a snake with a red breast (replacing belly)
'robin snake' is a snake with a red breast (replacing scales)
Insertion
'robin snake' is a snake that hunts robins
Identity
'robin snake' is both a robin and a snake, since both are animals and a beak is like a mouth,
'robin snake' is both a robin and a snake, since both arc animals and a red breast is like a belly,
'robin snake' is both a robin and a snake, since both arc animals and a red breast is like scales.
The variety o f interactions that the user can invoke is quite broad. Consider the examples in 
Figure 6.17. In this figure the user queries a combination such as 'drug baron'. The response 
suggests that a 'drug baron' can be understood by using drug as a context for 'drug dealer' or 
user (as in a 'drug user'). But 'drug dealer' has a higher score and so is the more favourable 
interpretation. The user interacting with INCA can also find any concepts that may give rise 
to a catachrestic interpretation when a particular concept is used as modifier. Indeed this can
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be done with all combinations types, by supplying the head concept or modifier concept in 
question. In Figure 6.17, the query first sees if there is a concept which forms a catachrestic 
combination with the concept R O B I N .  One is found, using the concept M O U T H .  The 
catachrestic relationship between these two can be then examined further by finding which 
aspect of R O B I N ,  M O U T H  is referencing.
' SICStus 3.8.6 (x86-win32-nt-4): Tue Apr 3 01:59:03 2001 ■ U H  _ Ini xl
File Edit Flags Settings Help
yes
! | ?- inca( drug, baron ).
CONTEXTUAL:
[ [contextual,drug_dealer,baron , 4] ] 
[ [contextual,user,baron, 2]]
d
yes
| ?- concept_name( X ;, catachrestic( robin, 
X = mouth ?
x ).
! yes
| ?- concept_name( X ;, catachrestic( robin, 
1 X = mouth,
1 2 = [catachrestic,mouth,=,part,beak] ? |
X, 2 ).
Figure 6.17 - A number o f different queries put to INCA
In Section 6.2.5 the simple-first rule and algorithm were described. This returns the first 
combination found by the INCA system. Remember that the application o f rules is done in a 
particular order, from the simplest to the most complex. This order is listed in Figure 6.13 and 
Figure 6.14 in the description o f the algorithms. For the user to apply the simple-first rule 
they simply enter "simple_first" as a third argument to INCA. This can be seen in Figure 6.17.
SICStus 3.8.6 (x86-win32-nt-4): Tue Apr 3 01:59:03 2001
File Edit Flags Settings Help
yes
[ | ?- inca( robin, snake, simple_first ).
SIMPLEST FIRST:
[ i  denti  t y , robi n , snake, [both ,are,animal , [red_breast, b e l l y ]] ]
yes
I ? -  I
□ a a .
A
j
Figure 6.18 - Returning the simplest interpretation first
In Section 5.3 we noted that several combination types give rise to new combinations which 
are stored in memory. In Figures 6.19 and 6.20 an interaction is shown where an
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interpretation is given for 'bottle mouth' and this compound is then added to the network. At 
present these compounds are not kept in the network (i.e. when INCA is closed this 
information is not saved). Initially, 'bottle mouth1 is interpreted as a catachrestic combination 
where M O U T H  refers to the opening part o f B O TT LE . This interpretation is returned by the 
catachrestic/3 procedure. To check and see if  a concept is part of the network the concept/1 
procedure is used. As Figure 6.19 demonstrates, this procedure merely checks to see if  a 
concept is part o f a relation assertion in the network. To add this compound to the network 
another procedure, load_concept/2, is used.
¡Mil
File Edit Flags Settings Help
| ? -  c a t a c h r e s t i c C  b o t t l e ,  m o u t h ,  X ) .
X =  [ c a t a c h r e s t i c , m o u t h , = , p a r t , o p e n i n g ]  ?
y e s
| ? -  c o n c e p t (  b o t t l e _ m o u t h  ) .  
no
| ? -  1 i s t i n g (  c o n c e p t  ) .  
c o n c e p t ( A )
r e l a t i o n ( A ,  _ )  •
c o n c e p t ( A )
r e l a t i o n ( _ ,  A, . _ j
L _________________________________ _ ^
' SICStus 3.8.6 (x86win32-nt-4): Tue Apr 3 01:59:03 2001
Figure 6.19 - Interpreting 'bottle mouth'
Figure 6.20 demonstrates how the load concept/2 procedure is used. It takes two arguments 
and creates a group of relation facts for the compound. The compound becomes part of the 
network when the load_concept/2 procedure succeeds. Note in Figure 6.19 the concept/1 
procedure now registers 'bottle mouth' as being part of the network. To create an entry for a 
catachrestic combination the properties o f the concept it refers to are asserted for the new  
compound. So for example the compound 'bottle mouth' has the property perform  entrance. 
Compounds are treated within in the INCA system as atoms linked together by an underscore, 
so the compound 'bottle neck' becomes bottle_neck. A  further link is created in the concept 
B O TT LE  where 'bottle neck' now exists as a part.
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File Edit Flags Settings Help
| ? -  1 o a d _ c o n c e p t (  b o t t l e ,  mouth  ) .
y e s
| ? -  c o n c e p t (  b o t t i e _ m o u t h  ) .
y e s
[ ? -  r e 1 a t i o n (  b o t t i e _ m o u t h , X, Y ,  _
X = e n t r a n c e ,
Y = p e r f o r m  ?
y e s
| ? -  r e l a t i o n C  X, b o t t l e _ m o u t h , Y ,  _  ) .
X = b o t t l e ,
Y = p a r t  ?
y e s J
I ? -  I
Figure 6.20 - Adding 'bottle neck' to the semantic network
6.4 H o w  b e s t to  te s t IN C A ?
INCA is designed to be a model o f concept combination and so, at the very least, it should 
produce interpretations that are similar to those that a human subject might give. If the 
interpretations that INCA gives are radically different to what people give, then this is a 
serious drawback to this current implementation o f the structural alignment view. For 
example, suppose a study indicates that nearly all interpretations fall completely outside any 
of the combination types that have been listed. Clearly then, INCA could not explain these 
combination types. This would also have implications for the theory outlined in Chapter 5.
INCA should be tested on a large number o f concepts, especially ones that have not been 
hand-coded by the author. Programs such as INCA can perform well when the coders hand- 
code the representations as invariably they know what information or type o f information to 
add to aid their programs. Fortunately, it is actually possible to test INCA on concepts which 
have not been hand-coded by the author. Sapper (Veale, 1995) has an extensive knowledge 
base and concepts from it can be used to test the combination type rules. There are some 
possible drawbacks with this approach however. Although the Sapper knowledge base can be 
adapted and used, the representation of the concepts may not be the exact kind that INCA  
requires, as different researchers may represent the same concept in different ways.
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In the next chapter a study is outlined where the responses o f  INCA are compared with those 
o f  10 subjects over 20 combinations.2 The representations that INCA w ill use for this study 
are taken from Sapper and have not been hand-coded by the author. The combinations used 
have also been chosen from a long list (over 2650) by three judges. A  number o f  analyses are 
performed on the data from this study.
6.5 Chapter Summary
In this chapter an implementation o f  the structural alignment m odel was presented. This 
implem entation is named INCA (interpreting nominal com pounds using alignment). The 
know ledge base or semantic network around which INCA is built is was also described. In the 
INCA know ledge base concepts are represented as frames with slot:filler structures. The 
know ledge base also includes information on the a priori potential similarity between all the 
concepts, it precomputes the shallow  and deep similarities that can exist between all the 
representations o f  concepts. The algorithm at the heart o f  INCA involves testing an input 
against rules which m odel each com bination type. Each o f  these rules was briefly explained, 
som e have different versions for generating interpretations based on shallow similarities or 
deep similarities. The algorithmic design o f  IN C A  was then set forth and a sample interaction 
with the program given. Tw o versions o f  the algorithm exist, one returns the simplest 
interpretation, and the other returns all possible interpretations. W e also discussed possible 
w ays o f  testing INCA, especially the idea o f  testing INCA using a different knowledge base. 
In the next chapter a study is presented which investigates IN C A  with respect to how  it 
compares w ith human performance.
2 Results are based on 19 combinations, one combination was eventually excluded from the study.
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Chapter 7 - Evaluation
7.1 Introduction
This chapter tests the INCA program by comparing its interpretations o f  certain combinations 
against those o f  a number o f  human subjects. This study serves tw o purposes: the output o f  
INCA can be analysed and the correctness o f  the combination types can be ascertained. If the 
output o f  INCA bears no resemblance to that o f  human subjects then the model is clearly 
flawed. A lso, i f  during the study subjects generate interpretations which fall outside o f  the 
combination types suggested by the structural alignment view , then this v iew  w ill have to be 
broadened to include new combination types.
A  description o f  a study is given, w hich involved a number o f  subjects generating 
interpretations for twenty combinations. The responses o f  the subjects were classified to allow  
a comparison between IN C A  and human performance, where classification was based on the 
combination types outlined in the previous chapter. To this a further category was added, "not 
classifiable". Interpretations that fell outside o f  the com bination types were assigned to this 
new  category. The categorised responses o f  the subjects and IN C A  were then compared and 
analysed. Observations were also drawn from this experiment's raw data (the subject's 
interpretations). This chapter has two parts, the first outlines the study and its results. The 
second exam ines observations drawn from the study and is thus more qualitative in nature.
Part I: A Study
7.2 Description O f The Experim ent
Having outlined INCA in the previous chapter w e now  w ish to test the program's output. One 
way o f  doing this is to compare the responses o f  test subjects against the responses o f  INCA  
to a number o f  given combinations. This is the main principle behind the study that we now  
outline. The study essentially involved taking the knowledge base o f  Sapper (Veale, 1995) 
and creating a number o f  com binations that were given to subjects to interpret; the responses 
o f  these subjects was compared w ith those o f  INCA, which was run without the "simple- first 
rule" (see Section 6 .1 .5 .1) so that as many combinations as possible w ould be found.
7.2.1 Organising The Experim ent
There are 600 concepts in the Sapper knowledge base. M ost o f  these concepts were 
com binations, e.g. 'eighteen tw elve overture', and o f  the 600 concepts only 242 were not 
compounds. These non-com pound concepts were selected to be the experimental building 
blocks o f  the com binations presented to the subjects. The range in com plexity o f  the concepts
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was large, with the number o f  properties ranging from 2 to 32. Concepts with a small number 
o f  relations are not suitable to test INCA (as INCA w ill not have enough information to 
generate an interpretation), so all the concepts with more than six relations were selected, 
leading to a list o f  59 concepts. From this list proper-nouns were removed, resulting in a final 
list o f  50 concepts. The number o f  possible combinations that can be created from this list o f  
50 concepts is quite large (2500).
U sing these concepts as a base, all possible juxtapositions o f  words into combinations were 
formed. A total o f  2256 combinations w ere generated. The list o f  combinations was then 
repeatedly shuffled. Two judges initially picked the first fifteen combinations from this list 
that they both agreed were not nonsensical. H owever, in conducting the initial pilot study it 
becam e clear that in certain cases INCA would not return an interpretation for certain 
combinations. It was then decided that the first ten combinations from the list selected by the 
judges w ould be used, with an additional ten combinations selected by the author. These ten 
were combinations for which INCA would give at least one response.
7.2.2 Method
The subjects were given a form listing the compounds. They were then instructed to write as 
m any interpretations for each com bination as possible, where these interpretations were to be 
ones that the subjects felt were reasonable. Subjects were also asked to mark the 
interpretation that they felt best suited the combination:
In this survey you will be presented with a number of novel compounds. For each compound 
you should write down as many meanings as possible. You may find that some compounds 
have only one reasonable meaning or you may find that diere is no reasonable meaning for die 
compound.
A  copy o f  the com plete form is in Appendix D (Section 2).
7.3 Collation O f Data
The purpose o f  this study was to compare the performance o f  the INCA program against 
human performance. Initially, all interpretations were classified into seven categories, which  
are listed in Table 7.1 This categorisation was done so that a comparison would take place 
between the numbers o f  interpretation types that subjects produced, as opposed to the quality 
o f  the interpretations (which is obviously more subjective; the quality o f  interpretations is 
discussed in Part II o f  this chapter).
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Table 7.1- Classification of interpretations
1. Meronymous
2 . Conjoined
3. Insertion
4. Context Insertion
5. Catachrestic
6. Contextual
7. Not Classifiable
The categories listed in Table 7.1 list all the combination types plus one new category, "not 
classifiable", which is for interpretations that fall outside o f  the combination types proposed 
by the structural alignm ent view  o f  concept combination. This category is quite important, as 
the more interpretations that fall into this category the less successful the alignment view  
appears.
Categorisation was done in accordance with the fo llow ing criteria:
1. A  meronym ous interpretation suggested that the head concept was part o f  the 
m odifier concept.
2. An conjoined interpretation suggested that the com bination was in some w ay  
both a member o f  the head concept and the m odifier concept.
3. An insertion interpretation suggested that the m odifier concept could be inserted 
into the head concept.
4. A  context insertion interpretation suggested that the m odifier concept referred to 
another concept that was part o f  the head concept which was replaced.
5. A  catachrestic interpretation used the head concept to make a figurative reference 
to a part o f  the m odifier concept.
6. A  contextual interpretation used the m odifier concept to refer to a context that 
was then aligned with the head concept.
7. Any interpretation that does not meet the criteria in 1 through 6 above is 
categorised as "not classifiable".
There w ere twenty questions in the form (see Appendix D, Section 2). The responses o f  ten 
subjects and INC A  to nineteen questions from the form were classified. Recall that the form  
originally consisted o f  ten questions selected by two judges and a further ten selected by the 
author. Due to a typographical error one o f  the questions from the ten selected by the author 
was not included in the analysis. These tw o groups o f  questions w ill be analysed separately.
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For each question the number o f  interpretations for each combination was calculated and the 
response o f  each subject after classification w as placed in a table. From this the average for 
the 10 subjects was determined. The responses to the same combinations from INCA were 
also entered into this table, and the average score o f  the ten subjects was compared with the 
results for INCA. An exam ple o f  this data is given in Table 7.2, while the com plete data can 
be found in Appendix D (Section 3). Table 7.2 shows the data for question six on the form. 
From this it can be seen that subject 7 (S7) only responded with one interpretation and that 
this interpretation was classified as a context-insertion type. At the bottom in italics is the data 
that was compared, i.e. INCA's responses against the average for the ten subjects.
Table 7.2 - Exam ple o f  collected  data
Q 6 Meronymous Conjoined Insertion Context
Insertion
Cataohrestic Contextual N C
S1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
S 2 0 0 2 0 0 0 1
S 3 0 0 2 0 0 0 0
S 4 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
S 5 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
S 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
S 7 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
S 8 0 0 2 0 0 0 0
S 9 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
S 1 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0
I N C A 0 2 1 2 0 0 0
S / A v g 0.2 0 1 0.1 0 0 0 . 4
7 .4  R e s u lts
A s already mentioned, in conducting the initial pilot study it becam e clear that INCA would  
not return an interpretation for certain combinations. It was therefore decided that the first ten 
combinations from the list selected by the judges be used, with an additional ten combinations 
selected by the author, These ten were com binations for which INCA gave at least one 
response. So the exam ination o f  the results w ill take place in two steps. First the combinations 
picked by the judges, and then the combinations selected by the author, w ill be examined in 
sequence.
7.4.1 Results: The First Ten Combinations
To summarise, the com binations we first exam ine are the ones picked by the tw o judges. 
INCA failed to respond with interpretations for a number o f  these combinations. O f the ten 
combinations INCA could only generate four interpretations, which are listed in Table 7.3. 
This is a possible result o f  at least two factors: problems with the INCA system  itself, or the
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nature o f  the representations used. The INCA program might be flaw ed so that few  
interpretations are possible given any combination, or the nature o f  the representations may 
cause information that INCA needs to find an interpretation to be omitted.
Table 7.3 - Combinations picked by the judges
Combination Interpretation found?
1. 'Eye plot1 No
2. 'Raisin Sculptor' No
3. 'Butcher Corpse' Yes
4, 'Cake Machete' No
5. 'Corpse Surgeon' Yes
6. Marzipan Cherry' Yes
7. 'Man Criminal' No
8. 'Author Priest' Yes
9. 'Surgery Priest' No
10. 'Experiment Eye' No
A s only four com binations resulted in an interpretation being given  by INCA w e w ill 
compare the interpretations o f  INCA against human subjects for these combinations. These 
combinations are: 'butcher corpse', 'corpse surgeon', 'marzipan cherry ', 'author priest'. This 
makes a comparison against all ten com binations rather redundant as the lack o f  values for 
INCA in six  o f  the ten combinations w ill skew any average score for INCA. So the four 
combinations where IN C A  does make a response w ill be examined. The lack o f  responses to 
the first ten combinations in the study is o f  critical concern.
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Figure 7.1 - Comparison of IN C A  and subjects on four combinations
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Figure 7.1 outlines a comparison of INCA against the average of 10 human subjects. It is 
clear that INCA finds more interpretations than human subjects, the most likely reason for 
this is because INCA attempts to look for all possible interpretations. The program looks for 
all possible interpretations available within the confines o f the combination type rales. When 
an interpretation is found for one combination type INCA also seems to generate more than 
one interpretation of this type. For example, 'author priest' is interpreted as a context insertion 
combination three times. Examining INCA's responses, the following context insertion 
interpretation were made:
1. » a  priest who affects readers, reader replacing believer «
2. »  a priest who effects readers, reader replacing heretics «
3. »  priest who depends on novels, novels replacing bible «
All three interpretations are based on a perceived similarity related to the modifier concept 
and an aspect of the head concept. It appears that a R E A D E R  is both like a B ELIEV E R  and a 
H E R E T IC  and that a B IB L E  is like a NO VEL.
From studying Figure 7.1, we can also predict how INCA's simple first rule would effect the 
comparisons. In each bar chart the combination nearest the left edge (or Y  axis) would be 
chosen. Now, for each of the combinations w e can argue that the combination type with the 
highest value as scored by the subjects is the best interpretation. In that case, INCA would 
find the best interpretation in three out o f the four cases. Where it would fail is on 'mazipan 
cherry' which is interpreted by INCA as »  something that is both a marzipan and a cherry 
since both are a type of food and almond mush is like cherry pulp « .
7.4.1.1 M issin g  In fo rm a tio n
The danger in taking representations that the authors had not constructed is that information 
that one might typically include or expect to be present may actually be left out. This is the 
case with a number o f combinations drawn from Sapper (Veale, 1995). For example, consider 
the combination 'surgery priest', which could be interpreted as: »  a priest who councils 
people undergoing surgery' « .  This would be a context-insertion combination type where the 
P A T IE N T  of S U R G E R Y  replaces the C H U R C H G O E R  of P R IE ST . Both P A T IE N T  and C H U RCH G O ER  
may be similar as both are peo p le  and both seek  relief,; albeit they may have different types of 
relief. This information is not contained in the representations that were used to test INCA. 
An approach which looks for interpretations based on structural correspondences needs 
information to be present to be matched. The lack o f interpretations can be interpreted as a 
reflection of the lack o f certain information in some of the concepts used for this study.
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7.4 .1 .2  S u m m a ry
The first part o f the study did not provide a lot of information with respect to how INCA  
compares with human subjects. The reason for this failure appears due to what we have 
dubbed "missing information", i.e. information that if placed in the knowledge base would 
allow INCA to generate interpretations. Four combinations alone are not sufficient to provide 
a suitable basis for comparison (hence the combinations used in the next section). From the 
combinations that did result in an interpretation, there do, however, appear to be a number of  
interesting points to glean.
Firstly, INCA produces more combinations than human subjects on average do, even when 
these subjects are asked to provide as many interpretations as possible. Also, when an 
interpretation is given which falls into one combination type, subjects to not generally 
generate another interpretation which will also fall into the same combination type. INCA, in 
contrast, consistently does this. More importantly it also shows a major flaw in these types of 
programs. INCA and programs of its ilk rely crucially on good input (in this case very rich 
representations). When the representations o f concepts in the knowledge base are not rich the 
program falters easily. Consequently, o f the ten combinations given to INCA only four could 
be interpreted.
7.4 .2  R esu lts : T h e  R e m a in in g  C o m b in a tio n s
INCA's lack o f success in generating any response in the earlier pilot study has led the author 
to add ten combinations to the experimental materials so INCA might at least provide a 
response and some comparison could be made between the system and the human subjects. 
One of these ten combinations one was excluded due to a typographical error leading to the 
following nine combinations being used:
'accountant author', 'architect composer', 'surgery composer', 'criminal composer', 
'cake marzipan', 'artery blood', 'accountant office', 'cancer disinfectant', 'author 
scalpel',
For each o f these combinations the interpretations of the subjects were again classified into 
one of seven categories. The average for the ten subjects was calculated and this was then 
compared against INCA's responses. Figure 7.2 provides a macro view  o f this analysis. From  
this figure it can be seen that again INCA provides more interpretations than the average 
subject, which fits well with what was found in with the first group of combinations. In terms 
of the first three combination types (meronymous, conjoined and insertion) INCA does
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provide more interpretations but the difference is not as noticeable when compared to the 
remaining three combination types. For instance, INCA produces a large quantity o f context- 
insertions when subjects clearly produce very little. This warrants further examination. Also 
worthy of investigation are the large number o f contextual combinations found by INCA  
compared to the small number found by the subjects.
Figure 7.2 - Comparison o f INCA and subjects over the second group o f combinations
The comparison between INCA and the subjects can also be examined question by question. 
Figures 7.3 to 7.12 outline the results in such a way. An examination at this level highlights 
areas where INCA has been successful while also pointing out possible problem areas. In 
each o f  these figures we will suggest that the best type of interpretation is the one that occurs 
with the most frequency among the subjects, e.g. in Figure 7.3 a conjoined combination 
appears to be the best type.
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Figure 7.3 - C om parison  for 'accountan t author'
A s already  noted, the conjo ined  com bination  type seem s to  be the best interpretation type for 
'accoun tan t author'. A pplying the sim ple-first rule, IN C A  w ould  re tu rn  th is result also. Note 
how ever th a t INCA, unlike hum an subjects, generates m ultip le  in terpretations for the sam e 
com bination  type. B ut th is can be rem edied  by  p ick ing  only  one in terpretation  fo r each 
com bination  type. N ote  also  th a t IN C A  generated  m ultip le insertion  based  interpretations. 
This w as because the concep t ACCOUNTANT w as sim ilar in som e key aspects to  AUTHOR. For 
exam ple, ACCOUNTANT w as found to  be sim ilar to  the concept 'N orm an M ailer', since bo th  use 
ink, both  use a pen and  both are people.
In F igure 7 .4  the con jo ined  com bination  seem s to  be the best in terpretation . A gain, i f  IN C A  
only found  the  sim plest in terp re ta tion  then it w ould  also find  this in terpretation  to  be the  best. 
H ow ever, IN C A  appears yet again to  have found  a num ber o f  con tex t insertion  com binations, 
w hich  a lthough also found  b y  som e subjects, not m any w ere found  overall. IN CA  found  a 
num ber o f  sim ilarities betw een  concepts related to  ARCHITECT and concepts related to
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COMPOSER. For exam ple, a  CONSTRUCTION-CREW w as seen to  be sim ilar to  an ORCHESTRA and 
a  com poser's LIBRETTO w as seen to  be s im ila r to  an  architect's BLUEPRINT.1 These are good 
exam ples o f  deep sim ilarity  and these  becam e the contex ts that w ere used  to  generate the 
con tex t-insertion  com binations. For exam ple an  'architect com poser' is »  a  com poser w ho 
creates b lue prints (replacing librettos) « .
F igure 7.5 - C om parison  fo r 'surgery  casualty '
F rom  F igure 7.5 w e can  see th a t IN C A  falters quite badly  w ith  th is com bination . A lthough the 
insertion type  seem s to  be th e  b es t in terpreta tion  type  IN C A  could  no t find  any insertion 
in terpretations. On closer exam ination  th is  appears to  be another case o f  m issing inform ation. 
S im ply  put, there  w as no t enough info rm ation  in  the  know ledge base  fo r certain  key  
sim ilarities to  be found. F or exam ple, a  rep resen tation  o f  CASUALTY should perhaps include 
inform ation  on how  a  person  becom es a  CASUALTY, i.e. due to  an  accident. I f  SURGERY and 
ACCIDENT are sim ilar then  SURGERY could  be  inserted , bu t this in form ation  w as not in the 
know ledge base.
1 Libretto = the text of a work (as an opera) for the musical theater.
1 4 6
In F igure  7.6 is another exam ple o f  w here  the sim ple-first rule finds the best interpretation. 
A gain  how ever, IN C A  seem s to  find  contex t-insertion  com binations w hen  subjects do not. In 
this particu la r case, this w as because the rep resen tation  o f  the concep t CRIMINAL is related to 
the concepts LOCK-PICK and 'therm al lan ce '.2 Both o f  these concepts are found  by IN C A  to be 
sim ilar to  the BATON th a t a  CONDUCTOR uses, since all are instrum ents and each has a sim ilar 
shape, i.e. are long and narrow. T hese sim ilarities form ed th e  basis fo r the  context insertion 
com binations IN C A  found.
W ith  regards to  F igure 7.7, again w hen  the  sim ple-first rule is applied, then  IN C A  finds the 
best in terpreta tion  type, w hich  fo r this com bination  is the insertion  type. This is also an 
in terp re ta tion  tha t gives rise to a  num ber o f  reversals, d iscussed  later in Section  7.5.1. This 
com bination  also g ives rise to  a  num ber o f  contex tual in terpretations w hich  subjects clearly 
d id  no t find, show ing  a  b ias in IN C A  tow ards the generation  o f  these  com bination  types.
2 thermal lance = A device used to bum through metal, e.g. in safe-cracking.
F igure 7.8 show s an  unusual com bination  w ith  respect to  this study, as this com bination  does 
no t g ive  rise to  a  g reat num ber o f  d istinct in terpretations. It appears th a t there  is only tru ly  one 
acceptab le  in terp re ta tion  fo r this com pound. A gain , w hen  the sim ple-first rule is applied then  
IN C A  finds the  best in terpretation .
T he com bination  in  F igure  7.9 appears to  have caused  great d ifficu lty  fo r IN C A  as the best 
in terp re ta tion  fo r 'accountan t office ' is o f  the  insertion  type. A  closer exam ination  reveals tha t 
the  concep t OFFICE is re la ted  to  the  concep t ACCOUNTANT in the  know ledge base and this 
becom es a  po in t o f  insertion. This is not surprising  as ACCOUNTANTS typ ically  w ork  in offices 
and  th is in fo rm ation  is in  the rep resen tation  o f  the  concept ACCOUNTANT. Furtherm ore, the  
concept OFFICE does no t have a  represen tation  o f  WORKER or OFFICE-WORKER that 
ACCOUNTANT can  replace, g iv ing  rise to  an insertion  type. A gain  IN C A 's failure results from  
m issing  inform ation  in  the  know ledge base.
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Figure 7.10 - Comparison of'cancer disinfectant'
From Figure 7.10 it can be seen that for the subjects, 'cancer disinfectant' is clearly an 
insertion combination. INC A, however, finds a context insertion combination. In fact, INCA  
suggests that the CANCER acts a context for the concept CANCER-CELL, so that CANCER-CELL 
replaces an associate of DISINFECTANT, namely BACTERIUM. So the combination was 
interpreted as »  a disinfectant which removes cancer-cells « .  For most subjects, 'cancer 
disinfectant' was a »  a disinfectant which removes cancer « .  Here it seems that INCA is 
being more specific than the subjects.
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Figure 7.11-  Comparison of ‘author scalpel’
In Figure 7.10, INCA again does not generate an insertion combination but generates a 
context insertion and a catachrestic interpretation. Even when the simple-first rule is applied, 
here INCA does not find the best interpretation. However, the interpretations that INCA does 
generate are worth considering. The catachrestic interpretation marks out that INCA has 
found the head concept to be similar to a part of the modifier concept. In this example it 
suggests that a SCALPEL is like an author's PEN. This results in an interpretation such as »  an
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'author scalpel' is the pen that an author uses « .  The same similarity between PEN and 
SCALPEL is also used to form the context insertion interpretation.
7.4.2.1 S u m m a ry
This section reveals that the second group of combination types produce similar findings to 
those o f the initial ten combinations. Firstly, IN C A  produces more interpretations than 
subjects do. Secondly, INCA produces more than one interpretation for a particular 
combination type. So INCA is actually consistent across both groups o f combinations.
Picking the simplest interpretation first, or applying the simple-first rule (as w e have dubbed 
it), seems to generally correspond with the best interpretation given by human subjects. When 
this heuristic fails, it often appears to be as a result o f deficiencies in the knowledge base, i.e. 
missing information. It is these deficiencies that make the generation o f an interpretation for 
the first set o f combinations so difficult.
Having said this, INCA is sometimes led astray by similarities between certain concepts. For 
example, in the case o f 'criminal composer' where interpretations are returned on the basis of 
how a BATON (drawn in from the context CONDUCTOR) is like a LOCK-PJCK, it appears that 
subjects either do not either find this information or if it is found it is not used during the 
combination process. This is especially true when other interpretations can be found.
7.4.2.2 S im p le  F ir s t  R u le  A lg o rith m
Figure 7.12 below shows a comparison of INCA for the second group of combinations when 
only one interpretation, the simplest, is allowed for each combination type. This provides a 
closer fit when compared to Figure 7.2. However, it is clear that INCA still generates 
interpretations that subjects do not, especially contextual interpretations. This could of course 
be an artefact o f the small number o f subjects but may also reflect a larger problem, namely a 
bias towards the generation o f context insertion combinations.
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Figure 7.12 - C om parison o f lN C A  and subjects over the sccond group o f  com binations 
w here IN C A  returns on ly  one in terpretation  per com bination  type
P a rt II: O bservations On The Raw D ata
7.5 Observations
T he observations ou tlined  in th is section  are draw n from  th e  raw  da ta  generated  by the 
subjects in the  experim ent. These observations deal m ainly w ith  the  correctness o f  our 
approach and  w ith results w hich  w ere unexpected  in  light o f  previous research  on concept 
com bination . The observations are based  largely  on the actual in terpretations o f  the subjects 
bu t we w ill re fer back  to  th e  com parisons m ade in the  last section.
7.5.1 Dealing W ith "N ot classifiable" In terpretations
The in terp retations g iven  by  the  subjects in  the  study w ere c lassified  into different 
com bination  types. H ow ever, a  num ber o f  in terpretations fell outside o f  the  standard 
com bination  types. E specially  w hen  the in terpreta tions w ere nonsensical or strange. For 
exam ple, 'arch itect com poser1 w as in terp reted  as »  ju s t  an  architect « .  This type o f  
in terp reta tion  does no t agree w ith  any  o f  the theories on concept com bination. W ith in  these 
"not c lassifiab le" in terpretations, how ever, there  m ay reside new  com bination  types. For at 
least tw o subjects som e in terpreta tions gave rise to  w hat w e term  a  reverse-insertion . For 
exam ple, Subject 6  and Subject 2 both interpreted:
'cake m achete ' as »  a  m achete-shaped  cake «
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This is what is known as a reversal, i.e. it has been interpreted as 'machete cake'. The head is 
now the first element and modifier is the second element, which is not the default way that 
combinations work in English work. Although only two subjects gave rise to this type of 
interpretation, they found this type o f interpretation more than once. The interesting aspect of  
this new combination type is that is appears to be a variant of the insertion combination type 
but where the head concept is the concept that is inserted, with the modifier concept being the 
recipient of the insertion.
A  further problem with the "not classified" group relates to what the words denote. 
Sometimes interpretations relied on concepts that were not clearly related to the combination. 
For example, 'Corpse Surgeon' was interpreted as »  a funeral home person, making the dead 
look proper for burial «  by subject 7. This was not the subject's choice as a best 
interpretation for this combination but it shows that combinations can refer to concepts not 
directly related to the constituents. Even in terms of the structural alignment view, where 
contexts can be evoked, this particular interpretation is quite complex and falls outside our 
view. Another example was given by subject 2, who interpreted a 'butcher corpse' as »  a 
killer corpse, e.g. a zombie « .  This type of interpretation also falls outside the structural 
alignment view and in fact all other theories o f concept combination. A question arises as to 
whether such an interpretation is worth investigating as only one o f the ten subjects generated 
such an interpretation.
Some interpretations were not classified as it appeared that the interpretation of the 
combination was treated as a 'adjective noun' and not 'noun noun'. For example, 'criminal 
composer' was sometimes interpreted as »  a bad composer « .  Here criminal appears to be 
used as a synonym o f the word bad (this occurs in English in utterances such as "his piano- 
playing is criminal"). When an interpretation appeared to be based on an adjectival modifier 
the interpretation was placed in the "not classifiable" category. Homonymy is not treated 
within the confines o f concept combination research but clearly combinations can involve 
homonymous words.
Overall, we suggest that the combination types outlined by the structural alignment view  
appear to cover a good range o f interpretations but they do not have complete coverage. For at 
least two subjects, combinations can be interpreted as a reverse insertion. Another type that 
might be marked out is the 'killer corpse' example (when interpreted as »  a zombie « )  is 
that when an interpretation is similar to an existing concept, then the interpretation is based on 
this existing concept.
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7.5.2 T h e  W o rk h o rs e : In s e r t io n  C o m b in a tio n  T y p e
The range of different interpretations that can be given by the insertion combination type can 
be large. Consider the combination, 'criminal composer', and the two interpretations listed 
below drawn from the study.
Subject 2: »  a composer that writes music / poems about criminals «
Subject 7: »  someone who composes for criminals «
In the first, the subject matter o f the MUSIC is replaced with CRIMINAL. In the second, the 
AUDIENCE o f MUSIC is replaced with CRIMINAL. These types o f combinations are thus quite 
likely to be highly polysemous. The structural alignment view  offers a good explanation of 
why this is the case. If the modifier is similar in multiple respects to the head, then an 
interpretation can be generated for each of these similarities. For example, the concept 
CRIMINAL may match parts o f the COMPOSER that link to the members of the PERSON concept. 
Consider that a COMPOSER often has a SPONSOR, so that a 'criminal composer1 could be »  a 
composer who is supported by criminals «  where criminal replaces sponsor. The more 
matches the modifier has with parts o f the head, the more interpretations that can be 
generated.
7.5.3 D ealin g  W ith  T h e  C o n jo in e d  C o m b in a tio n  T y p e
Although a reading of the literature on concept combination suggests that when presented 
with a combination, such as a 'robin snake1 it will be interpreted as »  a snake which is both a 
robin and a snake « ,  it actually appears that when a conjoined combination arises, subjects 
can pick one element o f the combination to be the head. For example: ’accountant author' was 
interpreted as:
»  an accountant who is also an author «
»  an author who is also an accountant«
It may be that the treatment of conjoined combinations needs to be revised. Wisniewski 
(1997a) suggests that these types o f combination should be treated either as conjunctions or 
hybridizations but neither o f these appears to capture a situation where a subject picks one 
element to be the head and the SA view does not fully account for this particular type of 
interpretation.
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7.5.4. The Quality of INCA 's Interpretations
IN C A 's in terp retations w ere  on the w hole  n o t as concise and  d irect as those o f  the  hum an 
subjects. H ow ever, the  ou tput o f  IN C A  w as genera lly  in agreem ent w ith hum an subjects' 
in terpretations. C onsider T ab le  7.4  w hich  com pares som e in terpretations generated  by  IN C A  
w ith som e in terpretations g iven  by  th e  subjects. 'B utcher corpse 1 w as in terpreted  as a  
conjoined com bination  and  m ost subjects in terp reted  it in  a  sim ilar m anner. H ow ever, 
insertion  in terpreta tions in  IN C A  m ention  th e  aspect o f  the  head  concep t th a t is replaced. This 
is no t th e  case w ith  hum an  subjects. This in fo rm atio n  is g iven  by  the  system  so th a t a  u ser can 
see w here  the  basis fo r the  in terpreta tion  orig inates. IN C A  also  p rovides tw o  in terpretations 
for 'corpse surgeon ' th a t are  h igh ly  sim ilar. H um an  subjects (in  th is  study a t least) did no t give 
in terpretations th a t are  h igh ly  sim ilar.
T ab le  7 .4  - C om parisons betw een  IN C A  and hum an subjects
Combination INCA Subject
'Bmchcr Corpse' "A person who is both a butcher 
and a corpse"
"the corpse of a butcher"
'Corpse Surgeon' "A surgeon who effects corpses, 
replacing patient" or 
"A surgeon who performs 
surgery on corpses, replacing 
patients"
"A surgeon who works on 
corpses"
’Cancer disinfectant' "A disinfectant that effects 
cancer cells, bacterium is 
replaced by cancer cell"
"product that disinfects cancer"
These in terpretations are  at best adequate, b u t IN C A  w ill o ften  produce  in terpretations th a t a 
hum an subject w ill not. T his can be seen m ore  c learly  in  te rm s o f  th e  actual interpretations 
them selves. C onsider the  in terpretations th a t IN C A  generated  fo r certa in  com binations w hen 
hum an subjects p roduced  no th ing  equivalent, in T ab le  7.5 below :
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Tabic 7.5 - Interpretations that iNCA gives but subjects do not -’ivc
'Butcher Corpse' Cataclircstic: "Corpse refers to die carcass that a butcher effects"
'Marzipan Cherry' Contextual Insertion: "A cherry made from almond mush" [ The almond 
mush part of Marzipan replaces the cherry pulp part of cherry ] 
Contextual Insertion: "A cherry made from sugar" |Thc sugar part of 
Marzipan replaces the cherry pulp part of cherry |
'Author Priest' Contextual: "A gothic author priest" [ The concept 'gothic author' was 
selected as a context for priest |
Contextual: "A romantic author priest" [The concept 'romantic author' was 
selected as a context for priest 1
In Table 7.5, three interpretations have been selected. These are ones which INCA generated 
but for which none of the human subjects generated a similar interpretation. The first 
interprets a CORPSE as referring to the CARCASS that a BUTHCER works on. This arises since a 
CARCASS and a CORPSE are actually quite similar concepts. This could be a case where INCA  
has found a similarity that most subjects may not notice. The second combination 'marzipan 
cherry' gives to two types o f contextual insertion combination. This is found because both the 
almond-mush and sugar part of MARZIPAN is similar to the CHERRY-PULP of CHERRY. The 
generation by INCA of contextual interpretations begins to become cognitively implausible 
when we reach the combination 'author priest'. It seems unlikely that subjects would interpret 
an 'author priest' as »  a romantic author priest «  because a BIBLE is like a ROMANTIC 
NOVLEL.
It could be said that similarities are on one level merely a reflection of the knowledge base,
i.e. the problem lies within the contents o f the knowledge base. However, we suggest that the 
combination rules as outlined in Chapter 6 may need some reworking. For example, what 
may count as a suitable context for the contextual combination type should be tightened. 
Perhaps a threshold for similarity should be added, where only contexts which are highly 
similar to the head concept can be brought into play.
7.5 .5  N ouns an d  S enses
A  problem that is not dealt with in the literature on concept combination but which clearly 
affects this study is the polysemy of the nouns in the noun-noun compounds. Many nouns 
have several senses, while an interpretation may be based on just one sense. For example, an 
entry for the word surgery in WordNet (Fellbaum, 1998) contains the information listed in 
Figure 7.13. The representations used by INCA for this study were based around just one
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sense and did not include the  ex tra  senses th a t subjects use w hen  m aking  interpretations. (This 
w as no ted  briefly  in Section  1.4.2).
The noun "surgery" has 4 senses in WordNet.
1. surgery — (the branch of medical science that treats disease or injury by operative procedures; "he
is professor of surgery at the Harvard Medical School").
2. surgery -  ((British) a room where a doctor or dentist can be consulted; "he read the warning in the
doctor's surgery").
3. operating room, OR, operating theater, operating theatre, surgery -  (a room in a hospital equipped 
for the performance of surgical operations; "great care is taken to keep tire operating rooms 
aseptic").
4. operation, surgery, surgical operation, surgical procedure, surgical process -  (a medical procedure 
involving an incision with instruments; performed to repair damage or arrest disease in a living 
body; "they will schedule the operation as soon as an operating room is available"; "he died while 
undergoing surgery")
F igure 7.13 - W ordN et entry for surgery
In fact, the po lysem y o f  nouns is a  p roblem  fo r all m odels o f  concept com bination. The 
structural alignm ent v iew  does not favour one sense over another and w ill attem pt to  find 
in terpretations fo r any sense th a t is located  in  our know ledge base. H ow ever, it should  be 
no ted  tha t the  initial construction  o f  our know ledge base did no t include concepts w hich  have 
m ultip le  senses. The bu rden  is on th e  architect o f  the  know ledge base  to  include inform ation 
on  w ord  form s w hich  can  give rise  to  m ultip le senses.
7.5.6 Summary
T his section dealt w ith  a  num ber o f  observations draw n from  the  study described  earlier in 
Section  7.1 There are five broad  observations th a t could be draw n from  this study:
1 . there  m ay be tw o  new  com bination  types (reverse insertion  and  referential)
2 . the  insertion  com bination  gives rise to  a large range o f  in terpretations
3. a  subject's dealing  w ith  con jo ined  com binations w as m ore subtle than  had  been 
an tic ipated  o r suggested  by previous research  on concept com bination.
4. IN C A 's in terp retations vary  in som e respects w ith  tho se  o f  subjects for the  sam e 
com bination  type.
5. IN C A  like o ther m odels o f  concept com bination  does no t deal w ith  the possib ility  
tha t nouns w ill have m ultip le senses.
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7.6 How Does INCA Really Compare W ith Human Perform ance?
Having tested INCA, looked at an adjusted version o f INCA and examined some observations 
of the raw data, we can now pose the question: how does INCA really compare with human 
subjects? The answer is not entirely positive. In terms of interpretations, INCA produces more 
than most subjects do. This can be altered by only allowing one possible interpretation for 
each combination type. The quality o f the interpretations INCA gives, although basic, are not 
completely different to those that a subject would give. The combination types that the SA  
model predicts do, however, appear to offer a good coverage o f the interpretations that human 
subjects give.
However, there should be a limit placed on the contextual and context insertion combination 
rules. It is clear that INCA finds these interpretations when subjects do not. This is a major 
difference between INCA and humans. Fortunately, there is a way to reduce the number of 
interpretations found by these combination rules. A  threshold can be placed on the similarities 
that are needed for these combinations. Only interpretations which involve concepts that have 
a very high degree o f similarity should be allowed.
O f course, a simple program will never be identical to a human especially in relation to a 
problem that requires a great deal of information. Even giving INCA access to over 600 
concepts from Sapper did not ensure that interpretations would be generated. In many cases 
the information needed was missing. For example, in a number of cases insertion 
interpretations would have been possible if more information had been in the knowledge base. 
The INCA system, despite its bias to generating certain interpretations that human subjects 
did not, worked quite well. The interpretations that INCA produced, although more crude 
than human subjects, were not altogether different from those that the subjects prodcuced. 
Earlier in Section 7.4.1 w e stated that INCA's lack of success in the first part o f the study was 
of major concern. It appears though, that this lack o f success was due to information not 
present in the database, rather than a problem with INCA itself. The use of outside knowledge 
was always going to be a potential problem with the study, but the results from the nine 
compounds chosen by the author reflect the findings from the first part o f the study. We 
suggest that with a larger knowledge base created by the author, INCA would succeed and cut 
down the chances o f INCA not generating a response. The use o f  the simple-first rule would 
also seem to aid INCA's effectiveness in generating the best interpretation for most 
combinations. The overall implications of this study for the structural alignment view are 
outlined in the next chapter.
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7.7 C h a p te r  S u m m a ry
T his chap ter outlined a  study on concept com bination . This study 's function  w as to com pare 
the ou tpu t o f  IN C A  against th a t o f  hum an  subjects. The study involved  a  num ber o f  subjects 
genera ting  in terpretations fo r tw en ty  com binations. The responses o f  these subjects w ere 
c lassified  to  allow  a  com parison  betw een  IN C A  and  hum an perform ance. It w as suggested 
tha t IN C A  should a lw ays apply  the sim ple-first rule. The possib ility  o f  new  com bination 
types w as discussed. T he discover}' o f  new  com bination  types w ould  result in the creation o f  
new  rules. B ut this should  only  be undertaken  w hen the  ex istence o f  these  com bination  types 
is exam ined  further.
O verall, th is chap ter show ed th a t p rogram s like IN C A  are slaves to the representations they 
use. I f  inform ation is om itted  from  a  representation , it canno t be retrieved later. The 
com bination  type ru les th a t IN C A  uses do cover a  good deal o f  in terpretations that hum an 
subjects m ade. W hen non-classifiab le  in terpretations do occur they  tend  to  be either 
nonsensical or involve in terpreta tions based  on treating  a  noun as an  adjective. H ow ever, the 
IN C A  system  did  d isp lay  a  bias tow ards contex t-insertion  com binations, w hile hum an 
subjects d id  not often find  these  types o f  in terpretations. It a lso  repeatedly  generated  m ore 
than  one in terpretation  o f  the  sam e com bination  type w hen  subjects generally  responded  w ith 
ju s t one in terpreta tion  o f  the  sam e com bination  type. In the  nex t chapter w e discuss the 
im plications o f  the p resen t study fo r  the  structural alignm ent v iew  o f  concept com bination.
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Chapter 8 - Discussion &  Conclusions
8.1 In tro d u c tio n
This chap ter w ill offer a  sum m ary o f  the  thesis and suggest w here the SA approach m ay be 
taken. W e suggest tha t there are a  num ber o f  advantages in adopting  the SA  approach. The 
m ost im portan t advantage is th a t w e can a ttem pt to  account fo r the three problem s o f  concept 
com bination  (polysem y, w orld  know ledge and figurative in terpretations) w hich w ere 
o rig inally  outlined in C hapter 1. The im plications o f  the study  in the last chapter w ill be 
d iscussed  in  relation to  the SA view  and  IN CA . In relation to the  study it appears tha t there 
m ay be new  com bination  types. W e also p o in t out a  num ber o f  problem s w ith  IN CA . Possible 
fu ture w ork  is then outlined. This fu tu re  w ork  includes rem oving  the problem s w ith IN CA  
th a t the study  th rew  up. O ther possib le  fu tu re  w ork  involves the  au tom atic  generation  / 
fo rm ation  o f  the  know ledge base  from  existing  know ledge bases. In the  conclusions section 
w e argue th a t SA can be v iew ed as a  fram ew ork and th a t this thesis is an attem pt a t 
exam ining  concept com bination  in term s o f  SA.
8.2 S u m m a ry  o f T hesis
C oncept com bination is a h igh ly  com plex  problem . T here are  several com peting theories and 
these theories disagree on fundam ental aspects o f  concept com bination , e.g. the nature o f  the 
genera tion  o f  interpretations. For som e theorists the genera tion  o f  in terpretations is best 
described  as a  slo t-filling  process bu t these theorists disagree over the  exact m echanism  for 
choosing the  right slot. O thers have suggested  tha t com binations are in terpreted  w ith  respect 
to  a  closed set o f  relations.
O ur approach  to  concept com bination  is to  suggest that SA is the underly ing  process. This is a 
p rocess w hereby conceptual structures are aligned and  sim ilarities found. Essentially, as SA 
w as set out in  this thesis it is a  process th a t finds sim ilarities betw een  conceptual structures. 
T hese sim ilarities are o f  tw o form s: shallow  sim ilarity  and deep sim ilarity . The form er is 
based  on collections o f  com m onalties betw een  concepts and the  later is based on shallow  
sim ilarity  (or o ther deep sim ilarities) and  is m ore structural in nature. A ssum ing this we 
ou tlined  how  a  SA m odel o f  concept com bination  w ould  work.
O ur approach  suggested  th a t there  are  six basic com bination  types (see Section 5.2.1). Each 
com bination  type has an  associated  SA  schem a (see Section 5.3). T he SA schem ata are based 
solely on shallow  sim ilarity  and deep sim ilarity . T hese com bination  types w ere: m eronym ous, 
conjoined, insertion, con tex t insertion , catachrestic  and the con tex t com bination. They range 
from  com binations tha t are  referential, i.e. reference parts o f  o ther concepts, or are
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constructive and involve the addition o f new properties to concepts. The difference between 
each combination type results from what aspects of the modifier concept and the head concept 
are aligned and whether this alignment gives rise to a shallow or deep similarity.
We suggested that there were three problems which affect concept combination: (1) the 
problem o f polysemy, (2) the problem of world knowledge and (3) the problem of figurative 
combinations. In Section 3.4 we outlined how the current theories o f concept combination 
have difficulty in dealing with all three o f these problems. Some of the theories may succeed 
with the problems if they were further modified. But this modification would begin to make 
the theories more cumbersome, e.g. they would have difficulty in judging when combinations 
were not literal.
In Section 5.4 we suggested that the SA view  can deal with these three problems. With regard 
to the problem of world knowledge, rich conceptual structures are used. Also all concepts are 
treated as occurring in a wider domain, with aspects of this domain being evoked as a context. 
This model has worked relatively well in the field of metaphor where the interpretations that 
models have to generate are often extremely complex, e.g. Sapper (Veale, 1995). O f course 
two o f our combination types explicitly look for a context, the context insertion combination 
type and the contextual combination type. Reasoning about the integration of concepts is dealt 
with purely in terms o f SA. No information other than the representation o f concepts is used. 
There are no separate but associated scenarios, e.g. in Dual Process Theory (Wisniewski, 
1997a, 1997b), or extra functional models.
There are currently three ways in which polysemous combinations can occur within our 
model. These are:
1. A  combination fits into two (or more) combination types.
2. A combination can be interpreted in similar but distinct ways in terms of the same 
combination type.
3. A  combination involves a mixture of 1 and 2.
The first type is accounted for by applying each o f the combination rules to a prospective 
combination. If a combination satisfies more than one rule then more than one interpretation 
will be generated. As noted in Section 7.5.2 many interpretations can be classified as insertion 
combinations. This is an example of the (2) above, although it appears that this holds true 
more for insertion combination type than any other combination type.
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Having suggested how multiple interpretations can be generated we also stated that in general 
we assumed the best interpretation would be the simplest or from our perspective the first 
interpretation found. This was dealt with in Section 5.5. However, it is difficult to rate what a 
best interpretation is, especially when no context is given. When a context is given there 
would likely be only one interpretation generated and there would be no need to choose a best 
interpretation.
This model makes no distinction between the figurative and the literal at the semantic level as 
SA is assumed to be able to account for all combinations. So, the problem of figurative 
language is actually accounted for in the exact same way as literal language. The separation 
of combinations into literal and figurative combinations is assumed to be done after the 
process of concept combination itself. However, looking at the classification of combination 
types it is clear that some by their definition will give rise to figurative interpretations: context 
combinations and catachrestic combinations.
8.2.1 A d v a n ta g e s  O f  T h e  SA A p p ro a c h
We suggest that overall there are two basic advantages to adopting a SA approach:
1. We can deal with the three problems of concept combination
2. We can take an eirenic approach to a problem that has given rise to many diverse 
theories
The first advantage has already been dealt with in the previous section. The second advantage 
is that we can build on the current models. In a sense, the SA view  can seen as suggesting that 
concept combination is a slot-filling process with the mechanics being guided by similarity. 
That is, the slot-filling is guided by SA  between the modifier concept and the head concept. 
What is new to our approach is that the interaction can involve related concepts (contexts) and 
we suggest that sometimes the head concept fills a part o f the modifier which the previous 
models do not suggest.
8.3 Im p lic a tio n s  o f  S tu d y
One basic question w e can ask in relation to the study is: does the SA  view  offer a good 
explanation o f the data? Before answering this question w e should distinguish between the 
model, the SA view, and the implementation of it, INCA. We will largely focus on the 
implications for the SA view. Leaving aside weaknesses in the INCA program (e.g. its over- 
finding of contextual and context insertion combinations) the SA view does seem to offer a 
good explanation o f the data. The combination types offer a good coverage of subjects'
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interpretations. The study could have shown that human subjects give rise to many 
interpretations that do not fall within our model's set of combination types but this was not the
case.
Where the SA  view  does seem to require possible modification is with respect to: the 
possibility o f new combination types. One new combination type could be the reverse 
insertion. This combination type seems to involve a reversal of the head and the modifier 
roles. Interestingly, when it occurred it did so as an insertion combination, not as any other 
combination type. It simply seems to involve interpreting a combination, "X Y" as a "Y X", 
Another possible combination type is the one which seems to check if an interpretation is 
captured by an existing concept. For example, when a "killer corpse" is interpreted as a 
ZOMBIE. Presumably because the properties o f a "killer corpse" are the same or highly similar 
to a ZOMBIE. It is not clear how prevalent each o f  these combinations is but the latter does 
seem to be a legitimate combination type. If a combination is interpreted as having properties 
which are strongly associated with another concept, then perhaps the whole combination 
refers to this concept. The other combination type could be an artefact of the study as 
reversals are generally assumed to be rare and it is consequently difficult to come with 
reasonable examples of this combination type.
8.3.1 Implications For IN CA
The study showed that INCA had great problems in dealing with interpretations in the 
absence o f information. This is big problem for these types o f programs. INCA needs huge 
representations and needs information on a concept's attributes, properties and functions. 
Given the difficulty in hand-coding these representations INCA can only deal with toy 
examples. The study in the last chapter, though, did involve a network that consisted o f over 
600 representations. The extension of INCA requires larger knowledge bases. The creation of 
a larger knowledge base is not a simple task. From a simply practical perspective it would 
make more sense to work with an existing and accepted and knowledge base, e.g. WordNet 
(Fellbaum, 1998). In a sense, this would remove the author from having to create the 
knowledge base and allow him to focus on interpreting combinations and refining the rules 
which generate the interpretations, this is mentioned in the future work section.
As a side note on the adoption o f a large knowledge base, especially WordNet (Fellbaum, 
1998), this is not a simple task either. It would involve a complete redesign of INCA as the 
information that INCA relies on is currently not directly available in WordNet. INCA relies 
on attributes and functions, and these are listed in the natural language glosses in WordNet. 
For example, in Figure 7.3 the bracketed information in the sense of surgery lists the
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attributes. As this information is not directly available and it would have to be extracted from
the gloss.
When comparing human performance and INCA we suggest that INCA needs to be changed 
in two crucial areas:
1. Reduce multiple interpretations of the same combination type.
2. Reduce the bias in INCA for creating contextual and context insertion combinations.
During the study it became clear that INCA will sometimes produce several interpretations 
that fall into the same combination type category. For example, in Figure 7.1, it is clear that 
INCA finds more than one interpretation which can be classified as a conjoined combination. 
Subjects do not appear to do this. When more than one interpretation is found and each 
interpretation can be classified as a similar combination type the best should be picked. This 
requires a mechanism for choosing the best interpretation. We suggest that the best 
interpretation may be the one based on the largest number of similarities.
INCA also appears to generate interpretations when subjects do not. The clearest example of  
this is in Figure 7.2 where INCA produces a large number of contextual and context insertion 
combinations compared with the average for the subjects. The contextual and context 
insertion interpretations are based on similarities that do exit between concepts but subjects 
are either not aware o f them or do not use them as a basis for interpretation. INCA should be 
limited in the number of interpretations it generates for these combination types. We suggest 
that a threshold be set where only interpretations based on a large number o f similarities are 
used. The setting o f this threshold will require further investigation.
Another implication of the study for INCA is that a model of word sense disambiguation is 
needed. Theories o f concept combination do not account for words that might refer to more 
than one concept, e.g. presumably the concept SURGERY which refers to an activity is not the 
same as the concept SURGERY when it seems to mean the location where GPs work. In fact, a 
cursory glance of Chapter 3 at the theories of concept combination will show that the 
examples used tend not have multiple senses, e.g. the concept ROBIN. Our study made it quite 
clear that distinguishing between multiple senses is o f critical importance to the interpretation 
of a combination.
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8.4 S u g g estio n s F o r  F u tu r e  W o rk
T he com puter program  1NCA is in m any w ays a crude m odel. T his is m ain ly  a result o f  the 
program  being designed to  take advan tage o f  the properties o f  the  know ledge base. H ow ever, 
it cou ld  be im proved in a t least one w ay, by  creating  or using a  m ore dynam ic m odel o f  SA. 
A t p resen t the program  uses rules w hich  like  all rules are brittle. They are  either satisfied or 
not. T hese rules also only look fo r a set o f  fixed patterns in the  netw ork, It is possible to 
change th is set o f  fixed patterns.
The SA  view  has little to  say  on the ro le o f  d iagnosticity  in concept com bination. H ow ever, 
w e have suggested  tha t the range o f  in terpretations tha t can arise in the  insertion  com bination 
type can be large. Perhaps d iagnostic ity  could  ac t as a  constrain t for this particu lar 
com bination  type. Indeed, IN C A  can already  w ork  out the  d iagnostic ity  o f  each property in 
the  netw ork  bu t this inform ation is no t curren tly  used. The nex t version  o f  IN C A  should 
investigate  the role o f  diagnosticity  in  concept com bination. It m ay be the case that 
d iagnostic ity  only has an  im pact on certain  com bination  types.
M aking  a  m ore dynam ic p rogram  and  exam ining  diagnosticity  does not, how ever, deal w ith 
the  problem  o f  having  to  create the  initial know ledge base. Perhaps a  m ore "m acro" approach 
is m ore suitable, e.g. say, taking a  large know ledge base and  w ork  w ith  this. There are no 
large collections o f  fram es or fram e-like representations availab le public ly  for research. So 
these  fram es m ust be created. Ideally  m ethods should  be developed  fo r autom atically  creating 
the  fram e represen tations tha t IN C A  needs. This could possib ly  be done by  data m ining a 
know ledge base such as W ordN et (Fellbautn , 1998).
L ast bu t not least is the  m assive p roblem  o f  w ord  sense d isam biguation , w hich  w as m entioned 
in the  p rev ious section. C learly , in this w ork  we have assum ed th a t nouns have a  prim ary 
sense and  w e tended  to use exam ples w here  there is only sense fo r each noun in the 
com pound. This is in line w ith  the cu rren t theories o f  concep t com bination  bu t some 
developm ent needs to  be m ade on th is thorny  issue. The know ledge base  does not b ar a  w ord 
having  m ultip le senses. A ll th a t is required  is tha t each sense is g iven  a  d ifferent nam e (in our 
approach  each sense shou ld  be m arked  by  a  d ifferent atom ). A  fu rther level could be added 
w here  a  w ord points to  a  list o f  d ifferen t concepts. For exam ple, the  w ord  surgery could  point 
to , SURGERY 1, SURGERY2 and so on. Entries in the  know ledge base like SURGERYl could 
cap tu re  one particu la r concept associated  w ith the w ord su rg ery . This w ould  add another 
d im ension  to  the outline o f  po lysem y in our m odel.
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To summarise, the future work that we envisage as an immediate consequence o f the current 
thesis is the following:
1. Create / Use a more dynamic model o f SA.
2. Investigate the role of diagnosticity.
3. Create large knowledge base.
4. Incorporate multiple senses
The four areas o f future work are relatively straightforward to implement, although they 
would require a great deal of work, e.g. (1) involves a near total re-write o f INCA. The 
development of a new knowledge base does not necessarily entail developing a new version 
of INCA but we feel that both tasks (1) and (3) should be undertaken together. Task (2) 
relates more to the SA model presented in this thesis rather INCA, however, the role of 
diagnosticity could be studied separately from INCA. The fact that diagnosticity scores are 
available in INCA for all properties in the knowledge base will prove a valuable tool in 
studying this problem. The incorporation of multiple senses is something that should be 
examined in more detail, as theories o f concept combination avoid this problem. Indeed, task 
(4) could be carried out w'hile task (3) is being undertaken.
8.5 C o n c lu sio n s
The SA  model o f concept combination is an attempt to take a multidisciplinary approach to 
the complex problem of concept combination. This model suggests that the interpretations of  
combinations can be broadly classified into one o f six combination types. These combination 
types were chosen to offer the largest coverage. With respect to the study it appears that the 
combination types are successful in dealing with most interpretations that people generate. 
For each combination type a SA schema was proposed to explain how interpretations are 
generated. These schemas were based on deep similarities and shallow similarities. In the 
study, the interpretations generated by INCA were similar to those that human subjects 
generated, although they were not as concise.
The SA model o f concept combination outlined in this thesis does not offer a complete 
solution to concept combination. It does, however, offer the researcher a framework to 
examine concept combination while also dealing with some of its thorniest problems. There 
are many models o f metaphor and analogy based on SA. Other approaches could be taken that 
apply SA  but do so in radically different ways to the one we have suggested in this thesis. By 
this we mean that analogy has been investigated in at least three different ways: ACM E  
(Holyoak & Thagard, 1989), Sapper (Veale 1995) and SM E (Forbus, Ferguson & Gentner,
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1994; Falkenhainer, Forbus & Gentner, 1989). Each claims to be a SA approach but each is 
quite different and so SA can be viewed as a framework to investigate concept combination.
If SA is a framework for the investigation o f concept combination then other SA approaches 
are possible. The work in this present thesis could be seen as the tentative first steps in 
exploring concept combination through SA. A researcher could quite easily create another 
model of concept combination which uses different mappings rules (in truth, probably more 
sophisticated ones). This new model and the model we outline could be quite different 
entities. But both would have the advantage o f being able to deal with: the problem of 
polysemy, the problem of world knowledge and the problem o f figurative interpretations.
With respect to the current approach outlined in this thesis it appears that the combination 
types do offer a wide coverage of the combinations that people generate. At the same time, it 
is clear that other combination types may exist. The INCA implementation o f the SA view  
has a number of quirks (see Section 8.3.1) but that these could be dealt with (see Section 8.4). 
The implementation o f the SA approach could also be done using a less-rule based model. 
However, the biggest hurdle in creating a new implementation is the creation of a larger 
knowledge base. This knowledge base would capture the multiple senses of words.
8 .6  C h a p te r  S u m m a ry
This chapter offered a brief recap on the main topics of this thesis, most importantly the SA  
model of concept combination and the implications of the study. W e suggest that there are at 
least two advantages in adopting the SA model. The most important advantage is that we can 
deal with the three problems of concept combination which were originally outlined in 
Chapter 1. The other advantage is that the model can incorporate and develop parts o f the 
current theories o f concept combination, e.g. providing a similarity-based mechanism for slot- 
filling.
The implications o f the study in the last chapter were also set out in relation to the SA model 
and INCA. One implication was that there may be new combination types. It was also 
pointed out that a number of problems exist with INCA. The possible future work we feel is 
necessary with respect to this thesis was then outlined. This work includes removing the 
problems with INCA that the study threw up. Other suggested future work involved the 
automatic generation / formation o f the knowledge base from existing knowledge bases. 
Finally, in the conclusion section we argue that SA can be viewed as a framework and that 
this thesis can be described as one attempt at examining concept combination in terms of SA.
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Section 1 - Tags used in Penn Treebank corpus
Appendix A - Corpus Study
Tag Description
$ dollar
opening quotation mark
M closing quotation mark
( opening parenthesis
) closing parenthesis
» comma
dash
# sentence terminator
J colon or ellipsis
CC conjunction, coordinating
CD numeral, cardinal
DT determiner
EX existential there
FW foreign word
IN preposition or conjunction, subordinating
JJ adjective or numeral, ordinal
JJR adjective, comparative
JJS adjective, superlative
LS list item marker
MD modal auxiliary
NN noun, common, singular or mass
NNP noun, proper, singular
NNPS noun, proper, plural
NNS noun, common, plural
PDT pre-determiner
POS genitive marker
PRP pronoun, personal
PRP$ pronoun, possessive
RB adverb
RBR adverb, comparative
RBS adverb, superlative
RP particle
SYM symbol
TO "to" as preposition or infinitive marker
UH interjection
VB verb, base form
VBD verb, past tense
VBG verb, present participle or gerund
VBN verb, past participle
VBP verb, present tense, not 3rd person singular
VBZ verb, present tense, 3rd person singular
WDT WH-determiner
WP WH-pronoun
WPS WH-pronoun, possessive
WRB Wh-adverb
Scction 2 - Sample programs used in Corpus study
1. "NounNoun" program
This program searches through a file and looks for nouns. If nouns are found then subsequent 
neighbours are checked to see if they too are nouns. If they are then they are printed to the screen.
NounNoun.java
Import java,io *; 
import java util *;
public class NounNoun {
static Vector lineSpace = new Vector();
public static void main(String[] args) throws lOException {
lf( args.length != 1 )
System.err.prlntln( "Usage: NounNoun <source file> " ) ;
else{
System.out.println( "\n\nResults taken fro m :" + args[0] + "\n\n"); 
processFile( a rgs [0 ]);
}
}
// Process the file that was passed In as the 1sl arg
public static void processFile( String in ) { //throws IOExceptlon{
try{
BufferedReader source = new BufferedReader( new FileReader( in) );
String line;
int note = 0;
while( ( line = source readL¡ne() ) != null ) 
{
I I  System.out.println( "At lin e :" + ++note + "\n”); 
lf( Ilne.lengthQ > 1 ) {
StringTokenlzer st = new StringTokenizer(llne," \n\r\t\f;,:)(=[]");
whlle( st.hasM oreTokens()) {
String temp = st.nextToken(); 
if(tem p != " /" )
lineSpace.addElement( te m p );
}
// prlntVector( lineSpace ); 
processUne( lineSpace ); 
lineSpace.removeAIIEIementsQ;
Í
// Close Streams 
source.close();
// target. closeQ;
}
catch( java.io.lOException ioe) {
System.out.printlh (ioe.getMessageQ);
}
}
I I  Process each in the given file
public static void processl_ine( Vector line ){
Vector compound = new Vector();
// System.out.println( “ W ord space processed...");
I I  How many of these words are nouns 
for( int i = 0; i < line.size() -1 ; i++ ){
String temp = ( String ) line elementAt( i );
if( isNoun( te m p ) ) {
String neighbour = getNeighbour( line, i );
if( neighbour != null && isNoun( ne ighbour) )  (
compound. addElement( te m p ); 
compound.addElement( ne ighbour);
Int mark = i + 1;
String n e ig h b o u r = getNeighbour( line, mark++ );
while( neighbour^ != null && lsNoun( n e ig h b o u r ) ) {  
compound.addElement( ne ighbour2); 
neighbour2 = null;
neighbour2 = getNeighbour( line, + +m ark);
}
i = ( mark -1 ) ;
}
if( compound.size() > 1 ) { 
printVector( compound); 
compound.removeAIIEIements();
1
)
I I  Get a token's neighbour
public static String getNeighbour( Vector Space, int mark ){
if( mark >= Space.size() -1  ) 
return null;
String temp = ( String ) Space.elementAt( ( mark + 1 ) ) ;  
return temp;
// Is a string a noun?
public static boolean isNoun( String temp){
if( temp.endsW ith( " /N N ") || 
temp.endsW ith( "/NNS” ) || 
temp.endsW ith( 7 N N P S ") || 
temp.endsW ith( 7 N N P ") )  { 
return true;
return false;
I I  Prints the compound
public static void printVector( Vector compound){ 
for( int i = 0; i < compound.size(); i++ ){
System.out.print( compound.elementAt( i ) + " " ) ;
}
System.out.printin( "\n");
}
}
//End of file
)
2. "collcct_nouns" script
This c-shell script calls the "NounNoun" program on a series of files in the Penn Ireebank. The 
directories in the script refer to the actual directories where the Penn ireebank is stored locally.
collcct nouns
#!/bin/csh -f
# Info is stored here-
cd /cl_resources/penn_treebank/tagged/wsj
# Collect Info & put here
touch ~/Corpus/Results/Noun_compound_list
foreach d ( * )
cd /cl_resources/penn_treebank/tagged/wsj/$d
foreach f  ( * )
echo $f
java -classpath ~/Corpus/Corpus_tools NounNoun $f >>~/Corpus/Results/Noun_compound_list
end
cd /ci_resources/penn_treebank/tagged/wsj
end
# End of file ________ _____________  ________
Further processing was done using the UNIX commands SORT and UNIQ to organise the generated 
files.
IAppendix B - INCA ( Sample C o d e ) 
Sample Concepts:
/* Some more concepts... */
% bike
create_concept( bike,
[
[ isa, 0.9, vehicle ],
[ perform, transport ],
[ part, handlebar, frame, wheels 
[ wheels, two ]
] ) •
:- create concept( frame,
[
[ isa, 0.9, structure 
[ perform, support ],
[ part, paint ]
] ) •
M ain Algorithm:
"inca.prolog"
% Filename: inca.prolog
oo
% Purpose: the is the main procedure for interpreting 
% combinations. The order in which combinations are 
% found is as follows:
o
o
% 1. Meronymous
% 2. Conjoined
% 3. Insertion
% 4. Context insertion
% 5. Catachrestic
% 6. Contextual
%
% Date: Summer 2 002 
% =====================================================
incaf M, H, [ Al, A2, A3, A4, A5, A6 ] , 1) 
% 1. Meronymous 
find^meronymous( M, H, Al ) ,
% 2. Conjoined 
find_conjoined ( M, H, A2 ) ,
% 3. Insertion 
find_insertion( M, H, A3 ),
% 4. Context insertion 
find_context_insertion( M, H, A4 ),
% 5. Catachrestic 
find_catachrestic( M, H, A5 ),
% 6. Contextual
find contextual( M, H, A6 ).
% 1 .  M e r o n y m o u s
v
findmeronymous( M, H, A1 )
meronymous( M, H, A1 ).
find_meronymous( M, H, [] ).
% 2. Conjoined
findconjoined( M, H, A1 )
conjoined( M, H, A1 ).
find conjoined( M, H, [] ).
% 3. Insertion 
findinsertion( M, H, Al )
insertion( M, H, A1 ).
find_insertion( M, H, [] ).
% 4. Context insertion 
find_context_insertion( M, H, A1 )
context_insertion( M, H, A1 ).
find_context_insertion( M, H, [] ).
% 5. Catachrestic 
find_catachrestic( M, H, A1 )
catachrestic( M, H, A1 ).
find_catachrestic( M, H, [] ).
% 6. Contextual 
find_contextual( M, H, A1 )
contextual{ M, H, A1 ).
find contextual( M, H, [] ).
% Given a combination - generate an interpretation
inca( M, H, [ Al, A2, A3, A4, A5, A6 ] , 2)
% 1. Meronymous 
find_meronymous2( M, H, Al ),
% 2. Conjoined
find_ conjoined2( M, H, A2 ),
% 3. Insertion 
find_insertion2( M, H, A3 ),
% 4. Context insertion 
find_context._insertion2 ( M, H, A4 ),
% 5. Catachrestic 
find_catachrestic2( M, H, A5 ) ,
% 6. Contextual 
find_contextual2( M, H, A6 ).
% 1. Meronymous 
find_meronymous2( M, H, Al )
gen_meronymous( M, H, Al ).
% 2. Conjoined 
findconjoined( M, H, Al ) 
_____ gen conjoined( M, H, Al ).
vi
% 3. Insertion 
find_insertion2( M, H, Al )
geninsertion( M, H, Al ).
% 4. Context insertion 
find_context_insertion2( M, H, Al ) :-
gen_context_insertion( M, H, Al ).
% 5. Catachrestic
find_catachrestic2( M, H, Al ) :-
gencatachrestic( M, H, Al ).
% 6. Contextual 
find_contextual2( M, H, Al )
gen_contextual( M, H, Al ).
% This version just prints out the results 
% neatly to the screen...
inca( M, H ) :-
inca( M, H, X, 2 ), 
print_results2 { X ) .
print_results([]).
print_results( [nullIT] ) :-
print_results2( T ).
print_results2( H )
H = [Cl, C2, C3, C4, C5, C6 ], 
write_interpretationl( Cl ), 
write_interpretati.on2 ( C2 ) , 
write_interpretation3( C3 ) , 
write_interpretation4( C4 ) , 
write_interpretation5( C5 ) , 
write_interpretation6( C6 ).
write_interpretationl( null ).
write_interpretationl( X )
write( ' Meronymous: 1 ), nl, 
write_list_2( X ).
write_interpretation2( null ).
write_interpretation2( X )
write( ’ CONJOINED: ’ ), nl,
write list 2( X ).
write_interpretation3( null ).
write_interpretation3( X ) :-
write( 1 INSERTION: 1 ), nl,
write list 2( X ).
wxxte_interpretation4( X ) : -
write( * CONTEXT INSERTION: ' ), nl,
write_list_2( X ).
write_interpretation5( null ).
writeinterpretationS( X ) :-
write! ' CATACHRESTIC: ' ), nl,
write_list_2( X ).
write_interpretation6( null ).
write_interpretation6( X )
write ( 1 CONTEXTUAL: ' ), nl,
write_list_2( X ).
write_list_2( [] ).
write_list_2{ [H|T ] )
H = [_,_ IX],
write( ' ' }, write( X ), nl,
write_list_2( T ).
S Version of INCA that applies the "simple first rule"
inca( M, H, X, simple_£irst) :- 
simple_first{ M, H, X ).
inca( M, H, simple_first) :-
inca( M, H, X, simple_first), nl, 
write ( ' SIMPLEST FIRST: 1 ), nl,
write( 1 1 ), write( X ), nl.
simple first( A, B, C ) :-
% 1. Meronymous 
meronymous( A, B, C ).
sxmple_first( A, B, C ) :- 
% 2. Conjoined 
conjoined (A, B, C ) .
simple_first( A, B, C ) :- 
% 3. Insertion 
insertion(A, B, C ).
simple_first( A, B, C ) :~
% 4. Context insertion 
context_insertion( A, B, C ).
simple_first{ A, B, C ) :-
% 5. Catachrestic 
catachrestic! A, B, C ).
simplefirst( A, B, C ) :~
% 6. Contextual 
contextual(A, B, C ).
w r i t e _ i n t e r p r e t a t i o n 4 ( n u l l  ) .
The Com bination Types: 
"meronymous.prolog"____
/* Meronymous combination type... */
% Version 1 - Meronymy based on structure
meronymous( A, B )
subconcept(A, C ), 
identical( B, C ), 
relation( A, B, _ ).
meronymous( A, B, [meronymous1, Rel, B, A ] )
subconcept(A, C ), 
identical( B, C ), 
relation( A, B, Rel, W ).
identical( A, B )
% They should have the same number of relations 
how_detailed(A, Z ) , 
how_detailed( B, Z ) ,
% Each subconcept should map onto one subconcept 
% in the other... 
the^same(A, B ).
% Important this still has to be done!
the_same( A, B )
all subconcepts 1( A, Listl ), 
all subconcepts 1( B, List2 ), 
aux_the_same( Listl, List2 ).
aux the same( [], _ ).
aux_the_same( [ H | T ], L )
member( H, L ) , 
aux the same( T, L ).
aux_the_same( _, _ ) :-
fail.
subconcept( A,B )
relation( A, B, _, _ ).
% Version 2 - Meronymy based on certain relations
%% It appears that only certain relations may be involved 
%% indexical combinations
meronymous( A, B, [meronymous2, Rel, B, A ] )
relation( A, B, Rel, W ), 
meronymous_relations( Rel ) .
meronymous relations( control ) . 
meronymous^relations( works_in ), 
meronymous_relations( part ). 
meronymous^relations( affect ).
meronymous r e l a t i o n s ( uses ) .__________________________________
ix
"conjoined.prolog"
/* Conjoined */
% Establish an equivalence between the two concepts 
% Deep similarity version
conjoined( Base, Target, [ conjoined, Base, Target, [ both, are, 
Scenario, [C, Cl] ] ] )
% For an equivalence to be established 
% then the base and target must share 
% a related scenario
find related_scenario_l( Base, Target, Scenario ), 
subconcept( Base, C ), 
subconcept( Target, Cl ), 
deep similarity! C, Cl, Z ).
% Shallow similarity version
conjoined( Base, Target, [ conjoined, Base, Target, [ both, are, 
Scenario, [C, Cl] ] ] )
% For an equivalence to be established 
% then the base and target must share 
% a related scenario
find_related_scenario_l( Base, Target, Scenario ), 
subconcept( Base, C ), 
subconcept( Target, Cl ), 
shallow_similarity( C, Cl, Z ),
find_related_scenario_l( Base, Target, Scenario ) 
relation( Base, Scenario, isa, _ ), 
relation( Target, Scenario, isa, _ ).
% Special rules for people
conjoined( Base, Target, [ conjoined, Base, Target, 'Both people?' ] 
)
relation( Base, person, isa, _ ), 
relation( Target, person, isa, _ ), 
diff( Base, Target ) .
"insertion.prolog"_____________________________________________________
%=====================================================
% Filename: insertion.prologO
o
% Purpose: desribes the basic rule(s) for the insertion 
% combination type.
%
% Date: Summer 2002
% Deep similarity version
insertion( A, B )
________s u b c o n c e p t ( B, C ),
x
deep similarity( A, C, Z ).
insertion( A, B, [ insertion, B, Rel, A, [replacing, C] 
% A matches a subpart of B 
subconcept( B, C ), 
deep similarity( A, C, Z ), 
relation( B, C, Rel, ) .
] )
% Shallow similarity version
insertion( A, B )
subconcept( B, C ),
shallow similarity( A, C, Z ),
insertion( A, B, [ insertion, B, Rel, A, [replacing, C] 
% A matches a subpart of B 
subconcept( B, C ), 
shallow similarity( A, C, Z ), 
relation( B, C, Rel, ).
])
insertion( A, B )
% A matches a subpart of B
subconcept( B, C ) ,
shallow similarity( A, C, Z ).
% Another version.,.
insertion( A, B, [ insertion2, B, A, [replacing, D, in, 
% A matches a subpart of B
C] ])
subconcept( B, C ) , 
subconcept( C, D ) , 
relation( C, D, , ), 
deep similarity( A, D, Z ).
insertion( A, B, [ insertion2, B, A, [replacing, D, in, 
% A matches a subpart of B
C] ]) : -
subconcept( B, C ), 
subconcept( C, D ), 
relation( C, D, , ), 
shallow similarity( A, D, Z ) .
"context insertion.prolog"
/* Insertion... */
% Context Insertion
context insertion( A, B )
% a subpart of A matches a subpart of B
subconcept( B, C ), 
subconcept(A, D ), 
deep similarity( D, C, ) .
context insertion( A, B, [ context insertion, B, Rel, D 
C] ]) :-
% a subpart of A matches a subpart of B
, [replacing,
xi
s u b c o n c e p t ( B, C ) , 
s u b c o n c e p t ( A ,  D ) , 
d e e p s i m i l a r i t y ( D, C, _  ) , 
r e l a t i o n !  B, C, R e l ,  _  ) .
c o n t e x t _ i n s e r t i o n ( A, B )
% a s u b p a r t  o f  A m a t c h e s  a s u b p a r t  o f  B
s u b c o n c e p t ( B, C ) , 
s u b c o n c e p t ( A ,  D ) , 
s h a l l o w _ s i m i l a r i t y ( D, C, _  ) .
c o n t e x t _ i n s e r t i o n { A, B, [ c o n t e x t _ i n s e r t i o n ,  B, R e l ,  D, [ r e p l a c i n g ,  
C] ] )  : -
% a  s u b p a r t  o f  A m a t c h e s  a s u b p a r t  o f  B
s u b c o n c e p t f  B, C ) ,  
s u b c o n c e p t ( A ,  D ) , 
s h a l l o w  _ s i m i l a r i t y (  D, C, _  ) ,  
r e l a t i o n ( B, C, R e l ,  ) .
"catachrcstic.prolog"__________________________________________________
/ *  C a t a c h r e s t i c  c o m b i n a t i o n . . .  * /
%
% F i l e n a m e :  c a t a c h r e s t i c . p r o l o g
%
% P u r p o s e :  d e f i n e s  t h e  c a t a c h r e s t i c  c o m b i n a t i o n  t y p e  
% w h e re  t h e  h e a d  i s  m e t a p h o r i c  r e f e r e n c e  t o  an  a s p e c t  
% o f  t h e  m o d i f i e r .
%
% D a t e :  Summer 2002
%
c a t a c h r e s t i c ( A, B ) : -
s u b c o n c e p t ( A ,  C ) ,
\ + (  s u b c o n c e p t ( A, B ) ) ,  
s h a l l o w _ s i m i l a r i t y ( C, B, _  ) .
c a t a c h r e s t i c ( A, B, [ c a t a c h r e s t i c ,  B, =,  R e l ,  C ] ) : -
S u b c o n c e p t ( A ,  C ) ,
$ \ + (  s u b c o n c e p t ( A, B ) ) ,
s h a l l o w _ s i m i l a r i t y ( C, B, L ) ,  
r e l a t i o n !  A, C, R e l ,  ) .
"context.prolog"
/ *  C o n t e x t u a l  * /
c o n t e x t u a l ( A ,  B ) : -  
c o n t e x t ( A ,  C ) , 
d e e p _ s i m i l a r i t y ( C, B, _  ) .
% The b ig g e r  th e  s i m i la r i t y  th e  g r e a te r  th e  sc o r e
c o n t e x t u a l !  A, B, [ c o n t e x t u a l ,  C, B, S c o r e  ] )
c o n t e x t ( A ,  C ) ,  
d e e p _ s i m i l a r i t y ( C, B, Z ) ,  
l e n g t h !  Z, S c o r e  ) .
% W h a t ' s  a c o n t e x t
c o n t e x t !  A, B )
r e l a t i o n !  B, A, , _  ) .
c o n t e x t !  A, B )
r e l a t i o n !  A, B, , ) .
Procedure for gathering interpretations: 
"generator, prolog"____________________
%
% F i l e n a m e :  g e n e r a t o r . p r o l o g
%
8 P u r p o s e :  f i n d s  e x a m p l e s  o f  p a r t i c u l a r  c o m b i n a t i o n  
$ t y p e s .  T h e s e  p r o c e d u r e s  show o f f  w a h t  INCA c a n  f i n d  
% o r  c r e a t e .
%
% D a t e :  Summer 2002
%
% Meronymous C o m b i n a t i o n s
g e n _ m e r o n y m o u s ( A, B, L ) : -
s e t o f !  [ A ,  B, Z ] ,  m eronym ous !  A, B, Z ) ,  L ) .
g e n _ m e r o n y m o u s ( A, B, n u l l  ) .
% I d e n t i t y  C o m b i n a t i o n s
g e n _ i d e n t i t y ( A, B, L ) : -
s e t o f !  [ A ,  B, Z ] ,  i d e n t i t y !  A, B, Z ) ,  L ) .
g e n _ i d e n t i t y ( A, B, n u l l  ) .
I  I n s e r t i o n  C o m b i n a t i o n s
g e n _ i n s e r t i o n ( A, B, L ) : -
s e t o f !  [ A ,  B, Z ] ,  i n s e r t i o n !  A, B, Z ) ,  L ) .
g e n _ i n s e r t i o n ( A, B, n u l l  ) .
% C o n t e x t  I n s e r t i o n  C o m b i n a t i o n s
g e n _ c o n t e x t _ i n s e r t i o n ( A, B, L ) : -
s e t o f (  [ A ,  B, Z ] ,  c o n t e x t _ i n s e r t i o n ( A, B, Z ) ,  L )
g e n _ c o n t e x t _ i n s e r t i o n ( A, B, n u l l  ) .
% C a t a c h r e s t i c  C o m b i n a t i o n s
g e n _ c a t a c h r e s t i c ( A, B, L )
s e t o f f  [ A ,  B, Z ] ,  c a t a c h r e s t i c !  A, B, Z ) ,  L ) .
gen c a t a c h r e s t i c ( A, B, n u l l  ) .
% C o n t e x t  C o m b i n a t i o n s
gen c o n t e x t u a l !  A, B, L )
s e t o f f  [ A ,  B, Z ] ,  c o n t e x t u a l !  A, B, Z ) ,  L ) .
g en  c o n t e x t u a l !  A, B, n u l l  ) .
Procedure for finding similarities:
"com parison. prolog"
%
% F i l e n a m e :  c o m p a r i s o n . p r o l o g
%
% P u r p o s e :  f i n d  s i m i l a r i t i e s  b e t w e e n  c o n c e p t s  i n  t h e  
% n e t w o r k .
%
% D a t e :  Summer 2002
%
% S i m i l a r i t i e s
% S h a l l o w  s i m i l a r i t i e s  a r e  g r o u p s  c o m m o n a l i t i e s
c o m m o n a l i t y !  A, B )
r e l a t i o n ( A, C, F, ) ,
r e l a t i o n !  B, C, F, _  ) ,
A \ = =  C,
B \ = =  C.
c o m m o n a l i t y !  A, B, [ C, F ] ) : -
r e l a t i o n ( A ,  C, F, _  ) ,
r e l a t i o n !  B, C, F, _  ) ,
A \ = =  C,
B \ = =  C.
% S h a l l o w  s i m i l a r i t y
s h a l l o w  s i m i l a r i t y !  A, B, L )
s e t o f ( X, c o m m o n a l i t y !  A, B, X ) ,  L ) .
s h a l l o w _ s i m i l a r i t y  ( A ,  B, L )
s e t o f !  X, c o m m o n a l i t y !  A, B, X ) ,  L ) ,
l e n g t h !  L, Num2 ) ,
xiv
Num2 > 1.
shallow_sim( A, B, _ ) 
fail.
% Deep similarity
deep_sim2( A, B, C )
deep_similarity (A, B, C ) .
deep_similarity ( A, B, R )
A \== B,
relation( A, C, F, _ ), 
relation( B, D, F, _ ),
% This is to help stop loops while backtracking 
% ...some of these checks are repetitious?
C \== D,
C \== B,
C \== A,
A \== C,
A \== D,
A \ =  B,
D \== B,
D \== A,
D \== C,
similarl ( C, D, R ) .
similarl( X, Y, Z )
shallow_similarity ( X, Y, Z ).
similarl( X, Y, Z )
deep_similarity (X, Y, Z ) .
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Appendix C - List of concepts
List of concepts with which arc in the knowledge base of 1NCA on loading.
1. bike
2. car
3. wheel
4. robin
5. snake
6. scales
7. skin
8. mouth
9. beak
10. belly
11. redbreast
12. hunting
13. prey
14. hunter
15. drug
16. user
17. baron
18. serf
19. dealer
20. drugdealer
21. furdealer
22. dealing
23. seller
24. buyer
25. commodity
26. house
27. building
28. dwelling
29. wall
30. roof
31. door
32. window
33. floor
34. boat
35. fires_weapons
36. porthole
37. deck
38. coat
39. fur
40. mink
41. leather
42. bottle
43. longnarrowpiece
44. bottlepart
45. opening
46. neck
47. subpart
48. whole
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Appendix I) - The Concept Combination Study
This appendix is divided into three sections:
Section 1 - The forty eight combinations drawn from Sapper 
Section 2 - The form 
Section 3 - The data
Section 1 - The forty-eight combinations drawn from Sapper
accountant architect author believer brain butcher 
cake carcass casualty chef cherry composer 
corpse country criminal dough edifice experiment 
eye face general hacker illusion machete 
magic magician man martyr marzipan 
modernism novel opera plot politician 
priest raisin religion scalpel scientist sculptor skiing 
slaughter snow soldier surgeon surgery sword tree
Section 2 - The form
( Question 18 was the one that was omitted from the study).
Survey
Background:
Many ideas in English are expressed in the form of compounds, e.g. "web surfer", "arms race". 
Compounds which are novel to speakers often have more that one meaning. For example, the novel 
compound "robin snake" may mean:
"a snake that hunts robins"
"a snake with a red underbelly"
"a snake that is hunted by robins"
"a snake with a beak instead of a mouth"
Instructions:
In this survey you will be presented with a number of novel compounds. For each compound you 
should write down as many meanings as possible. You may find that some compounds have only one 
reasonable meaning or you may find that there is no reasonable meaning for the compound. If you do 
find more than one meaning for a compound please tick or mark the one which you think is the best 
interpretation.
In the box below four interpretations for "robin snake" are given and the best one is marked. The 
choice of which meaning is the best one is completely subjective. There is no right or wrong answer - 
in the survey just mark the meaning which you think is the best description of the compound in 
question.
Robin Snake
1. a snake tha t hunts robins *
2. a snake with a red  underbelly
3. a snake tha t is hunted by robins
4. a snake with a beak instead o f  a mouth
Please write your answers neatly and take as much time as you wish with each compound.
xviii
2. Raisin Sculptor
3. Butcher Corpse
4. Cake Machete
xix
5. Corpse Surgeon
6. Marzipan Cherry
7. Man Criminal
8. Author Priest
xx
9. Surgery Priest
10. Experiment Eye
11. Accountant Author
12. Architect Composer
xxi
13. Surgery Casualty
14. Criminal Composer
15. Cake Marzipan
16. Artery Blood
xxii
17. Accountant Office
18. Anglicanism Religion
19. Cancer Disinfectant
20. Author Scalpel
Thanks for your time!
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Section 3 - The data
Q1 Meronymous Identity Insertion Context Catachrestic Contextual N.C Number of
Insertion interpretations
S1 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2
S2 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2
S3 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
S4 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
S5 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2
S6 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2
S7 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 2
S8 0 0 3 1 0 0 0 4
S9 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
S10 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
INCA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
S/Avg 0 0 1.3 0.1 0 0 0.4 18
Q2
S1
Meronymous
0
Identity Insertion 
0
Context
Insertion
1
Catachrestic
0
Contextual
0 0
N.C Number of
interpretations
0 1
S2 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 3
S3 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2
S4 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
S5 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 2
S6 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 2
S7 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 2
S8 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 3
S9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
S10 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 2
INCA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
S/Avg 0 0.2 1.2 0.2 0 0.1 0.1 1.8
Q3 Meronymous Identity Insertion Context Catachrestic Contextual N.C Number of
Insertion interpretations
S1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
S2 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 3
S3 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
S4 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
S5 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
S6 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
S7 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 2
S8 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
S9 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 2
S10 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 2
INCA 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 3
S/Avg 0.2 0.5 0.2 0.2 0.1 0 0.3 1.5
Q4 Meronymous Identity Insertion Context
Insertion
Catachrestic Contextual N.C Number of 
interpretations
S1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
S2 0 0 3 0 0 0 1 4
S3 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2
S4 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2
S5 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
S6 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 2
S7 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 2
S8 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 2
S9 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
XXIV
S10 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 2
INCA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
S/Avg 0.1 0 1.3 0 0 0 0.5 1.9
Q5 Meronymous Identity Insertion Context Catachrestic Contextual N.C Number of
Insertion interpretations
S1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 2
S2 0 0 1 0 0 2 0 3
S3 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
S4 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
S5 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
S6 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 2
S7 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 3
S8 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
S9 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
S10 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3
INCA 0 0 2 0 0 3 0 5
S/Avg 0 0.2 0.8 0 1 0 0 2 0.5 1 8
Q6 Meronymous Identity Insertion Context Catachrestic Contextual N.C Number of
Insertion interpretations
S1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
S2 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 3
S3 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2
S4 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
S5 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
S6 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3
S7 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
SB 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2
S9 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
S10 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2
INCA 0 2 1 2 0 0 0 5
S/Avg 0 2 0 1 0.1 0 0 0.4 1.7
Q7 Meronymous Identity Insertion Context Catachrestic Contextual N.C Number of
Insertion interpretations
S1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
S2 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 2
S3 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2
S4 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
S5 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
S6 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 2
S7 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 2
S8 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2
S9 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
S10 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 2
INCA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
S/Avg 0 0.5 1 0 0 0 0.1 1.6
Q8 Meronymous Identity Insertion Context
Insertion
Catachrestic Contextual N.C Number of 
interpretations
S1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 2
S2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
S3 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
S4 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
S5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
S6 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 3
S7 0 1 2 0 0 0 1 4
XXV
S8 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 2
S9 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
S10 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 2
INCA 0 3 0 3 0 1 0 7
S/Avg 0 0.9 0.4 0.1 0 0 0 3 1.7
Q9 Meronymous identity Insertion Context Catachrestic Contextual N.C Number of
Insertion interpretations
S1 0 2 2 0 0 1 0 5
S2 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 3
S3 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
S4 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
S5 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
S6 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
S7 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2
S8 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2
S9 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
S10 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 2
INCA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
S/Avg 0 0.4 1.1 0 0.1 0.1 0.2 1.9
Q10
S1
Meronymous
0
Identity
0
Insertion Context 
Insertion
0
Catachrestic
1
Contextual
0 0
N.C Number of
interpretations
0 1
S2 0 0 1 1 1 0 2 5
S3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
S4 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 2
SS 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
S6 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2
S7 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
S8 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
S9 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
S10 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
INCA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
S/Avg 0.3 0 0.1 0,6 0.1 0 0.5 16
Q11 Meronymous Identity Insertion Context Catachrestic Contextual N.C Number of
S1
Insertion interpretations
0 2 0 1 0 0 0 3
S2 0 4 0 0 0 0 1 5
S3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
S4 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 2
S5 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
S6 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 3
S7 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 2
S8 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
S9 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
S10 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 2
INCA 0 2 4 2 0 0 0 8
S/Avg 0 1.2 0.4 0,1 0 0 0.3 2
Q12 Meronymous Identity Insertion Context Catachrestic Contextual N.C Number of
Insertion interpretations
S1 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 3
S2 0 2 0 1 0 0 1 4
S3 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 2
S4 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 2
S5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
xxvi
Q13
S1
Meronymous
0
Identity Insertion Context 
Insertion
0 1
Catachrestic
0
Contextual
0 0
N.C Number of
interpretations
0 1
S2 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 3
S3 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
S4 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
S5 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 2
S6 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 2
S7 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 2
S8 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
S9 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
S10 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 2
INCA 0 0 0 0 2 5 0 7
S/Avg 0.3 0 0 9 0.2 0 0 0 2 1.6
Q14
S1
Meronymous
0
Identity
2
Insertion
0
Context
Insertion
Catachrestic
0
Contextual
0 1
N.C
0
Number of 
interpretations
3
S2 0 2 1 1 0 0 0 4
S3 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
S4 0 2 0 1 0 0 1 4
S5 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 2
S6 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 2
S7 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 3
S8 0 1 1 0 0 0 2 4
S9 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 2
S10 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 2
INCA 0 2 0 2 0 0 0 4
S/Avg 0 1.2 0.5 0.2 0 0.1 0 7 2 7
Q15 Meronymous Identity Insertion Context 
Insertion
Catachrestic Contextual N.C Number of
interpretations
S1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
S2 0 0 2 3 0 0 0 5
S3 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 2
S4 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2
S5 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
S6 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 2
S7 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 2
S8 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
S9 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
S10 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
INCA 0 0 3 0 0 1 0 4
S/Avg 0 3 0 0 9 0.3 0 0 0.3 1.8
Q16 Meronymous Identity Insertion Context Catachrestic Contextual N.C Number of
Insertion Interpretations
S1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 2
S2 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 2
S3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
xxvii
S4 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
S5 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
S6 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 2
S7 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 2
S8 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
S9 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
S10 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
INCA 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
S/Avg 0 9 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 4 1.4
Q17
S1
Meronymous
0
Identity
0
Insertion Context 
Insertion
1
Catachrestic
0
Contextual
0 0
N.C Number of
interpretations
0 1
S2 0 0 2 0 0 0 2 4
S3 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
S4 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2
S5 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
S6 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2
S7 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 2
S8 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
S9 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
S10 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 3
INCA 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
S/Avg 0 0 1.3 0.1 0 1 0 0.3 1.8
Q18 R e m o ve d
Q19
S1
Meronymous Identity 
0
Insertion
0
Context
Insertion
0
Catachrestic
1
Contextual
0 0
N.C Number of
interpretations
0 1
S2 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 3
S3 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
S4 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
S5 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
S6 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2
S7 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 2
S8 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2
S9 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 2
S10 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 2
INCA 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
S/Avg 0 0 1.1 0 3 0 0 0.3 1.7
Q20 Meronymous Identity Insertion Context Catachrestic Contextual N.C Number of
Insertion interpretations
S1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
S2 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 3
S3 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
S4 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
S5 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
S6 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2
S7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
S8 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2
S9 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
S10 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 2
INCA 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 2
S/Avg 0 0 0.8 0 0.2 0 0.4 1.4
XXVlll
